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Resumo
O comércio de carbono, enquanto uma política climática de mercado que permite
aos poluidores cumprir com compromissos de redução de emissões recorrendo a direitos
de poluição transacionáveis, é apresentado pelos seus proponentes como a alternativa mais
eficiente para a mitigação das alterações climáticas, enquanto oponentes contrapõem que o
argumento  baseado  na  custo-eficiência  negligencia  os  prejuízos  que  resultam  da
mercantilização do carbono. Esta tese contribui para este debate, que é fundamental para o
futuro  das  políticas  ambientais,  expondo  os  custos  sociais  do  comércio  de  carbono  e
posicionando-se  contra  a  inclusão  do  comércio  de  carbono  no  leque  de  políticas
climáticas. A argumentação aqui desenvolvida é baseada nas contribuições teóricas sobre
os custos sociais de atividades privadas e conflitos de valores, assim como perspetivas
críticas sobre a neoliberalização da natureza e os limites do mercado.
O comércio de emissões foi  primeiramente proposto como uma alternativa às
taxas ambientais pigouvianas maximizadoras da eficiência. Baseado na perspetiva sobre
custos sociais assente em direitos de propriedade, o comércio de emissões permitiria ao
regulador  escapar  à  impossível  tarefa  de  calcular  um  nível  ótimo  de  poluição  e
providenciaria em alternativa uma forma custo-eficiente de atingir um nível de poluição
determinado exogenamente.  Esta  transição teórica permitiria  à Economia centrar-se na
discussão dos melhores meios par atingir fins dados e esquivar-se à discussão dos fins. A
dicotomia  fins-meios,  no  entanto,  não  se  aplica  fora  da  teoria  económica,  tal  como a
descrição do comércio de emissões como uma alternativa simples e eficiente à regulação
direta.  Como  a  experiência  dos  EUA com  o  comércio  de  emissões  demonstra,  criar
mercados  para  direitos  de  poluição transacionáveis  requer  investimento  governamental
num aparato regulatório que não é menos complexo do que é requerido pela regulação
direta ou pela taxação. Esta experiência também ilustra o quanto a alegada eficiência dos
mercados  de  emissões  é  resultado  do  seu  fraco  desempenho  ambiental  e  da  sua
desconsideração pela justiça social e pela participação democrática.
Os  mercados  de  carbono criados  ao  abrigo  do Protocolo  de  Quioto  suscitam
problemas adicionais. Comparados com os esquemas de “limitação e comércio” baseados
num único poluente e um número restrito de fontes, esquemas como o Sistema Europeu de
v
Comércio de Licenças  de Emissão são mais  complexos e requerem maior  intervenção
governamental. Para mais, instrumentos flexíveis como o Mecanismo de Desenvolvimento
Limpo  permitem  aos  países  industrializados  poluir  além  dos  seus  compromissos  de
emissões  e  suscitam preocupações  com a  integridade  disputável  de  metodologias  que
contabilizam reduções de emissões de projetos de compensação em relação a um cenário
de referência arbitrário. O fraco desempenho ambiental destes esquemas é ilustrado pela
sua  incapacidade  de  incentivar  a  descarbonização,  enquanto  distribuem  rendas  aos
poluidores e criam novas fontes de corrupção.
Estas  questões  não  são  redutíveis  a  discussões  sobre  procedimentos
contabilísticos  e  outras  tecnicalidades.  Abrindo  a  “caixa  negra”  da  quantificação  e
comensuração  do  carbono,  é  revelado  que  os  seus  cálculos  marginalizam  incertezas
relevantes e assumem um grau de precisão que o conhecimento científico e a tecnologia
não  podem  providenciar  no  presente.  No  entanto,  dado  que  contabilizar  aumentos  e
reduções de emissões requer decisões políticas sobre o que deve ser contabilizado, qual a
métrica  relevante  e  o  que  é  um  grau  de  incerteza  aceitável,  avanços  científicos  e
tecnológicos  não  são  condição  suficiente  para  que  seja  possível  produzir  os  números
inequívocos que o comércio de carbono requer.
Indo mais longe na discussão sobre as implicações da comensuração e abstração
de carbono, esta tese apresenta um argumento contra a inclusão do comércio de carbono
no leque de políticas climáticas, baseado em quatro críticas normativas. Com o apoio da
literatura  crítica,  é  defendido  que o  comércio  de  carbono  é  ineficaz,  antidemocrático,
injusto e antiético e que, por estas razões, só pode ser considerado como uma política
custo-eficiente  quando  os  seus  custos  sociais  são  ignorados.  Um argumento  contra  o
reformismo do comércio de carbono é então apresentado mostrando como tentar contrariar
os efeitos negativos dos mercados de carbono através de restrições ao comércio conduz à
erosão  destes  mercados.  Uma melhor  alternativa  é  o  apoio  a  políticas  climáticas  que
fomentam uma pluralidade de valores e providenciam benefícios sociais.
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A tese conclui defendendo uma mudança no debate sobre política climática no
sentido da discussão dos valores que são fomentados ou prejudicados por cada política.
Um enquadramento geral  é proposto que respeita o pluralismo de valores e reconhece
conflitos entre valores incomensuráveis, o que não é compatível com políticas de mercado.
Palavras  chave:  Comércio  de  carbono,  mercados  de  emissões,  créditos  de
carbono, política climática, Protocolo de Quioto
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Abstract
Carbon trading, as a market-based climate policy that allows polluters to comply
with emissions reductions commitments with tradable pollution rights, is presented by its
proponents  as  the  most  cost-efficient  alternative  for  climate  change  mitigation,  while
critics  counter  that  the  cost-efficiency  argument  ignores  the  harms  that  result  from
commodifying carbon. This thesis contributes to this debate, which is fundamental for the
future  of  environmental  policies,  by  exposing  the  social  costs  of  carbon  trading  and
making the case against its inclusion in the climate policy-mix. The argument developed
here draws from theoretical contributions on the social costs of private activities and on
value conflicts, as well as critical perspectives on the neoliberalization of nature and the
limits of the market.
Emissions trading was firstly proposed as an alternative to efficiency-maximizing
or  pigouvian  environmental  taxation.  Based  on  the  property  rights  approach  to  social
costs,  emissions  trading  would  allow  regulators  to  escape  the  impossible  task  of
calculating the optimal level of pollution and offer instead a cost-efficient way to achieve
an  exogenously  determined  level  of  pollution.  This  theoretical  shift  would  allow
economics to be centred on discussing the best means to achieve given ends and relived it
of discussing ends. The ends-means dichotomy, however, does not hold outside textbook
economics,  as  well  as  the  description  of  emissions  trading  as  a  simple  and  efficient
alternative  to  direct  regulation.  As  the  US  experience  with  emissions  trading  shows,
creating  markets  for  tradable  pollution  rights  requires  government  investment  in  a
regulatory apparatus that is no less complex than what is required for direct regulation or
taxation. This experience also illustrates how the purported efficiency of emissions trading
systems is a flip side of their weak environmental performance and their disregard for
social justice and democratic participation.
Carbon  trading  schemes  created  under  the  Kyoto  Protocol  raise  additional
problems.  Compared  to  “cap  and  trade”  schemes  based  on  a  single  pollutant  and  a
restricted number of sources, schemes like the EU Emissions Trading System are more
complex and require further government intervention. Furthermore, flexibility instruments
like the Clean Development Mechanism allow industrialized countries to pollute beyond
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their  emissions  commitments  and  raise  issues  with  the  disputable  integrity  of
methodologies that account for emissions reductions from offset projects relative to an
arbitrary baseline. The dismal performance of these schemes is illustrated by their inability
to  provide  an  incentive  to  decarbonization,  while  distributing  rents  to  polluters  and
creating new sources of corruption.
These issues are not reducible to discussions on accounting procedures and other
technicalities.  Opening  the  “black  box”  of  carbon  quantification  and  commensuration
reveals that its calculations sideline relevant uncertainties and assume a degree of accuracy
that  scientific  knowledge  and  technology  cannot  deliver  in  the  present.  Yet,  since
accounting for emissions increases or reductions requires political decisions on what is to
be  accounted  for,  what  is  the  relevant  metric  and  what  is  an  acceptable  degree  of
uncertainty, further scientific and technological developments are not enough to make it
possible to produce the unambiguous numbers that carbon trading requires.
Going further on the discussion of the implications of carbon commensuration
and abstraction, this thesis presents an argument against the inclusion of carbon trading in
the climate policy-mix based on four  normative  critiques.  With  the support  of  critical
literature, it is argued that carbon trading is ineffective, undemocratic, unjust and unethical
and that, for these reasons, it can only be considered as a cost-effective policy when its
social costs are ignored. An argument against carbon trading reformism is then presented
by illustrating how trying to mitigate the negative effects of carbon markets by imposing
restrictions on trading leads to the erosion of these markets. A better alternative is claimed
to  be  supporting  climate  policies  that  foster  a  plurality  of  values  and  deliver  social
benefits.
The thesis  concludes  by  advocating  a  shift  in  the  climate  policy  debate  to  a
discussion on the values that are fostered or hindered by each policy. A general framework
is  proposed  that  respects  value  pluralism  and  acknowledges  conflicts  between
incommensurable values, which is not compatible with market-based policies.
Keywords: Carbon trading, cap and trade, offsets, climate policy, Kyoto Protocol
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Introduction
1 Introduction
It is no exaggeration to present climate change as one of the most important, if
not  the  most  important,  crisis  humanity  faces.  According  to  the  scientific  evidence
compiled  by  the  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change,  global  warming  is
unequivocal. The result of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, mostly from
burning  fossil  fuels,  climate  change  is  a  broad  term  that  encompasses  changes  in
precipitation, temperature and occurrence of extreme weather events, like cyclones, floods
and heat waves, as well the sea level rise that follows diminishing snow and ice cover.
Climate change negatively impacts agricultural productivity, human health, biodiversity
and  freshwater  availability.  The  growing  intensity  and  frequency  of  extreme  weather
events and the sea level rise compromise the survival of a growing number of people,
affecting in particular those who cannot easily adapt due to poverty or discrimination and
those that live in the most vulnerable areas of the planet (namely low-lying islands) (IPCC
2014). In parallel,  the increasing uptake of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by oceans
leads  to  their  acidification,  which  negatively  impacts  shell-forming  marine  organisms,
including species of molluscs, corals and plankton (Doney et al., 2009).
Considering the dire and growing impacts of climate change, many of which will
be  irreversible  for  centuries,  substantial  and  sustained  reductions  in  greenhouse  gas
emissions are needed, as well as investment in adaptation measures that limit climate risks.
Avoiding global warming is  no longer possible but  it  is  feasible  to limit  it  to  a mean
temperature increase under 2oC and avoid some of the worst impacts of climate change.
Achieving  this  goal  requires  reducing  GHG emissions  by  40  to  70  percent  by  2050,
relative to 2010, targeting a long-run objective of zero emissions by 2100 (IPCC 2014).
Reducing CO2 emissions, in turn, requires reducing fossil fuel energy use in all productive
sectors,  including  transportation,  as  well  as  reducing  deforestation  and  agricultural
practices  that  compromise  land-based carbon  sinks.  Simultaneously, it  is  necessary  to
reduce emissions from other GHGs, namely methane (CH4) emissions from landfills and
livestock, nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions from agriculture and other trace gas emissions
1
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from specific industrial processes.
The relevance of the climate crisis stems not only from the impacts of climate
change but also from the major challenge that reducing GHG emissions represents,  in
particular  considering  that  industrial  societies  are  highly  fossil  fuel  dependent  and,
therefore,  that  the  production  of  goods  and  services  inevitably  leads  to  increased
emissions. Overcoming fossil fuel dependence implies major changes in production and
consumption, which are not reducible to technological innovations. Considering that these
changes conflict with fossil fuel corporations' profitability, it is to be expected that these
corporations form lobbying coalitions, to prevent climate action altogether or to condition
it to their interests. Such coalitions can benefit from greater political clout compared to
communities and social movements that advocate for leaving fossil fuels underground, in
particular considering that those who are most affected by climate change are also among
the  poorest  and  most  vulnerable  and,  therefore,  among  the  most  politically
disenfranchised.
It is in this context that carbon trading emerged and became the main climate
policy  in  industrialized  countries.  Carbon  trading  allows  polluters,  defined  as  firms,
countries or even individuals, to replace reducing emissions for paying others to reduce
their emissions. This is achieved by “cap and trade” and “baseline and credit” schemes. In
the former case, the government distributes tradable pollution allowances according to a
pre-determined emissions cap, relieving the regulator of the task of determining emissions
limits for each polluter while burdening the regulator with new tasks related to carbon
markets creation and regulation. In the latter case, polluters can increase their emissions by
buying  credits  from offset  projects  that  reduce  emissions  beyond  a  business  as  usual
baseline.  The  Kyoto  Protocol,  as  the  international  treaty  that  determines  how climate
change should be addressed, incorporates both types of schemes, allowing industrialized
countries  with  emissions  commitments  to  trade  carbon allowances  and to  buy carbon
credits generated in other countries, including countries without emissions commitments.
After more than a decade of Kyoto's carbon trading, the market-based climate
policy has been touted by many as a cost-efficient alternative to other forms of regulation,
2
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while others point out at the rising GHG emissions and the many problems created by
carbon  trading  as  evidence  supporting  the  case  for  its  abandonment.  This  debate  is
fundamental not only for its implications to climate policy but also for its intersections
with  debates  on  other  market-based environmental  policies,  namely  renewable  energy
credits (Berry, 2002), energy efficiency credits (known as white certificates) (Giraudet et
al., 2012), and markets in ecosystem services, namely in biodiversity offsets and water
quality (Robertson, 2007; Walker et al., 2009). The present thesis aims to contribute to this
debate by presenting a radical critique of carbon trading, which supports arguments for not
including  it  on  the  climate  policy-mix.  The  argument  developed  here  draws  from
theoretical contributions on the social costs of private activities and on value conflicts, as
well as critical perspectives on the neoliberalization of nature and the limits of the market.
To this end, a review of emissions trading theory will be presented, which shows
how it  was based mostly on a shift  in  economic theory away from taxation aimed at
achieving  an  estimated  optimal  pollution  level  to  property  rights  arrangements  that
minimize  the  cost  of  achieving  an  exogenously  determined  pollution  level.  This  is
followed by a review of emissions trading practice, starting with the early experiences in
the US and proceeding with international carbon trading, which is  contrasted with the
theory to illustrate how the move from “blackboard economics” to “real world economics”
is  far  from  trivial.  An  analysis  of  the  commensuration  processes  that  establish
equivalences across carbon emissions is then presented to expose the divergence between
the accuracy and accountability in measurement activities that carbon trading demands and
what science and technology can provide. Finally, a normative critique of carbon trading is
developed, based on the social values that carbon markets disregard, and it is explained
why this critique cannot be reduced to debates on market reforms.
In  the  first  chapter,  the  intellectual  roots  of  emissions  trading  are  reviewed
through the lens of the Coasean critique of the Pigouvian approach to social costs. The
Pigouvian approach conceptualizes social costs as externalities, that is, external effects of
productive  activities  for  which  no  market  price  exists.  It  follows  from this  approach,
applied to environmental problems, that externalities can be corrected through the taxation
3
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of pollution, which would bring it to its optimal level and thus maximize efficiency. The
Coasean critique points out that, while pollution causes harm, the taxation of productive
activities also does, and that the question that should be raised a priori is whether or not
any intervention in the market is warranted. Underlining the role of property rights and
transaction costs, the Coasean approach to social costs was one important stepping stone
towards  devising  environmental  policies  based  on  tradable  pollution  rights.  The  first
proposals for emissions trading in air and water pollutants could, then, be presented as a
cost-effective  alternative  to  direct  regulation  and  taxation,  given  that  decisions  on
pollution  distribution  and  pricing  would  be  transferred  from governments  to  markets.
Furthermore, emissions trading was purportedly simpler and more flexible than previous
regulatory policies.
In the second chapter, empirical evidence on the performance of early emissions
trading schemes is given. Before the Kyoto Protocol was signed, both emissions trading
theory and practice was entirely US-based, so this chapter focuses on the US experience
with emissions trading. The first attempts to introduce some flexibility in compliance with
pollution limits are analysed, showing how nascent emissions trading schemes presented
regulators with new problems and challenges. The chapter then proceeds to an empirical
review of the Acid Rain Program, the first emissions trading scheme in the world, and of
two regional emissions trading programs, the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market and
the NOx Budget trading. After presenting data on their environmental performance and the
history of their evolution, this review of emissions trading in the US finalizes with some
lessons for environmental policy.
In the third chapter, the history and performance of Kyoto's  carbon trading is
reviewed. After presenting a history of how carbon trading was introduced in international
climate negotiations  and how it  evolved,  the chapter  proceeds to  present  an empirical
review of the two main carbon markets created following Kyoto: the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) and the  EU Emissions  Trading System (ETS).  The former  allows
industrialized countries to buy carbon credits generated from offset projects  located in
developing countries, which are supposed to be additional relative to business as usual and
4
Introduction
contribute towards sustainable development. The latter allows large polluters in the EU to
trade emissions allowances, which have been mostly given away for free, as well as buy
carbon credits from the CDM. Both markets were created following the successful efforts
by some major polluters to prevent the implementation of new regulations or taxes and,
unsurprisingly,  have  led  to  polluters  being  subsidized,  instead  of  penalized,  for  their
pollution,  as  well  as  created  loopholes  for  polluters  to  evade  emissions  reductions
commitments.
In the fourth chapter, the “black box” of carbon commensuration is opened and
analysed,  to  highlight  the  kind  of  abstractions  and  calculations  needed  to  create
equivalences  across  different  carbon  emissions  and  inquire  into  the  accuracy  and
accountability of the calculations. As with all emissions trading systems, a carbon trading
system  requires  that  carbon  emissions  can  be  measured  accurately,  to  prevent  that
polluters, traders and other market actors can profit from measurement errors, as well as
reduce  ambiguities  in  evaluating  compliance.  The  accuracy  of  carbon  emission
measurements  is  evaluated  in  this  chapter  by  presenting  an  empirical  review  of
measurement uncertainties, issues with the use of Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) to
convert  different  GHGs  into  a  common  metric,  the  role  of  co-pollutants  and  the
uncertainties,  inaccuracies  and  indeterminacies  inherent  to  the  inclusion  of  land-use
emissions in carbon inventories. The review shows how carbon trading requires the use of
complex  calculations,  which  hide  inherent  uncertainties  that  reflect  not  only  lack  of
scientific  knowledge  but  also  the  impossibility  of  predicting  social  futures  and  are
supported by unjustified political assumptions.
In the sixth chapter, a critique of carbon trading is  presented.  This critique is
based on a taxonomy of  normative critiques constructed from the critical  literature.  It
upholds that carbon trading is  ineffective, since it does not promote the kind of changes
needed to decarbonize production,  unjust,  since it  aggravates existing intragenerational
and  intergenerational  inequities,  undemocratic,  since  it  transfers  the  power  to  make
decisions on carbon emissions reductions and the accountability of climate policy over to
polluters  and  other  carbon  market  actors,  and  unethical,  since  it  turns  polluting  the
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common environment from a wrong into a  right.  Proceeding into  a  discussion  on the
possibilities of addressing these critiques through changes in carbon markets design, the
prospects  of  finding  an  idealized  carbon  trading  system are  contrasted  both  with  the
impossibility  of  addressing  some critiques  through reforms  and  the  trade-off  between
carbon trading's cost-efficiency and the restrictions to trading that are inherent to design
changes.
The  thesis  concludes  by  arguing  that  carbon  trading  has  failed  in  all  of  its
purported objectives, while being successful at blocking the necessary transition to a low-
carbon development path. These considerations, along with the incompatibility between
carbon trading and other  climate policies  and its  social  costs,  justify  dropping carbon
trading from the policy-mix. Further considering that climate policy decisions are just as
much about what alternatives are chosen as they are about what alternatives are on the
menu, the question that climate policy theory has to answer is what policies are worthy of
being pursued and what policies are not. The critique of carbon trading presented here can,
then, be used as a basis for a new policy framework that respects value pluralism, instead
of taking efficiency as the overriding societal goal to which all others must cede.
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2 The intellectual roots of emissions trading: Revisiting the
Coase vs. Pigou debate on social costs
“Unless I am very much mistaken, markets can be used to implement any anti-
pollution policy that you or I can dream up. The only real question is how much you or I
are willing to pay in order to reduce pollution” (Dales, 1968b: 100)
The adoption of  emissions  trading as a  means of  compliance with the Kyoto
Protocol and the growing pressure to create new markets in environmental services based
on carbon markets shows how an idea that was somehow esoteric in the 1960s became
very  popular  in  the  political  arena.  Trading rights  to  pollute,  as  proposed by Crocker
(1966) and Dales (1968) not only is on the menu of instruments to address the social costs
of  production  but  is  further  the  preferred  instrument  of  many economists  and policy-
makers.
Emissions trading theory questioned the Environmental Economics tradition of
framing pollution as an externality, a market  failure that  can be corrected through the
efficient taxation of pollution. This tradition of understanding social costs as a case of
missing  prices  drew  its  inspiration  from  Pigou  (1932),  who  argued  for  government
intervention to increase social welfare and opposed the laissez faire ideals of free-market
libertarianism. Against such elegant solution for the problem of social cost, Coase (1960)
famously argued that its efficiency claims are unwarranted, and proposed instead a cost-
benefit analysis of different institutions to deal with social costs.
The Coasean critique of Pigou's Welfare Economics became the cornerstone of
social cost theories that emphasized the role of property rights and/or supported an anti-
regulatory agenda. Even if some of these theories are based on a somewhat misguided
reading of both Coase and Pigou, this does not diminish the relevance of the Coasean
critique to debates on instrument choice for environmental policy.
This chapter reconstructs the intellectual history of emissions trading using the
Coasean  critique  as  a  starting  point.  Alternative  critiques,  such  as  Kapp's  (1978)
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institutional analysis of social costs as pervasive unpaid costs of production that are borne
by  the  population,  will  not  be  addressed  here.  While  such  theories  had  their  role  in
fostering  critical  perspectives  on  social  costs,  namely  in  the  Ecological  Economics
tradition, their contribution to emissions trading theory is negligible.
We  begin  by  presenting  Pigou's  approach  to  social  costs,  based  on  his
contribution  to  Welfare  Economics,  which  is  contrasted  with  the  modern  theory  of
externalities  and  the  Environmental  Economics  concept  of  Pigouvian  taxes.  We then
proceed to present Coase's approach to social costs and the inherent critique of Pigouvian
taxes.  The Coasean critique is  itself  critiqued,  by arguing that  it  cannot  be applied to
Pigou's  Welfare  Economics.  The Coase Theorem and its  use to  defend a deregulatory
agenda by the Coaseans is also subjected to critical analysis. We follow by presenting the
early contributions to the theory of emissions trading and tracing their intellectual sources,
exposing the importance of the Coasean critique. The chapter concludes by illustrating the
connections between the Coasean and Pigouvian views on property rights and pollution
and the first proposals for a market for pollution rights.
2.1 The  Pigouvian  approach  to  social  costs:  A case  of  missing
prices
             Pigou's Welfare Economics
We can trace the origin of the concept of externalities to Alfred Marshall (1890).
In  his  Principles  of  Political  Economy,  the  Cambridge  University  professor  discusses
gains from spatial concentration of firms in industrial districts that market prices fail to
capture. In particular, technological spillovers, due to imitation by competitors, undermine
the a firm's capacity to fully appropriate the gains from its innovation efforts. As a result,
firms will  have a sub-optimal  level  of innovation and the market equilibrium will  not
maximize economic efficiency.
Marshall's  successor  as  chair  of  Political  Economy  at  Cambridge  University,
Arthur Pigou, extended the analysis of external effects of production to consider different
sources of divergence between social and private marginal costs.  Pigou's (1932 [1920])
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The Economics of Welfare became the basis for the analysis of external costs and benefits
of production not reflected on market prices, or, to use the modern term, externalities.1
Pigou starts  by  defining  an  indicator  which  he called  the  National  Dividend,
which  roughly  translates  to  the  Gross  National  Product  in  the  current  terminology,
calculated as the flow of goods and services produced or consumed in a country. The
National  Dividend is  an indicator  of economic welfare or  wealth,  i.e.,  the measurable
dimension (in monetary terms) of social welfare. Even though an increase in economic
welfare should lead to an increase in overall welfare, Pigou mentions two exceptions to
this rule.
The first is the decrease of non-measurable dimensions of welfare, in spite of an
increase in wealth. Since it isn't possible to draw a boundary between the measurable and
non-measurable dimensions of welfare, Pigou assumed that the two should be correlated.
In some exceptional cases, however, he admitted that this might not happen, as it is the
case when workers are coerced to work more than they wish to, and the dissatisfaction
brought  about  by  an  increase  in  work  done  exceeds  the  satisfaction  provided  by  the
consumption of its product.
The second exception stems from equity concerns. If an increase in the size of the
National Dividend is achieved at the expense of a decrease in the share of the divided
distributed to the poor, welfare will not increase. On the one hand, there is an inverse
relationship  between  income  and  share  of  income  dedicated  to  consumption.  Since
economic welfare depends on income consumed and not income earned, and since poor
people spend relatively more than rich people, the law of diminishing utility leads to the
conclusion  that  economic  welfare  will,  in  general,  increase  if  the  share  of  income
distributed to the poor increases and the National Dividend does not decrease. On the other
hand, even though relative income contributes more to rich people's welfare than absolute
income, as being richer is more important than being rich, welfare will not diminish when
the share of income earned by the poor increases. This is because the decrease in welfare
borne  by  the  rich  when  the  distribution  of  income  becomes  more  egalitarian  is
substantially inferior to the increase in welfare accrued by the poor from the increase in
1 This book expands and builds upon Pigou's first major book, Wealth and Welfare (Pigou 1912).
9
The intellectual roots of emissions trading: Revisiting the Coase vs. Pigou debate on social costs
consumption.
Pigou then proceeds to expand on the Marshallian theory to explain how self-
interest  will  not  maximize  welfare,  measured  by  the  National  Dividend.  The  implicit
distinction  between  wealth  and  welfare  followed  the  moral  philosophy  of  another
Cambridge professor, Henry Sidgwick (1887), whose utilitarianism opened the way for a
critique of laissez faire by allowing for a sub-optimal equilibrium to emerge from the sum
of optimizing individual actions (Backhouse 2006). To this endeavour, Pigou distinguishes
between the marginal social and private net products. While the former is “the total net
product of physical things or objective services due to the marginal increment of resources
in any given use or place, no matter to whom any part of this product may accrue,” the
latter only accounts for the net product accruing to the individual firm or person (Pigou,
1932: 132).
Pigou considered that, while the marginal private product, net of costs of resource
reallocation,  will  tend to be equalized across different investments by self-interest,  the
marginal social product will tend to differ from the marginal private product, preventing
the maximization of the National Dividend. In particular, the existence of social costs of
production leads to a divergence between social and private products:
Here the essence of the matter is that one person A, in the course of rendering some service,
for  which  payment  is  made,  to  a  second  person  B,  incidentally  also  renders  services  or
disservices to other persons (not producers of like services), of such a sort that payment cannot
be  exacted  from the  benefited  parties  or  compensation  enforced  on  behalf  of  the  injured
parties. (ibid.: 183)
Pigou  mentions,  following  Marshall,  scientific  research  as  one  example  of  a
situation where the marginal private product is inferior to the marginal social product and
adds other  examples,  like the  creation of  public  parks  or  the  installation  of  lamps on
houses that illuminate the streets. As for examples of situations where the marginal private
product is superior to the marginal social product, Pigou mentions the construction of a
polluting factory in a residential zone, the use of automobiles (which wear out roads) and
women work in the perinatal period (which negatively affects babies' health).
Since  self-interest  alone  cannot  maximize  the  national  dividend,  Pigou (ibid.:
192)  concludes  that  divergences  between  private  and  social  products  often  call  for
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“extraordinary encouragements” or “extraordinary restraints”, the most obvious forms of
which are “bounties and taxes”. But direct regulation, in the form of prohibitions, is also
considered when the excess of private over social product is large enough.
In the  case  of  women's  work during “the  periods  immediately  preceding and
succeeding” childbirth, Pigou (1932: 190) considers that the serious harm to the health of
their children is motive enough to advocate the prohibition of such work. Since poverty is
the cause for women's work in the perinatal period, and since the harm caused by extra
poverty can be superior to the harm caused by such work, Pigou then concludes that this
prohibition must be accompanied by a relief to the families that become impoverished by
it.
The pervasive character of social costs and other market failures led Pigou to
advocate for state intervention to increase the national dividend:
In any industry, where there is reason to believe that the free play of self-interest will cause an
amount  of  resources  to  be invested different  from the amount that  is  required in  the best
interest of the national dividend, there is a prima facie case for public intervention. (ibid.: 331)
The case for intervention, however, could not be more than a prima facie one, since it is
necessary to consider the possibility of government failure:
It is not sufficient to contrast the imperfect adjustments of unfettered private enterprise with
the best adjustment that economists in their studies can imagine. For we cannot expect that any
public authority will attain, or will even whole-heartedly seek, that ideal. Such authorities are
liable alike to ignorance, to sectional pressure and to personal corruption by private interest. A
loud-voiced part of their constituents, if organised for votes, may easily outweigh the whole.
(ibid.: 236)
We can  find  in  this  analysis  an  important  inconsistency  in  Pigou's  welfare
economics. Even though Pigou distinguishes wealth from welfare, his analysis of social
costs  implicitly  dismisses  this  distinction  and  focuses  on  maximizing  the  value  of
production.  This  focus  on  efficiency  and  disregard  for  equity  and  non-measurable
elements of welfare later became the norm in the economic orthodoxy.
             Pigouvian taxation and externalities
Within the framework of Environmental Economics (EE), which developed in the
1960s,  Pigou's  analysis  was  subsumed  under  the  concept  of  Pigouvian  taxes,  which
rearrange market equilibria to internalize the cost of externalities (e.g. Cropper and Oates,
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1992;  Pearce,  2002;  see  also  Aslanbeigui  and  Medema,  1998).  In  the  neo-classical
mathematical models, this implies that pollution and production levels must be adjusted to
reach  their  optimum,  which  corresponds  to  the  point  where  the  marginal  benefit  of
production is equal to the marginal cost of pollution. 
This  formalization  of  eco-taxes  exposed  EE  to  criticisms  regarding  the
practicability of its prescription for maximizing efficiency. 
The difficulties were identified early on by Mishan (1967), which noted that the
quantification of externalities, if possible, is a complex task given the data dispersion and
the non-separability of externalities that emerge from complementary economic activities.
Consequently, it might be impossible or, at least, very difficult, to estimate the optimal
level of pollution, assuming that such a level exists.
A possible solution for this problem was presented by Baumol and Oates (1971),
who proposed that environmental  taxes be set at  a level  consistent with a pre-defined
standard for an acceptable environment, though a trial-and-error process. This standard-
and-taxes approach restricts the role of economics to finding the least-cost instrument to
achieve an acceptable level of pollution. While not maximizing efficiency, the solution
purportedly  avoids  the  problems  with  information  gathering  and  quantification  that
permeate Pigouvian taxes. Still, an alternative based on an iterative process is arguably as
impracticable as the efficiency-maximizing tax, considering the high bureaucratic costs
and the time it takes to change a tax rate, not to speak of the uncertainty associated with
entrepreneurial projects.
The impracticability of Pigouvian taxes is a consequence of EE failing to follow
Pigou's welfare economics to concentrate on maximizing welfare and not efficiency. While
Pigou also failed to follow this maxim in his analysis of social costs, EE's Pigouvian taxes
went further and not only ignored the role of equity and non-measurable dimensions of
welfare but also the possibility of government failure.  The Pigouvian tax is, therefore,
more than a prima facie case for intervention.
Another  difficulty  of  Pigouvian  taxes  is  that  its  defence  relies  on  framing
pollution as a textbook example of a negative externality. It is possible, however, to turn
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this  argument  upside  down,  by  framing  pollution  prevention  as  an  example  of  an
investment with positive externalities. In fact, following Pigou's analysis of the prevention
of  smoke  from  factory  chimneys  (Pigou,  1932:  139),  investing  resources  in  smoke
prevention renders services to the population for which it is difficult to exact payment,
which implies that the affected population should compensate the polluter for the costs
incurred in reducing its emissions. Regarding the important choice to make on who is to
pay the cost of reducing pollution, EE's preference for taxes indicates a political agenda
covered  by  efficiency  arguments,  an  agenda  that  had  already  been  contested  by  the
Coasean approach to social costs.
2.2 The  Coasean  approach  to  social  costs:  A case  of  missing
property rights
             Coase's comparative institutional analysis
The main challenge to  the Pigouvian approach to  social  costs  came from the
Chicago School economist and co-founder of the Law and Economics field Ronald Coase
(1960), with a contribution that can be seen as the basis of the property rights approach to
social costs of production.
Coase starts by exposing the object of his paper as “those actions of business
firms which have harmful effects on others” (ibid.: 1). His starting point for a critique of
the Pigouvian approach to the external effects of production is the reciprocal nature of
social costs:
The traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that has to be made.
The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what has to be
decided is: how should we restrain A? But this is wrong. We are dealing with a problem of a
reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A. The real question that has
to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A? The
problem is to avoid the more serious harm. (ibid.: 2)
The  question  of  who  is  to  be  allowed  to  harm  who  is  to  be  answered  by
comparative institutional design, by which different arrangements of property rights are
ranked according to the total social product (ibid.: 34). Using a classical example of social
costs of production, Coase argued that if a factory emits smoke that harms people who live
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nearby, the most important question, which must be answered by the law, is whether the
factory has the right to pollute or the people affected by the smoke have the right to live in
a smoke-free area. In the former case, the people affected by the smoke must either live
with the smoke or bribe the firm that owns the factory to reduce its emissions, in the latter
case the firm must either reduce its emissions or bribe the people affected by the smoke to
compensate them for the harm caused. 
According  to  Coase,  “the  ultimate  result  (which  maximises  the  value  of
production) is independent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work
without cost.” (Coase, 1960: 8). This is a point that was already present in his analysis of
the allocation of broadcasting rights (Coase, 1959: 27). The Coase Theorem, as it later on
became known,  states  thus  that,  assuming  that  transaction  costs  are  zero,  as  standard
neoclassical theory does, any property rights arrangement will lead, through bargains, to
the  maximization  of  the  value  of  production.  But  Coase  noted  that  this  is  a  highly
unrealistic assumption:
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes
to  deal  with,  to  inform  people  that  one  wishes  to  deal  and  on  what  terms,  to  conduct
negotiations leading up to  a bargain,  to  draw up the contract,  to  undertake the inspection
needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on.  (Coase,
1960: 15).
In  the  real  world,  where  such  transaction  costs  exist  and  are  non-negligible,
Coase outlined four possible alternative solutions for the problem of social cost: property
rights transactions between affected parties, integration of the relevant parties in a firm,
regulation and doing nothing.
The first solution, bargaining, occurs whenever transaction costs are lower than
the increase in social production that results from the negotiation between the affected
parties, taking into account the pre-existing property rights arrangement. As Coase noted, a
tax on the firm that causes harm on others is equivalent to a bargaining solution where the
property  rights  are  awarded  to  the  victims,  whenever  the  tax  revenue  is  used  to
compensate victims. Conversely, we might add that a Coasean bargain is equivalent to a
subsidy given to the firm to reduce the harm done whenever the cost of the subsidy is
supported by the victims.
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The second solution, creating or expanding a firm, applies in the special case
when a productive activity causes harm in another productive activity. Coase here follows
his theory of the firm (Coase, 1937), which states that a firm is an alternative to the market
for the organization of production and the choice between market transactions and intra-
firm transactions depends on their  relative costs. The concentration of the activity that
causes harm and the activity that is harmed in one firm, therefore, is a viable solution
whenever  the  firm's  administrative  costs  are  inferior  to  the  transaction  costs  from
bargaining.
The third solution, regulation, is relegated to cases where transaction costs are
high, namely because the number of parties involved is high. But even in this case it is
necessary to take into account how the government acts. If the costs of government action
are  higher  than  transaction  costs  and/or  if  the  government  fails  to  act  in  a  way  that
maximizes the value of production, the fourth solution, doing nothing, is preferable.
Coase concludes, then, with the defence of a comparative institutional analysis
approach, by which the status quo is compared to the effects of a proposed policy change,
taking the value of production as the metric to compare the two, in order to decide whether
or not to approve the said policy: “In devising and choosing between social arrangements
we should have regard for the total effect. This, above all, is the change in approach which
I am advocating.” (Coase, 1960: 44).
Taking into account that in many real world situations, transaction costs are high,
the  Coasean  approach  often  leaves  us  with  the  choice  between  regulation  (which,
presumably, includes taxation) and doing nothing. Further taking into account the high
costs of gathering all the relevant information and the possibility of government failure,
the  cost-benefit  approach  to  regulation  defended  by  Coase  can  be  used  to  support
arguments against regulation.
             Critiquing the Coasean critique
The  Coasean  critique  can  be  used  to  expose  an  internal  inconsistency  of
neoclassical solutions for externalities. In a zero transaction cost world, Coase argued, an
efficiency-maximizing solution to the problem of social cost, which arises from the harm
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caused on others by business firms through their productive activities, can be achieved
through bargains involving the affected parties. This means that the case for intervention
made by neoclassical economists, namely those in EE, is unwarranted, since they already
assume the inexistence of transaction costs.
The  critique  does  not  extend  easily  into  Pigou's  welfare  economics,  though,
which is what Coase was targeting. There is nothing in Pigou's work that indicates that he
was  assuming  a  zero  transaction  cost  world.  On  the  contrary,  Pigou  analysed  how
obstacles to movement of resources, information asymmetries and other transaction costs
prevent the equalization of rates of return across different investments that should emerge
from self-interest.
Another important aspect in which Pigou's welfare economics diverges from the
target of Coase's critique is in the variable that is to be maximized. For Pigou, the priority
was to maximize welfare, which combined efficiency, equity and ethical considerations.
Even if Pigou incoherently deviated from this norm in his analysis of social costs, focusing
merely on maximizing the value of production, his welfare economics was still grounded
on moral considerations that were lost with in Coase's representation.
Taking the maximization of welfare, instead of the value of production, as the
social  objective,  Coase's  reciprocity  argument  does  not  hold.  A  policy  change  that
increases the value of production while decreasing the share of this value that accrues to
the poor would not pass Pigou's welfare maximization criterion. The same can be said of a
policy that allows those responsible for significantly harmful behaviour to buy the right to
cause harm, as the example of women labor given in the previous section shows. It is
possible, therefore, to use Pigou's approach to social costs to argue against redistributing
income from the victims of pollution to the polluter or to frame the right to cause harm as
a factor of production.
The reciprocity argument is complemented by what became known as the Coase
Theorem.  This  theorem  was  never  formulated  explicitly  by  Coase,  but  rather  by  his
colleague George Stigler as  “under perfect competition, private and social costs will be
equal” (Stigler, 1966: 113). A more descriptive formulation was given by Calabresi: “if
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one assumes rationality, no transaction costs, and no legal impediments to bargaining, all
misallocations of resources would be fully cured in the market by bargains” (Calabresi,
1968, p. 68).
Many free-market economists used the theorem to support a general case against
regulation  and,  occasionally, for  market  solutions  to  the  problem of  social  costs  (e.g.
Demsetz 1972, Buchanan 1973, Anderson and Leal 2001). The anti-regulation argument,
however, is unwarranted,  since the theorem can only be seen as a rhetorical device to
mobilize against neoclassical economics and expose the importance of transaction costs,
as Coase explained in Nobel Prize in Economics acceptance speech:
I  tend to regard the Coase Theorem as  a stepping stone on the way to an analysis of an
economy with positive transaction costs. The significance to me of the Coase Theorem is that
it undermines the pigouvian system. Since standard economic theory assumes transaction costs
to be zero, the Coase Theorem demonstrates that the pigouvian solutions are unnecessary in
these circumstances. [...] My conclusion; let us study the world of positive transaction costs.
(Coase, 1992: 117)
Using  the  Coase  Theorem  as  a  basis  for  a  theory  of  deregulation  exposed
Coasean approaches of social costs to critiques of the theorem, which question its validity.
Apart from critiques to the assumption of utility maximizing behaviour by individuals, the
theorem has been criticized extensively for disregarding obstacles to efficient trading in
property rights.
One such obstacle was pointed out by Mishan (1967: 91-94), when discussing
“external  diseconomies”  and  property  rights.  Following  Mishan,  efficiency  can  be
maximized either by having a polluting factory compensate the affected people or having
the inhabitants bribe the firm to reduce its output or install pollution control equipment. In
this situation, it is possible to estimate the optimum product using market prices by, for
instance, calculating the costs of cleaning clothes and houses borne by the affected people.
But Mishan also considers situations in which market prices cannot be used to
value the harm caused. In such situations, the efficient solution that emerges from a barter
in property rights among the involved parties will be determined by their relative wealth.
Concretely, the probability that the outcome of the barter will be the desired outcome of
one party is positively correlated with its or her wealth. The distribution of property rights
that follows from the assignment of liability is no longer irrelevant, contrary to what was
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postulated in the Coase Theorem, since it affects wealth distribution and, therefore, the
value of production.
A practical consequence of wealth and income effects in the presence of social
costs is that people will give different answers to the questions “how much are you willing
to pay to  avoid harm?” and “how much are you willing to accept to tolerate harm?”.
Another  reason for  this  divergence lies  on the endowment effect,  described by  Thaler
(1980) as what happens when people assign a greater value to a good when they own it.
The endowment effect leads economic agents to pay more to avoid the loss of something
they own than to obtain something they don't own. Kahneman et al. (1990) argue, based
on  experimental  results,  that  this  effect  invalidates  the  Coase  Theorem,  even  when
transaction  costs  and income effects  are  absent,  since  the  allocation  of  resources  will
depend on the distribution of property rights.
A second  obstacle  to  efficient  trading  in  property  rights  is  the  existence  of
strategic behaviour. Bribes and charges are asymmetric, as the former leads to a higher
output in the long run, due to strategic behaviour by firms to secure a larger bribe and to
the entry of new firms in the industry (Bramhall and Mills, 1966; Kamien et al., 1966).
When dealing with the social costs of pollution, therefore, distributing property rights to
emitters or receptors has different effects on the long run optimal output.
Another way of looking at the problem of strategic behaviour is by thinking of
transactions in property rights not as market transactions but rather as bilateral bargains.
Applying this perspective, Farrel (1987) noted that these Coasean bargains will only be
efficient when all parties involved have complete information. In real world situations,
where this assumption does not hold, parties face an incentive to misrepresent their costs
and secure a larger gain from the negotiations.
Hahnel  and  Sheeran  (2009)  argue  that  this  problem is  even  worse  when  the
number of parties involved is large, as is the case of pollution. In these cases, separate
negotiations with individual victims will be inefficient, regardless of liability attribution. If
the polluter is liable for the damage, an individual victim has an incentive to hold out, by
demanding  a  compensation  higher  than  the  costs  borne  and  threatening  to  veto  the
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negotiations if her conditions are not met. If the victims are liable, an individual victim has
an incentive to free ride, by not participating in the negotiations, in the expectation that
others will pay the bribe the polluter is demanding. The creation of a coalition of victims
becomes necessary, but it does not eliminate strategic behaviour, as it is still necessary to
know who are the victims and what is the extension of damage borne by each victim, and
victims have an incentive to lie on both of these questions.
A third obstacle to efficient trading in property rights is rent-seeking behaviour.
Jung et al. (1995) noted that the distribution of property rights is a zero-sum game, with
effects on wealth and income distribution. This creates an incentive for rent-seeking, prior
to the trading of property rights, to affect the property rights distribution. Since allocating
resources  to  rent-seeking is  inefficient,  even in  the zero transaction cost  world of  the
Coase Theorem efficiency will not be maximized.
These obstacles to efficient trading translate into arguments on the invalidity of
the Coase  Theorem.  It  still  might  be objected,  though,  that  these obstacles  amount  in
practice  to  transaction  costs.  As  Wohar  (1988)  noted,  different  versions  of  the  Coase
Theorem arise partly from different concepts of transaction costs. In fact,  Coase never
defined precisely what counts and what does not count as a transaction cost, not excluding
income  effects,  the  prevention  of  strategic  or  rent-seeking  behaviour,  as  well  as
information costs and other impediments to an efficient trading in property rights from the
definition.  This,  however, leaves  us with a dilemma,  as the theorem is only correct  if
transaction costs are defined broadly as “anything that might prevent the achievement of a
Pareto solution” (Swan, 1975: 70). In other words, either the theorem is inconsistent or it
is a tautology.
Despite its theoretical shortcomings, Coase's contribution to the analysis of social
costs  sparked an  interest  in  solutions  to  the  problem of  social  cost  based  on tradable
property rights. A market of permits to pollute emerged, then, as a possible solution both
to implement such rights and to minimize transaction costs.
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2.3 Emissions trading as an alternative to environmental taxation
             Early proposals for tradable pollution rights
In the 1960s, when the field of EE was in its infancy, Coase's critique of Pigou
was largely either ignored or considered irrelevant by the first environmental economists,
which viewed pollution as a market failure, to be corrected through taxation (e.g. Kneese,
1962). One exception was Tom Crocker, a PhD candidate at the University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee,  who,  following a  grant  from the  U.S.  Public  Health  Service  to  study the
economics  of  air  pollution,  proposed pricing pollution  through a  market  on emissions
rights.
In his contribution to a symposium on the economics of air pollution, held in
Washington  D.C.,  Crocker  (1966)  frames  pollution  as  a  market  failure.  The  problem,
according to Crocker, is that the polluter pays nothing for using the air to dispose its waste,
while  the  receptors  of  pollution  pay  nothing  for  their  use  of  the  life  and  property-
supporting  capacity  of  the  air.  It  follows,  then,  that  the  objective  of  an  atmospheric
pollution control program should be to narrow the difference between the cost savings that
accrue to emitters from not having to reduce their emissions and the damage costs that
accrue to receptors from the pollution. This can be achieved through a market on rights to
use the air:
[…] a market pricing system which defines emissions rights, open to emitters and receptors on
a  periodic  competitive  basis  can  drastically  increase  the  likelihood  of  achieving  optimal
intertemporal and interspatial allocation of the air's two value dimensions. The informational
requirements to achieve the optimum will be minimal, as the regulator will not have to know
the emitter and receptor preference functions. (Crocker, 1966: 81)
While the maximization of two value dimensions in time and space is a manifest
impossibility, the approach purportedly reduces the information gathering requirements for
the regulator, relative to the optimal taxation of pollution. What is needed for this market
to work is an institutional design that defines property rights over the air and makes it
possible for polluters and receptors to trade these rights. Receptors have to be organized in
groups, in order to prevent the free rider problem, as some receptors can choose not to pay
for clean air and expect other receptors to pay. How such a market would work in practice
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was, however, a question left unanswered by the author.
A more elaborated argument for emissions trading was made by John H. Dales,
an economist from the University of Toronto, though not an environmental economist. In
his book on pollution and property rights, Dales (1968b) criticized the EE tradition of
presenting  “simple  solutions  for  simple  problems,”  arguing  that  the  measurements
necessary to find optimal levels of pollution by comparing costs and benefits are to be
distrusted. Actual problems, he stated, are characterized by a lack of information, because
some data  is  difficult  to  obtain  (namely  data  on  emission  control  costs)  and some is
unobtainable  and  can  only,  at  best,  be  approximated  (namely  data  on  valuation  of
environmental amenities).
Dales then proceeds to propose a solution for social costs that is less demanding
on information gathering than environmental taxes based on an optimal level of pollution.
After  arguing that  “treating air  and water  as  unrestricted common property is  socially
indefensible” (ibid.: 75), since it leads to excessive environmental degradation, the author
sets  up  a  blueprint  for  an  emissions  trading  scheme in  water  pollution  rights.  In  this
scheme, a politically independent Water Control Board (WCB) defines a cap for aggregate
waste  and  accordingly  issues  tradable  emissions  rights,  which  are  auctioned  to  waste
dischargers. Individual firms can then buy and sell emissions rights through the WCB,
which can also intervene in the market to implement both a floor and a ceiling price.
Environmental groups can also participate in the market to buy emissions rights and set
them aside, thus buying a cleaner environment. This scheme, that became known as “cap
and trade”, differs from Crocker's proposal by having the level of environmental quality
defined exogenously, rather than having it somehow determined by the emissions rights
market.
The  criticism  of  the  neoclassical  orthodoxy  present  in  EE  allows  Dales  to
reconfigure the economist's task, since “[...] economic analysis, which is all but useless in
helping us to decide on a policy, is all but indispensable in helping us to decide on the very
best way of implementing a policy once it has been chosen” (ibid.: 99). Economics does
not have to define what the optimal or acceptable level of pollution is but rather faces the
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more modest task of finding the least costly way of enforcing a level of pollution that is set
politically.
While  Crocker's  emissions  trading  system  aimed  to  the  impossible  task  of
optimizing two value dimensions in time and space, Dales'  system doesn't rely on any
claims  of  optimization.  In  this  framework,  emissions  trading  is  preferable  to  other
regulatory  instruments,  whenever  it  can  be  used,  not  because  it  allows  an  optimal
allocation  of  resources  but  rather  because  it  minimizes  the  cost  of  meeting  a  given
environmental objective. Administrative costs, in particular, are lower than with emissions
charges:
Such markets would automatically set the correct level of the pollution charge (instead of it
having  to  be  set  by  some committee,  after  long  and  learned  discussion)  and  would  also
automatically, and continuously, adjust the level of the charge to take account of economic
growth. A simple market that can be operated by three or four people and a small staff of
stenographers to register purchases and sales is very much cheaper, and just as efficient, as a
large bureaucracy replete with computers to give answers to complicated pricing problems. If
it is feasible to establish a market to implement a policy, no policy-maker can afford to do
without one. (ibid.: 100)
The argument for emissions trading is repeated in a paper published in the same
year  (Dales,  1968a),  in  which  the  relationship  between  prices  and  property  rights  is
explored. For Dales, the inexistence of property rights in water led to the inexistence of a
mechanism to transform technological externalities into prices. Using a framework similar
to Crocker (1966), the author distinguishes between two uses for water, waste disposal and
other uses or amenities, which are conflicting. Unlike Crocker, though, Dales argues that it
is  impossible to  calculate  the value of a  marginal  change in  amenity use (or  receptor
damage costs, to use Crocker's terminology). Consequently, the optimum level of waste
disposal cannot be calculated.
Dales (1968a) elaborates on how the level of pollution is to be determined by
considering  that  decisions  on  the  maximum level  of  emissions  are  political  in  nature,
representing an equilibrium between complaints about the cost of anti-pollution measures
and the  complaints  about  pollution,  rather  than  an  equilibrium between the  costs  and
benefits of anti-pollution measures. Implicitly, Dales assumes that advances in scientific
knowledge on the effects of pollution have only an indirect effect on the computation of
the equilibrium level of pollution. The question, then, becomes how to choose the best
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way of enforcing the cap on emissions, taking into account the costs of different options,
rather than trying to find a property rights distribution that maximizes the social product. 
There  are  six  different  options  considered  by  Dales:  individual  quotas  on
emissions,  emissions  standards,  individual  subsidies  to  polluters,  subsidies  per  ton  of
emissions,  individual  charges  and  charges  per  ton  of  emissions.  Leaving  aside  the
subsidies,  which  generate  excess  profits,  across-the-board regulations,  which  lead  to  a
non-optimal  distribution  of  the  costs,  and  individual  solutions,  which  have  very  high
administrative costs, we are left with charges per ton of emissions as the only acceptable
option. In order to have a unique charge on emissions and minimize administrative and
other transaction costs, a market on pollution rights can be created.
This  solution,  according  to  Dales,  minimizes  costs  because  the  regulator  no
longer has to estimate an optimal level of pollution nor resort to a trial-and-error procedure
to find a charge that induces this level of pollution. The market mechanism will not lead to
an optimal distribution of the costs but it will likely lead to savings in administrative costs
that  outweigh  the  losses  measured  against  a  theoretical  optimum  that  assumes  zero
administrative and other transaction costs.
Even though Dales (1968a, 1968b) and Crocker (1966) elaborated their policy
proposals in parallel, the two proposals for a market in emissions rights follow a strikingly
similar  framework.  Both  authors  think  of  pollution  as  the  result  of  a  zero  price  on
emissions  but  refrain  from automatically  concluding  that  taxing  emissions  is  the  best
policy by considering that it is also possible to price emissions by setting tradable property
rights.  In  both  cases,  environmental  taxation,  even  if  feasible,  is  a  more  costly  and
information demanding instrument to achieve a desired level of pollution than a market on
emissions rights, in which emitters and receptors can participate. 
The two authors also diverged from the emerging EE in explicitly criticizing the
view of pollution as a problem to be fixed,  rather than as a natural fact of life. Thus,
Crocker (1966) rejects the idea that we should have clean air no matter what the cost, and
Dales  (1968b)  named  the  first  chapter  of  his  book “To live  is  to  pollute”.  For  these
authors, pollution was not an issue serious enough to justify tough regulation to protect
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public  health,  with Dales  (ibid.:  103)  going as  far  as  to  claim that  “The only wholly
tenable argument against pollution at the present time is the aesthetic one”.
The discussion on social costs present in early emissions trading theory shows
many similarities with Coase's analysis. This is reinforced by the rejection of the concept
of externalities by the authors in other publications.  Crocker (2008: 10) dismisses this
concept  as  “awful  jargon”  that  distracts  economists  from  analysing  the  connections
between  institutions,  behaviour  and  the  environment.  Dales  (1975:  496-7)  also
recommends  that  economists  dispense  both  the  language  and  concept  of  externalities,
arguing that it  reflects an arbitrary selection of activities not constrained by prices but
relevant  to  welfare,  and  advocates  following  Coase's  suggestion  of  comparing  the
efficiency of different institutional restrictions to behaviour.
             Tracing the sources of emissions trading theory
We can  trace  the  intellectual  underpinnings  of  emissions  trading  theory  by
comparing the sources used by the two authors. Crocker (1966) did not quote any of his
sources  in  the  economics  literature,  so  we  shall  resort  to  a  personal  communication
(Crocker,  2008),  in  which  the  author  recalls  the  process  of  writing  his  original
contribution.  Dales  (1968b)  quoted  his  sources  indirectly,  by  bundling  them  in  an
appendix to his book.
Despite  being  written  in  parallel,  the  two  seminal  contributions  to  emissions
trading theory are both rooted the property rights approach to social costs, popularized by
Coase's  critique  of  Pigou.  The  starting  point  is  the  critique  of  EE  and  its  Pigouvian
taxation,  which  Crocker  traces  back  to  Pigou  (1920),  while  Dales  quotes  instead  the
influential Kneese and Bower (1968) book on the economics of water pollution. This is
contrasted  with  the  property  rights  approach,  which  both  authors  identify  with  Coase
(1960), while Dales also adds Reich's (1964) analysis of the property rights created by
regulations and court decisions as a source.
The case for establishing property rights on environmental goods is also justified,
in the authors view, by Gordon's (1954) argument against open access. The argument, that
was  later  popularized  as  the  “tragedy of  the  commons” by  Hardin  (1968),  states  that
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common-property natural resources will be over-exploited to the point of depletion, since
individuals treat them as free goods, unless property rights are established over their use
and access.
Crocker further adds Samuelson (1954) as basis for claiming that non-rival and
open access goods, like clean air, will be undersupplied due to free-riding behaviour. In his
proposal  for  a  market  on  emissions  rights,  this  concern  leads  him  to  advocate  the
aggregation  of  individual  receptors  in  organizations,  to  assure  that  all  individuals
contribute to the purchase of clean air.
Mishan's (1967) discussion of external diseconomies and property rights, which
was  published  a  year  after  Crocker's  contribution,  was  also  quoted  by  Dales  as  an
inspiration. Supposing that different individuals will have different preferences regarding
pollution and going so far as to admit the possibility that some individuals might be so
used to polluted air that they will dislike being in an unpolluted environment,  Mishan
argues that the enforcement of amenity rights by law would cause market forces to create a
separate facilities solution for the problem of external diseconomies. Concretely, polluting
businesses would be located in places where the local inhabitants are willing to accept
higher levels of pollution, while people who prefer cleaner environments would choose to
live in less polluted areas. As Dales (1968b) notes, granting fewer rights to pollute leads to
the same outcome as granting more rights to  a  cleaner  environment,  so his  emissions
trading proposal differs from Mishan's separate facilities proposal as it conceives not just
the creation of environmental property rights but also a market to trade them.
A final influence in emissions trading theory is Hayek's (1945) argument against
centralized planning and for free markets. Following Hayek, since information is dispersed
across individuals and firms and cannot be fully centralized, planning is impracticable.
The  market  provides  a  more  efficient  alternative  to  planning,  because  market  prices
already convey all  the  relevant  information  on production  and consumption,  therefore
eliminating  the  need  to  centralize  information.  Crocker  quotes  Hayek's  theory  as  an
evidence that prices not only transmit information but also that rationality is institutionally
constructed through people's interactions with the market, that is, people learn how to be
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rational by participating in market transactions. Dales, on the other hand, does not quote
Hayek, but his discussion on the role of emissions rights markets in setting a price for
emissions  rights  that  removes  from  the  regulator's  shoulders  the  impossible  task  of
centralizing all the information on pollution control costs is remarkably Hayekian.
In  short,  both  Crocker  and  Dales'  proposals  for  emissions  trading  to  be
considered as a cost-effective instrument to be added to the policy-mix regarding pollution
control  were inspired by the discussion regarding the  connections  between prices  and
property rights, which in turn was influenced by Coase's critique of Pigou. Analysing the
theoretical underpinnings of emissions trading theory allows us to put the importance of
the Coasean critique in perspective and conclude that, while not negligible, it is clearly not
decisive enough to make Coase the “grandfather of emissions trading”.
2.4 Conclusions
Pigou's (1920) treatise on economic welfare spurred a vast literature on external
economies,  or  externalities,  defined as  positive  or  negative  effects  of  a  production  or
consumption activity that are not reflected in market prices. EE, in particular, was founded
on the framing of pollution as a negative externality, to be corrected preferably through
taxation of the polluting activity. Despite having departed from Pigou in assuming that
social  costs  constitute  more  than  a  prima  facie case  for  intervention,  the  orthodox
approach to environmental issues dubbed its eco-taxes as Pigouvian.
This approach to social costs of production was criticized by Coase (1960), who
argued that the case for imposing a cost on the polluter to reduce the harm caused to the
polluted is unwarranted. Due to the reciprocal nature of social costs, the cost of pollution
reduction might also be efficiently attributed to the polluted. Coase then concluded that, in
a world with positive and non-negligible transaction costs, the questions of if and how to
control  pollution  and  who  is  to  bear  the  cost  of  this  control  are  to  be  answered  by
comparative institutional design, where different solutions are ranked according to their
efficiency.
Coase's  critique  of  Pigou  was  reduced  by  the  Coaseans  into  a  theorem that
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postulates the irrelevance of property rights distributions, assuming zero transaction costs.
The Coase  Theorem then became the basis  of  a  more  general  critique of  government
intervention.  As  several  contributions  have  shown,  this  theorem,  even  if  considered
relevant in the real-world, where transaction costs are positive, is either inconsistent or
tautological.
Drawing from the Coasean critique of Pigou the idea that pollution problems can
be  thought  as  property  rights  allocation  problems,  Crocker  (1966)  and Dales  (1968b)
argued that it  is  possible  and even desirable to put a  price on pollution by creating a
market  on  pollution  rights.  While  pollution  taxes  were  already  seen  in  the  economic
orthodoxy as more efficient than direct regulation, this position wrongly assumed that the
optimal level of pollution is calculable and ignored the significant difficulties in gathering
the necessary information to determine the adequate level  of pollution taxes.  Tradable
pollution  rights,  then,  would  relieve  the  regulator  from  gathering  information  about
pollution control costs and allow a given level of pollution to be achieved at the least cost
for regulated industries.
This approach implied a shift away from trying to estimate the optimal pollution
level to trying to find out the best instrument to achieve a given pollution level. It also
implied a shift in the framing of pollution, from a problem that should be corrected to a
nuisance that  should be managed.  Accordingly, while  the emerging EE field proposed
using taxes as an efficient alternative to direct regulation in pollution control, emissions
trading theorists proposed using tradable pollution rights as an efficient alternative to both
taxes  and direct  regulation,  an idea that  slowly became a reality  with  the progressive
liberalization of industrialized countries' economies in the following decades.
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3 Born in the USA: The early experiences with emissions
trading
“Market-based  programs  require  significant  planning,  preparation,  and
management during development and throughout the life of the program” (EPA, 2002: 66)
Originally proposed by Dales (1968b) and formalized by Montgomery (1972),
emissions trading, or “cap and trade”, is a market-based regulatory instrument based on
tradable  emission  allowances.  The  advantages  of  this  instrument  compared  to  direct
regulation,  the  argument  goes,  stem  from  its  superior  cost-efficiency,  simplicity  and
flexibility, as well as its inferior informational requirements. Since it was introduced in the
Kyoto Protocol, emissions trading has been at the centre of the discussion over instrument
choice for environmental protection. Before the late 1990s, however, emissions trading
theory  and  practice  which  emerged  from  several  amendments  made  to  air  quality
regulations was circumscribed to the US.2
Air  quality  in  the  US  is  regulated  by  the  Clean  Air  Act  (CAA),  a  federal
legislation  approved  in  1963  aimed  at  first  to  research  into  techniques  for  pollution
monitoring  and  control.  In  1970,  the  CAA was  significantly  revised  to  enact  direct
regulations  on  pollution.  Emissions  limits  for  some  pollutants  were  set  as  National
Ambient  Air  Quality  Standards  (NAAQS),  defined  for  air  regions  and  met  through
measures  specified  in  State  Implementation  Plans  (SIPs).3 New  Source  Performance
Standards (NSPS) were defined for new emissions sources (a category that also includes
existing sources that underwent major modifications), setting limits on emissions based on
2 Even though emissions trading can also be applied to water quality regulation this variant has not been
used extensively and, therefore, is excluded from this survey. Water quality trading was proposed in the
academic literature (e.g.  David  et al.,  1980; Eheart  et al., 1980; Joeres and David, 1983; Maloney and
Yandle, 1983; Brill et al. 1984) and even in an EPA publication (deLucia, 1974) but it is limited to small-
scale local experiences, with only a reference to the failed Wisconsin Fox River market being made in the
literature (Oates 1984, Hahn 1989a).
3 NAAQS were  defined  for  247 air  quality  regions  and  six  pollutants:  sulphur dioxide  (SO2),  carbon
monoxide  (CO),  nitrous  oxide  (N2O),  particulate  matter  (PMx),  hydrocarbons  (HC),  and  photochemical
oxidants.  Some substances  face  two standards:  primary  (aimed to  protect  public  health)  and  secondary
(aimed to protect public welfare, i.e., vegetation, materials and visibility).
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the best  abatement  technology. These revisions  coincided with the  creation of  the  US
Environmental  Protection Agency (EPA), in  December 1970, to enforce environmental
regulations and monitor pollution (EPA, 2013).
Following the emergence of a conflict between this new bureaucratic machinery
and  industrial  growth  in  several  states  and  of  neoliberal  governance  within  the  US
Presidency, mechanisms for trading pollution credits  were gradually introduced by the
EPA, granting polluters an added flexibility in compliance with emissions standards. These
mechanisms gave way in the early 1990s to the first “cap and trade” schemes implemented
in the world, applied at the national and regional scale. This chapter presents a critical
review of both the US experience with emissions trading for air quality regulation and the
literature  based  on  this  experience,  aiming  to  present  some  relevant  conclusions  for
contemporary debates on pollution markets.
The structure  of  the  chapter  is  as  follows.  The first  section  surveys  the  first
attempts at emissions trading in the US: the EPA Emissions Trading Program, a patchwork
of  different  provisions  that  allowed  trading  in  pollution  credits,  and  the  lead  credits
market, through which refineries could average their lead in gasoline content. The survey
proceeds  in  the  second  section  with  the  first  “cap  and  trade”  system,  the  Acid  Rain
Program, while the third section is dedicated to similar schemes applied at the regional
level, in California and in the Northeast. The final section concludes by presenting some
lessons that can be inferred from these experiences.
3.1 Early emissions trading programs
             The Emissions Trading Program
The 1970 CAA included regulations like the NSPS, which were applied on a
source-by-source basis, so that a plant with several sources (corresponding to boilers or
other equipment) had to comply with the regulations in each source. The first experiments
with emissions trading can be traced to a reinterpretation of the word “source” by the EPA,
to include a whole plant.
In 1972, the EPA approved a “netting” provision for smelters, allowing new or
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modified sources to avoid the mandatory emissions review procedures from the NSPS if a
firm lowers its  emissions  in  other  sources enough to assure that  plant-wide emissions
remain constant. This provision was successfully challenged in court but was brought back
in 1975, when the EPA restricted its revised definition of stationary source to existing
sources undergoing modifications (Landau, 1980).
Flexibility in compliance with the CAA was further enhanced as it became clear
that many areas in the US would not be able to comply with the 1975 deadline for meeting
the  NAAQS.  This  policy  context  was  framed  as  a  “growth  ban”  by  the  federal
government, due to a clash between the CAA regulations and the industrial growth in non-
attainment  areas  (Lane,  2015).  The  EPA reacted  by  proposing  an  “offset”  provision,
through  which  the  emissions  from  new  sources  could  be  compensated  by  reducing
emissions from existing sources (Yandle, 1978).
The Offset Policy, approved in 1976, allowed the installation of new sources in
non-attainment areas provided that two conditions were met. First, emissions had to be
more than offset, which is to say, emissions reductions from existing sources had to be
greater than the emissions from the new source. Second, new sources had to comply with
Lowest Achievable Emissions Rate (LAER) standards, set at a level at least as stringent as
Best Available Control Technology (BACT) standards  (Dudek and Palmisano, 1987).
In 1977, the CAA was amended by the US Congress, and a “banking” provision,
that allowed firms to reserve credits from netting, bubbling or offsetting for future use or
sale, was introduced. This provision faced several limitations, reinforced by the 1980 EPA
decision that credits were not an absolute property right and, consequently, states could
take away a part or all of the banked credits. Given the uncertainty of the long term status
of banked credits, firms were wary of using this provision (Hahn, 1982).
The  1977  CAA  Amendments also  included  a  Prevention  of  Significant
Deterioration (PSD) provision,  which applied in areas that were in attainment of NAAQS,
to maintain air quality in these areas and prevent pollution to rise up to the standard. A
small emissions increase in attainment areas was allowed, as long as all major sources
were subjected to BACT standards, which were designed to be at least as stringent as
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NSPS (Landau, 1980). The steel industry, lagging in compliance with the CAA, reacted to
the new regulations by lobbying for a “bubble” proposal, through which several sources
within a plant could be grouped in an imaginary bubble and face a single emissions limit.
In 1977, this proposal was presented to the EPA, facing opposition from environmental
groups.  The  EPA reacted  by  approving  the  bubble  policy,  in  1979,  subject  to  some
restrictions. Bubbles could only group sources in an attainment area and could not lead to
an increase in emissions. Polluters had to show that bubbles were equivalent to point-by-
point regulation in terms of pollution reduction, enforceability and environmental impact.
Bubbles could not be used by noncomplying sources neither be a means for extending
deadlines for compliance (Liroff, 1986: 37-46).
In December 1979, the bubble policy was revised to allow for multiple plants to
be grouped in a single bubble and for emissions increases in individual bubbles. In 1980-
81, further revisions allowed bubbles to be formed in non-attainment areas for which SIPs
had not yet  been approved and extended deadlines for compliance.  The revisions  also
partially  removed  the  requirement  that  bubbles  were  treated  as  SIP  revisions,  a
bureaucratic process that could take up to a year, by allowing states to define generic
regulations (ibid.: 46-51).
These four provisions were unified under the Federal Emissions Trading Policy
Statement, released in its interim version in 1982 and in its final version in 1987 (Ellis et
al., 1982; Brady and Morrison, 1984;  Borowsky  et al., 1987).  The Emissions Trading
Program  (ETP)  thus  created  the  Emissions  Reduction  Credit  (ERC)  as  the  common
currency for netting, bubbling, offsetting and banking, defined as an emissions reduction
that is not required by law, and is enforceable, quantifiable, and permanent.
As for the environmental effectiveness of bubbles, offsets, netting and banking,
theoretically it should be null or slightly positive, in the sense that trading ERCs leads to
emissions going down in one source by the same amount (or possibly more) than the
emissions increase in another source. In practice, though, considering that some polluters
were able to evade regulations through “paper trades” that represented accounting tricks
rather  than  real  emissions  reductions  and  that  credits  were  often  were  awarded  to
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incidental reductions that would have happened anyway, the trading provisions often led to
local emissions increases (Dudek and Palmisano, 1987; Driesen, 1998). On the other hand,
EPA's refusal to award ERCs to the shutdown of old power plants, while justified by the
distinction  between  an  investment  in  emissions  reductions  and  capital  replacement,
strengthened the incentive to prolong the life of old plants that was already present with
NSPS regulations, which might have led to increased emissions (Maloney and Yandle,
1984; Maloney and Brady, 1988).
Even though in some cases, namely bubbles, polluting industries actively lobbied
for  emissions  trading,  in  most  cases  industries  were  either  indifferent  or  opposed  to
emissions  trading,  seeing  it  as  a  non-workable  system  and  as  another  means  for
government intervention. Environmentalists, on the other hand, were generally opposed to
any flexibility provision, seeing them as a way for polluters to evade regulations through
accounting tricks,  and some NGOs even tried to  block them through the legal system
(Liroff, 1986: 130-131). It seems, then,  that the motives for the adoption of emissions
trading  provisions  must  be  found  within  the  regulatory  system  itself.  The  simple
explanation that the EPA adopted emissions trading because of the potential cost savings
associated to it is hardly convincing, though, as there were no  ex ante estimates of the
efficiency gains. On the other hand, the connection between theory and practice is not
clear,  as economist  Robert  Hahn,  while  working  for  the  US  Council  of  Economic
Advisers,  illustrated  by  simultaneously  defending  that  the  “patient”  (the  government)
followed  the  “doctor's”  (the  economists)  orders  on  “economic  prescriptions  for
environmental problems” (Hahn, 1989a) and, conversely, that the “patient” did not exactly
do what the “doctor” ordered (Hahn, 1989b).
Meidinger (1985) proposes that emissions trading was the result of the promotion
of  a  new regulatory  culture  by  policy  entrepreneurs  recently  graduated  from law and
economics programs. This culture is based on four principles: (1) science is crucial to
evaluate the impacts of regulation but cannot form the basis for choosing the social goals;
(2)  regulatory  decisions  are  inevitably  the  result  of  compromises  among  contending
interests;  (3) the role of regulatory agencies is to develop a framework through which
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compromises can be achieved; (4) regulatory policies are based and legitimised, as much
as possible, through compromises. This was the product of a historic period marked by
economic  recession,  growing  conservatism and the  emergence  of  neoliberalism,  when
government agencies like the EPA were under pressure to adopt a more business-friendly
approach  and  reconcile  (even  if  just  apparently)  their  objectives  with  economic  and
industrial growth.4
Meant  to  increase  the  economic  efficiency  of  environmental  regulation,  the
various flexibility provisions considerably differed from the “cap and trade” system that
Dales (1968b) had proposed and were widely criticized in  the economics  literature as
being too complex and bureaucratic to deliver significant cost savings (Noll, 1982; Brady,
1983; Oates, 1984; Levin, 1985; Hahn and Hester, 1987, 1989a, 1989b; Tietenberg, 2006).
As Lane (2012: 586) puts it, the ETP “produced crude chimerical forms, merely ad hoc
programmes” superimposed on pre-existing regulations and based on the narrative of the
superior efficiency of economic incentives relative to “command and control” regulation
that  had  been  established  in  the  Environmental  Economics  discipline  to  support  the
flexibilization of CAA targets (e.g. Baumol and Oates, 1975; Kneese and Schultze, 1975).
             Lead Averaging and Banking
In the 1920s, refineries started adding lead to gasoline as an inexpensive way to
increase octane levels. Higher octane gasoline improves the engine performance but the
use of lead in gasoline corrodes engines  and exhaust  systems,  increasing maintenance
costs and fuel consumption. Furthermore, lead is a toxic substance that does not break
down over time and its use in gasoline is associated with increased blood pressure and
hypertension rates in adults and reduced cognitive performance in children, among other
health issues. Still, lead phase-out was successfully resisted by refineries due to the higher
cost of unleaded gasoline, involving either additional processing or replacement of lead for
more expensive additives (Nichols, 1997).
The first step to reduce lead in gasoline was given in the early 1970s, with the
4 For a historical review of this period and the concomitant rise of free-market economics, see Backhouse
(2005).
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introduction of  catalytic  converters  in  cars,  used to  reduce emissions  of  hydrocarbons
(HC), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and carbon monoxide (CO). Since the use of leaded gasoline
is  incompatible  with  catalytic  converters,  which  became mandatory  in  new cars  from
1975, in 1974 new regulations were approved to spread the diffusion of unleaded gasoline
and prevent owners of cars with catalytic converters from using leaded gasoline. This was
achieved by forcing retailers to offer unleaded gasoline in each gas station and install
different sized nozzles for leaded and unleaded gasoline. At the same time, incentives for
old vehicle substitution were approved, to accelerate the introduction of cleaner engines
(Kerr and Newell, 2003).
The introduction of regulations for catalytic converters in 1975 was accompanied
by the introduction of a standard of 0.5 grams per gallon (gpg) for lead in gasoline by the
EPA. The standard, which only came to effect in 1979, contrasted with the average lead
content of 2.4 gpg that was registered in the early 1970s, when unleaded gasoline did not
exist. Since the standard was calculated on the basis of total gasoline production, refineries
could  comply  with  it  by  expanding  their  unleaded  gasoline  production  share.  Small
refineries  faced  less  strict  standards,  ranging  from 0.8  gpg to  2.65  gpg,  according  to
gasoline production in the previous year, since they lacked the equipment necessary to
produce unleaded gasoline (Nichols, 1997).
In  1982  the  EPA,  following  a  recommendation  from  the  Task  Force  on
Regulatory Relief, considered relaxing the lead standard for large refineries and deferring
the deadline for small refineries to face the same standard as large refineries did. Opposed
by environmentalists,  public  health  officials  and even  members  of  the  EPA staff,  this
recommendation was shelved. Instead, the EPA narrowed the definition of small refineries,
determined that special provisions for small refineries would be phased out by mid-1983
and reviewed the standard so that lead limits  were calculated as an average of leaded
gasoline only. The new standard was set at a quarterly average of 1.1 grams per leaded
gallon  (gplg),  which  was  equivalent  to  the  previous  standard  taking  into  account  the
leaded  gasoline  market  share.  Following  a  cost-benefit  analysis  on  reducing  lead  in
gasoline, published in 1984, the standard was lowered to 0.5 gplg in mid-1985 and further
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reduced to 0.1 gplg in 1986 (Nichols, 1997).
The 1982 review of  regulatory  policy  also  allowed lead  averaging.  This  was
achieved through a “baseline and credit” program, through which refineries producing
gasoline with less lead than the standard could sell  lead credits to refineries that were
above the standard. During the first year, trading was restricted to refineries of similar
size, with a segmented market that allowed averaging among large refineries and among
small  refineries  but  not  among  large  and  small  refineries.  From 1985,  the  averaging
program was supplemented with a banking provision that lasted until the program ended,
in the end of 1987. Lead was definitively eliminated as fuel additive in 1996 (Sovaccool,
2011).
Source: Hilton (2006)
The environmental results of the regulations to phase out lead were encouraging.
By 1980, the US already had the third lowest lead content in gasoline in OECD countries,
after Germany and Japan. After the trading period, in the end of 1986, the US had a much
lower lead in gasoline content than most of OECD countries, being surpassed only by
Japan, which had already eliminated lead. This contrasts with the EU, which delayed lead
phase out until 1987 due to trading restrictions that imposed a minimum content of lead in
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gasoline and opposition from some Member States to regulations mandating the instalment
of catalytic converters in new vehicles (Hammar and Löfgren, 2004).
As for the economic performance of the lead credits market, both trading and
banking levels were high and above the initial EPA estimates, indicating low transaction
costs (Ellerman  et al., 2003). The administrative costs of this system were quite low, as
there was no need to certify tradable credits, so a refinery which managed to produce
gasoline with less lead content than the average received credits automatically. Yet, these
low  administrative  and  transaction  costs  were  achieved  at  the  expense  of  opening  a
backdoor to fraudulent activities.
Since monitoring gasoline production and lead incorporation in refineries directly
would be costly, the EPA delegated the data collection task to refineries. Refineries also
had to report their lead credits transactions, deposits and withdrawals. A computer system
was then set up, to analyse the data received and detect inconsistencies between the data
on lead use and the data on lead trading and banking and between all of this data and the
data on lead sales. This self-reporting system led to significant misreporting of lead use
and,  more  frequently,  gasoline  production.  Additionally,  many  refineries  engaged  in
falsifying credits, which were then traded several times before being discovered by the
EPA.  Since  the  task  of  tracking  these  false  credits  to  their  original  source  was  very
difficult, fraudsters could leave the market before being found out (Newell and Rogers,
2004).
Fraudulent  activity  was severely affected by the unexpected entry in the lead
credits trading system of “alcohol blenders”, which were mainly big service stations that
mixed  alcohol  with  leaded  gasoline,  lowering  the  relative  concentration  of  lead  in
gasoline.  These  blenders  were  treated  as  small  refineries  by the  EPA,  which  led  to  a
substantial increase in the number of participants in the lead credits market, as well as the
quantity  of  erroneous reports  sent  to  the  EPA and falsified  credits  sold in  the market
(ibid.).
The literature on lead in gasoline averaging and banking points out economic
reasons for its adoption. Averaging is explained by Hahn (1989b) by the delay in refineries
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investment in the equipment necessary to produce unleaded gasoline, while Newell and
Rogers (2004) find its reason for existence in the high compliance costs faced by small
refineries, compared with the lower costs and lower than demanded lead content achieved
by large refineries. Banking, on the other hand, appears as a necessity to Nichols (1997)
due to the time that it took to install the equipment to reduce gasoline lead content, which
could lead to failure to comply with the deadline for meeting the standard, while Newell
and Rogers (2004) explain it on the basis on non-linear cost increases as standards became
more stringent. These explanations, however, are incomplete.
Like the ETP, the market for lead in gasoline credits was created as an ad hoc
extension of existing regulations that introduced some flexibility for regulated firms. In the
same  line,  lead  averaging  allowed  the  EPA to  exert  its  regulatory  authority  without
clashing with the neoliberal and conservative Reagan administration. Emissions trading
again  was  a  form  of  creating  a  narrative  reconciling  environmental  protection  with
economic growth, even if in reality it provided polluters a cheap and dirty way out of
environmental regulation.
3.2 The Acid Rain Program
In the 1980s, the nascent literature on emissions trading started to take off, with
several articles published in economic journals discussing design choices like the initial
allowance allocation method and mechanisms for promoting market competition or price
stabilization (e.g. Hahn and Noll 1982; Hahn 1984; Lyon 1985). This was complemented
by the first edition of Tietenberg's (1985) influential manual on emissions trading, which
generalized  the  case  against  direct  regulation  through  econometric  estimates  of  its
inefficiencies. A related discussion was centred on pollutants with local impacts, regarding
which the cap can be set  according either  to  a desired pollution level  or to  a  desired
emissions level (e.g. Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1982, 1984, 1987; Krupnick  et al., 1983;
McGartland, 1988). The case for emissions trading was made mostly based on arguments
about  superior  cost-efficiency  and  administrative  simplicity,  compared  with  direct
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regulation (e.g. Tietenberg, 1980; Noll, 1982).5 Some law scholars went further, though,
and  defended  that  emissions  trading  was  inherently  more  democratic  than  direct
regulation,  since  it  was  based  on  explicit  environmental  goals  rather  than  obscure
technological considerations (Ackerman and Stewart, 1988; Sunstein, 1991), with Stewart
(1987: 154) making the extreme case that environmental regulations amounted to “nothing
less  than  a  massive  effort  at  Soviet-style  central  planning of  the  economy to  achieve
environmental goals.”
From the (US-based) economics literature, a scheme for emissions trading started
to  emerge,  in  which  allowances  are  auctioned  (or,  if  necessary  to  guarantee  political
support, given for free), banking is allowed, provisions are made to facilitate the entry of
new firms and the cap is set at a maximum emissions level. The case for such a scheme
was supported by the Government Accountability Office (GAO 1982), as well as the EPA
(1981).  In  the  political  arena,  a  case  for  the  use  of  emissions  trading  for  controlling
pollution  from stationary  sources  was  made by Project  88,  a  report  commissioned by
senators of both US political parties and coordinated by Richard Stavins, from Harvard
University (Stavins, 1988). Contributors to the Project 88 report, which was delivered to
both presidential candidates before the 1988 elections included industry representatives,
environmentalists, academics and government representatives.
Of particular relevance to the evolution of emissions trading was the Project 88
proposal to create a “cap and trade” system for pollution causing acid rain, which was
supported by many economists (Gollop and Roberts 1985; Raufer et al., 1986; Raufer and
Feldman 1987; Diemer and Eheart 1988; Dudek 1989; Tietenberg 1989; Tripp and Dudek
1989).  The system was to  be directed at  sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions from power
plants, one of the main contributors to the acidification of rain water that, as shown by
scientific  studies,  resulted  in  damage  to  lakes  and  forests,  as  well  as  crops  and
monuments.6 
5 The case for the superiority of emissions trading compared to direct regulation in terms of incentives to
environmental innovation was not as clear cut, with Malueg (1989) arguing that this is only true for firms
that are net sellers of allowances before and after the innovation.
6 SO2 emissions also contribute to the concentration of fine particulate matter (PM2.5), which were later
shown to have harmful health effects, namely contributing to respiratory problems (McCormick, 1997: 32-
33).
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Even though acid rain was by then an important political topic, due to growing
pressure by environmentalists,  Congress  was stuck in  a  regulatory gridlock,  with over
seventy bills directed at mitigating acid rain being rejected before 1989 (McCauley et al.,
1988).  Until  then,  the  CAA merely  mandated  NSPS for  new power  plants,  implicitly
assuming that emissions would go down as old plants were replaced by new ones. The
differential  treatment  of  old  and new power  plants,  however,  created  an  incentive  for
prolonging  the  life  of  old  power  plants,  significantly  hampering  the  effort  to  reduce
emissions (Ackerman et al., 1998). In addition, states often chose to achieve NAAQS by
requiring power plants to install taller smokestacks, to increase pollution dispersion, which
resulted both in significant interstate pollution transport and a worsening of the acid rain
problem (Ellerman et al., 2005: 14).
The impasse was overturned by the approval of the 1990 CAA Ammendments,
which implemented the Acid Rain Program (ARP), an emissions trading system for SO2
emissions  from large  coal  plants.  In  addition  to  installing  Flue  Gas  Desulphurization
equipment (scrubbers), coal plants now also had the option to substitute high-sulphur coal
with low-sulphur coal  and/or  buying SO2 allowances  to  comply  with the CAA. Since
scrubbers can remove more than 90 percent of SO2 emissions, coal plants that chose to
install  them would become net allowance sellers,  while plants that chose not to could
become net buyers (Winebrake et al., 1995).
The ARP was divided into two phases. From 1995 to 1999, Phase I applied to the
263 largest SO2 sources from utilities, corresponding to 110 highest emitting power plants
(almost all were coal plants from the northeast and midwest). The cap was set according to
an emissions rate of 2.5 pounds of SO2 per million Btu of heat input, multiplied by the
historical fuel use in the 1985-1987 period, leading to an emissions reduction of about 3.5
million tons per year.7 From 2000 to 2010, all fossil-fuelled power plants producing more
than 25 MW and new energy generating units were subjected to a declining cap that would
limit yearly SO2 emissions to 8.95 million tons.
7 Throughout this chapter, the term “ton” refers to the US unit of measurement, which is equivalent to 2,000
pounds. This is not to be confused with “tonne” or “metric ton”, which equals 1,000 kilograms nor with the
non-US ton, which equals 2,240 pounds.
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The cap was intended to reduce yearly SO2 emissions by 10 million tons, or
about  50  percent,  from 1980 levels.  This  number  was  determined  by multiplying  the
emissions rate specified in NSPS by total emissions from coal plants, so the 1990 CAAA
merely repeated the environmental objective that was implicit in the 1970 CAA (Driesen,
2010).  Findings  from the  National  Acid  Precipitation  Assessment  Program  (NAPAP),
which cost half a billion dollars and employed over three thousand scientists, as well as
from other scientific studies, were ignored by Congress when deciding on the ARP cap
(Heinzerling,  1995).  Rather  than discussing the merits  of different  caps,  congressional
debate was focused on appeasing states and industries to secure their support, through
various provisions that distributed additional allowances (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1998).
Sources were allocated allowances for free. To reward early action and spur trade,
sources could trade Phase I allowances from the beginning of the 90's and trade Phase II
allowances  in  the  Phase  I  period.  Banking  was  also  allowed  without  restrictions
(Napolitano et al., 2007a).
The initial allocation of allowances in Phase I was corrected by several special
provisions that allocated additional allowances. To favour the eastern high-sulphur coal
business,  power  plants  that  installed  scrubbers  were  awarded  bonus  allowances.
Additionally,  bonus  allowances  were  awarded  to  sources  that  invested  in  energy
conservation or renewable energy, and some large power plants in states that successfully
lobbied  for  cost  sharing  provisions.  To assure  that  the  cap  was  still  met,  a  “ratchet”
provision was also incorporated, reducing the allocation to all sources by the same amount
as  the  bonus  allowances  given  by  special  provisions.  The  same  pattern  of  special
provisions that corrected the initial allocation due either to technical issues or to successful
lobbying  by  utilities  and  states  was  observed  in  Phase  II,  with  over  thirty  special
provisions that made allocation rules difficult to track and understand (Ellerman  et al.,
2005: 36-48).
Another innovation was the inclusion of two “opt in” provisions, that made it
possible for non-Phase I electricity generating units to enter the market in Phase I. The
substitution provision allowed firms to substitute emissions reductions from Phase I units
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for  reductions  in  non-covered  units.  The  compensation  provision  made  non-covered
sources  participate  in  the  program  when  utilities  shifted  electricity  production  from
covered to non-covered sources. About 30 percent of eligible sources chose to participate
in  the  ARP, mostly  through the  substitution  provision,  through which  units  that  were
reducing emissions  for  reasons  unrelated  to  the  program could  become net  allowance
sellers (Schmalensee et al., 1998; Montero, 1999).
To spur  trading  and  give  a  clear  price  signal  to  affected  firms,  as  well  as
accommodate the entrance of new sources of emissions, an annual allowance auction was
introduced.  Every  year,  the  EPA would  set  aside  a  small  part  of  the  allowances  (3.1
percent in Phase I and 2.8 percent in Phase II) for auctioning. Utilities could also sell
allowances through the auctions, specifying quantity and minimum price. Revenues were
then redistributed on a  pro rata basis  to  utilities,  making the auctions  revenue-neutral
(Svendsen and Christensen, 1999).
A final innovation was the Direct Sales Reserve provision, created to introduce a
price ceiling for allowances. From 1993, sources could buy up to 25,000 allowances for
$1500, adjusted for inflation. Since prices were lower than anticipated, this provision was
never used and in 1997 it was terminated (Joskow et al., 1998).
Monitoring in the ARP was assured by the mandatory instalment of Continuous
Emission  Monitoring  Systems  (CEMS),  which  submit  data  on  hourly  emissions  in
quarterly reports to the EPA. Power plants that failed to deliver allowances to cover their
emissions would face a fine of $2000 per ton of SO2, corrected for inflation, as well as a
deduction of excess emissions in the following year's allocation.
During Phase II, several federal and state rules intended to tighten the cap on SO 2
and NOx emissions were proposed and approved. In 2002, the W. Bush administration
proposed the Clear Skies Act, but it failed to garner political support for it.  The failed
proposal gave way to the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), promulgated in 2005, which
intended to  reduce SO2 emissions  to  73  percent  below the  2003 level.  This  new rule
targeted eastern states that were in non-attainment regarding both ozone (O3) and PM2.5
NAAQS  partly  due  to  transport  of  precursors.  Following  CAIR,  the  ARP  would  be
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replaced by a new SO2 emissions trading program in 2010, with a second phase starting in
2015.  To  achieve  the  new  environmental  objective,  sources  in  states  with  PM2.5
concentrations above the NAAQS would have to deliver two SO2 allowances for each ton
of emissions from 2010 to 2014 and 2.86 allowances for each ton of emissions after 2014.
Since banking was allowed, there was a strong incentive to reduce emissions before 2010
and bank allowances for future use (Palmer and Evans, 2013; Schmalensee and Stavins,
2013).
In  2008,  CAIR  was  successfully  challenged  in  court  by  North  Carolina,  a
downwind state, for not adequately considering the effect of emissions transport across
states. The DC Circuit court initially vacated the rule but after the EPA filed petitions
arguing that this would severely affect its capacity to control pollution and protect human
health,  the  court  remanded  the  rule.  This  decision  maintained  CAIR  as  originally
promulgated but  also placed a burden on the EPA to come up with a  new regulatory
scheme that would not allow upwind states to significantly increase emissions (McCubbin,
2009).
The answer to the new dilemma came in 2011 with the Cross-State Air Pollution
Rule (CSAPR), which would replace CAIR in 2012. The new rule severely limited inter-
state trading, so emissions trading was restricted mostly to sources located in the same
state.  In  2012,  however,  the  rule  was  invalidated  by  the  DC Circuit  court,  following
petitions by a groups of states. This led the EPA to appeal to the Supreme Court, which
reversed the DC Circuit decision in 2014. As a result, CSAPR was implemented in 2015,
aiming to achieve by 2017 a 73 percent reduction in SO2 emissions from 2005 levels.
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Source: EPA (2015)
Phase  I  of  the ARP was marked by substantial  emissions  reductions  between
1990 and 1995, of about  25 percent  for all  sources.  Emissions from units  included in
Phase I were stable between 1995 and 1999, having reduced a mere 7 percent, while non-
included units actually increased their emissions. The cap, calculated by the complex set
of  formulas  given  by  allocation  provisions,  was  always  significantly  higher  than
emissions, with polluters banking an average of about 2 million allowances per year. 
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Source: EPA (2015)
Emissions reductions were much steeper in Phase II. By 2007, the 10 million ton
SO2 emissions reduction from 1980 had already been achieved, three years before the
initial deadline. From 2008, after CAIR was implemented, even if provisionally, emissions
reductions accelerated again, and by 2003 SO2 emissions were 81 percent below 1980
levels. While the ARP achieved an average yearly 1 percent reduction in Phase I and 3
percent between 2000 and 2007, the introduction of CAIR led to an average yearly 13
percent reduction between 2008 and 2013.
Early reductions in the 1990s can be partially explained by significant changes in
coal and electricity and markets. Productivity improvements in extraction and transport, as
well  as  a  significant  reduction  of  rail  rates  following the  1989 deregulation,  led  to  a
substantial decline in the price and an increase in availability of western and eastern low-
sulphur  coal.  During  the  same  period,  electricity  demand  shifted  and  became  more
concentrated in areas closer to low-sulphur coal reserves. This led the use of low-sulphur
coal to become more economical and utilities invested in process innovations to blend
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high-sulphur coal with low-sulphur coal to use in boilers designed to burn high-sulphur
coal  only  (Burtraw, 1996).  Almost  all  emissions  reductions  prior  to  1993  were  from
Midwest coal plants, as it became cheaper for these plants to use low-sulphur coal from
Western reserves in the Powder River Basin (Ellerman and Montero, 1998).
Ellerman  et al. (2000: 77-106) estimate that declining low-sulphur coal prices
and rail rates was the main factor for emissions reductions until 1994. During Phase I, coal
switching and mixing was the main means of compliance with the ARP, representing 52
percent of units and 59 percent of emissions reductions, while only 10 percent of units
used scrubbers, representing 28 percent of emissions reductions (Lange and Bellas, 2005).
The market for emissions abatement equipment also changed in the early 1990s,
with scrubber prices falling and their effectiveness increasing, even though patent counts
related to SO2 control technologies had decreased (Lange and Bellas, 2005; Popp, 2003).
While the 1990 CAAA provided a disincentive for innovation in scrubber technologies,
the combination of  emissions  standards  and public  R&D funding had by then already
facilitated their rapid maturation (Taylor et al., 2005).
Additionally, as it  takes two to three years to install  scrubbers and allowance
prices during Phase I were overestimated, many utilities chose to commit themselves to
installing scrubbers before 1995, even though it was not the most cost-efficient option
considering the low allowance prices observed. Since scrubber operational costs are very
low, it  would  not  make  sense  not  to  use  them once  installed.  Some coal  plants  also
committed themselves to buying more low-sulphur coal than what would be economical,
through long-term supply contracts (Ellerman et al. 2000: 302-305). Curiously, then, a part
of  early  emissions  reductions  can  be  explained  by  errors  in  estimating  the  cost  of
complying with the ARP.
Due to these early reductions, emissions were always below the cap in Phase I,
allowing utilities to bank excess allowances. During the first years Phase II, coal plants
were able to emit more than the cap by using banked allowances. The introduction of
CAIR,  however,  dramatically  changed  the  regulatory  status.  Since  utilities  were
confronted with having to face a 50 percent discount factor on allowances used after 2010,
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and since allowances banked before this date were not subjected to the discount factor,
there was a strong incentive to reduce emissions before CAIR came to effect and bank
excess allowances. By 2012, 44 percent of ARP units had installed scrubbers to comply
with new regulations, with only 4 percent using other abatement methods (EPA, 2015).
Regarding the distribution of emissions, empirical analyses based on Phase I data
do not show signs of pollution “hot spots” being created by the ARP, nor disproportionate
impacts on regions with a higher number of low income residents or people of colour.
Data on the geographical distribution of trading shows that the major emissions reductions
came from the biggest emitters (Swift, 2000, 2004), while crossing emissions data with
census  data shows that  there were no significant  differences  in  the  racial  and income
demographics  between  coal  plants  that  increased  emissions  and  those  that  reduced
emissions or between allowances buyers and sellers (Corburn, 2001; EPA, 2005b).
As  a  result  of  the  emissions  reductions  imposed  by  CAIR,  allowance  prices
declined  rapidly.  While  allowance  prices  were  always  below  $200  until  late  2003,
discussions over stricter regulations on SO2 emissions led to a demand surge that raised
prices up to about $1550 in late 2005 (EPA, 2006a). After the EPA announced CAIR prices
dropped to $400-$600 during 2006 and 2007 (EPA, 2007). In 2008, when litigation led to
CAIR being vacated and then remanded, priced dropped to about $100 and then steadily
declined (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013). During 2011, prices were below $5, showing
that lowering the cap on SO2 emissions and introducing restrictions to trading effectively
killed off the acid rain market, as it led to a de facto mandatory installation of scrubbers on
the largest SO2 sources (EPA, 2012).
The higher than expected emissions reductions achieved after the 1990 CAAA
led emissions trading proponents to present the first “cap and trade” scheme adopted in the
world as a success, or even a “living legend of market effectiveness” (Burtraw and Palmer,
2004). None of the analyses published on the ARP, however, presents an international
comparison with policies followed in other industrialized economies.  Engaging in  that
comparison, the 29 percent reduction in SO2 emissions in the 1990-2000 period does not
seem all that impressive when compared to the 61 percent reduction achieved in the EU
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(EEA, 2014).
The significant progress in reducing SO2 emissions in the EU is mostly due to the
implementation of direct regulation that made coal plants and other major sources to use
abatement technologies. This regulation, in turn, followed the 1984 Helsinki Protocol, the
1994 Oslo Protocol and the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution, which specified critical loads for each country and
significant emissions reductions. While the 1994 protocol already opened the way for Joint
Implementation,  through  which  a  country  could  offset  its  emissions  by  investing  in
emissions-reducing projects in other countries, the specification of national critical loads
restricted flexibility enough to made this option too costly to be a reality (Bailey  et al.,
1996; Rodríguez, 1999; Menz and Seip, 2004).
Within  the  EU,  the  most  impressive  emissions  reductions  were  achieved  by
Germany. Following the approval in 1983 of the Ordinance on Large Combustion Plants,
Germany  started  to  introduce  strict  standards  on  both  emissions  and  desulphurization
rates. Compared to the 1990 CAA standards for Phase I of the ARP, the SO2 emissions
standards for large sources specified in the German 1988 Large Scale Combustion Act
were about 85 percent lower (Schwarze, 2005: 57). Combined with voluntary agreements
with  private  utilities,  this  led  to  emissions  going  down  much  faster  than  what  was
required, amounting to an 84 percent reduction in the 1980-1990 period in West Germany
(Wätzold, 2004). In the 1990-2000 period, following reunification, Germany reduced its
SO2 emissions by a further 88 percent, almost three times as much as the US (EEA, 2014).
While  this  intervention  was  very  costly,  since  it  demanded  a  massive  investment  in
scrubbers and fuel switching on existing power plants, the final environmental goal was
stringent  enough  to  make  cost  savings  from  a  hypothetical  emissions  trading  system
negligible (Bültmann and Wätzold, 2000).
The EU case-study, together with the demise of the ARP following the approval
of CAIR, shows how the potential efficiency gains associated with emissions trading are
negatively correlated with its environmental effectiveness. It seems, then, that the superior
cost-efficiency of the ARP compared to direct regulation or taxation is more due to its
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unambitious emissions cap than to the flexibility in compliance.
3.3 Regional emissions trading systems
             The Regional Clean Air Incentives Market
In the late 1980s, the Los Angeles air basin had the worst air quality in the USA,
with frequent high-ozone episodes. Tropospheric ozone (O3) is formed by the interaction
of NOx and Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) in the presence of sunlight and results in
lung, throat and eyes irritation and respiratory illnesses, as well as crop damage. While
NOx emissions result mostly from burning fossil fuels in power plants, industrial boilers
and cars, VOC emissions can be attributed to multiple sources in chemicals manufacturing
and use, as well as natural sources.
To address  this  problem,  the  South  Coast  Air  Quality  Management  District
(SCAQMD) elaborated a new Air Quality Management Plan (AQMP) in 1989 that would
complement the existing LAER standards that were already applied to new sources under
NSPS with BACT standards for old sources. Industry reacted by creating the Regulatory
Flexibility  Group,  a  lobby  that  opposed  direct  regulation  and  proposed  an  emissions
trading program.  Finding legal  support  in  the  1990 CAAA, that  introduced emissions
trading for SO2, this lobby managed to persuade the SCAQMD to shelve its AQMP and
replace it with a proposal for two “cap and trade” markets for ozone precursor NOx and
acid rain precursor sulphur oxides (SOx) (Zerlauth and Schubert, 1999).8
The Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) was approved in the end
of  1993  and  implemented  from  1994,  replacing  previous  SCAQMD  rules.  The  new
emissions trading system applied to facilities emitting more than four tons of either NOx or
SOx per day, as well as other facilities that voluntarily opted in. Emissions allowances
were called RECLAIM Trading Credits (RTCs) and were issued for a given compliance
year and pollutant. Each year, each facility had to deliver enough RTCs to cover its NOx
and SOx emissions, with each RTC being equivalent to a pound of emissions. Since inter-
8 A market for VOCs was originally proposed by the SCAQMD but never materialized due to concerns with
monitoring and environmental justice, as well as industry and environmental groups opposition (Thompson,
2000; Egelston and Cohen, 2004).
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pollutant  trading  was  not  allowed,  this  configuration  in  effect  created  two  separate
emissions allowance markets.
Trading was further restricted by dividing the LA Basin into two geographical
areas, inland and coast. To account for air currents that drift emissions from the coast to
inland, sources located on the coast could not buy allowances from sources located inland.
Banking allowances for future use or sale was also not allowed, due to fears of
future emissions increases. To allow for some temporal flexibility and avoid a rush to the
market  by the end of each year, facilities were divided into two groups,  one facing a
reporting period from January through December, and the other facing a reporting period
from July through June, and trading allowances between these groups was allowed. Each
firm received in 1994 all the RTCs for future years, up to 2010, to accommodate for the
predictability required in long-term investments (Schubert and Zerlauth, 1999).
The initial allowances were allocated to sources on the basis of the highest annual
emissions between 1989 and 1992, estimated by multiplying throughput with an emissions
factor. This calculation was then corrected upwards to account for pre-1994 emissions
reductions and to counteract estimated recessionary effects on firms. In 2000, the number
of  allocated  allowances  was  recalculated  according  to  a  more  stringent  emission
coefficient and the minimum input since 1994. The number of RTCs was to diminish at a
constant rate,  to achieve the same objective of the direct regulation policies originally
proposed, a 75 percent reduction for NOx emissions and a 60 percent reduction for SOx
emissions  by  2003,  relative  to  1994.  After  2003,  allowance  allocations  would  remain
constant (EPA, 2006b). As the cap was progressively lowered and economic growth led to
increasing allowance demand, RECLAIM was projected to allow the LA Air Basin to
reach NAAQS attainment by the 2003 deadline at  a cost 40 percent lower than direct
regulation would (Hall and Walton, 1996; SCAQMD, 1996).
To assess compliance with RECLAIM, as well as its environmental performance
and economic impacts,  the SCAQMD also approved Rule 2015, which states that  the
program would be the target of annual audits, as well as a three-year audit in 1997. The
rule further specified a mechanism for reviewing compliance and enforcement norms, to
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be enacted if the allowance average annual price exceeded $15,000 (SCAQMD, 1993).
Two offsetting provisions were implemented to allow RECLAIM sources to buy
credits from mobile or stationary sources that could be converted to RTCs. Mobile Source
Emission Reduction Credits (MSERCs), created under Rule 2008, were issued by reducing
emissions from vehicles, namely by scrapping old polluting vehicles or even lawn and
garden equipment and replacing them with lower emissions alternatives or by using low-
emissions buses on public transport systems. Area Source Credits (ASCs), created under
Rule 2506, were generated by sources that voluntarily reduced their NOx or SOx (Drury et
al., 1999). 
To monitor emissions, major sources, defined as those with the potential to emit
10 or more tons of NOx and 100 or more tons of SOx annually, had to install CEMS and
report emissions daily, while large sources of NOx reported quarterly emissions estimated
by multiplying measured fuel use and emission coefficients. If the SCAQMD found the
emissions data lacking credibility, it could use a “missing data” clause and assume a worst
case scenario volume of emissions. Facilities that failed to deliver enough allowances to
cover their emissions were penalized by having their next year allocation reduced in the
same amount as excess emissions. Trespassers could also face a civil penalty or even a
withdrawal of the facility’s operating permit (Schubert and Zerlauth, 1999).
Over  the  years,  the  cap  was  reviewed  to  account  for  new  information  on
emissions, new sources entering the area and credits generated by various provisions. The
objective was to reflect a technologically feasible abatement volume but the revisions of
NOx allowance allocation resulted in a substantial increase of the cap. In the end, initial
allocations during the first two years were 40 to 60 percent above emissions (EPA, 2002)
and until 2003 the aggregation of individual allowances exceeded the level compatible
with NAAQS (Schubert and Zerlauth, 1999).
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These  revisions  and  the  generous  over-allocation  of  allowances  led  to  a
disappointing  environmental  performance.  The  cross-over  point,  when emissions  were
above allocations, was initially predicted by the SCAQMD (1996) to be achieved in 1997-
1998  for  NOx and  1998-1999  for  SOx.  Since  emissions  reductions  were  smaller  than
predicted, this point was achieved only in 2000, when NOx emissions exceeded allocations
by  about  11  percent  and  SOx emissions  were  just  4  percent  below  allocations.  This
reflected the California energy crisis of 2000-2001, when market manipulation by by the
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Figure 4: NOx emissions and RTC NOx allocations, 1989-2012 (tons)
Source: SCAQMD (2015)
Figure 5: SOx emissions and RTC SOx allocations, 1989-2012 (tons)
Source: SCAQMD (2015)
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Texas  energy  consortium  Enron,  facilitated  by  the  previous  deregulation  of  energy
markets, and higher summer temperatures led both to a lower supply and higher demand
for energy, resulting in a major price increase (FERC, 2003). Satisfying energy demand
led  to  increased  production  in  old  gas-fired  plants,  most  of  which  didn't  have  NOx
emissions controls, resulting in increased emissions (SCAQMD, 2003).
To  address  this  crisis,  the  SCAQMD  formed  an  advisory  committee  which
presented recommendations to stabilize allowance prices. Consequently, participation of
electricity generating units in RECLAIM was suspended temporarily in May 2001 and the
newly drafted Rule 2009 subjected electricity generating units to direct regulation. Each
facility was required to meet an NOx emissions rate compatible with the Best Available
Retrofit Control Technology (BARCT), as early as possible but not later than 2004, for
turbines  used  as  peaking  units,  or  2003,  for  all  other  units.  To  prevent  market
manipulation,  utilities subject to BARCT regulations were prevented from selling NOx
allowances until 2007. Utilities that exceeded the limit on emissions could buy allowances
through the Mitigation Fee Program, at a price of $15,000. The revenues generated by this
measure  were  then  applied  to  remove allowances  from the  market.  Additionally, non-
complying  utilities  were  also  penalized  with  an  equivalent  deduction  from  future
allocations (SCAQMD, 2001).
The new regulations reduced emissions far more rapidly than what was achieved
with emissions trading. In the 1994-2000 period, the yearly average rate of NOx reductions
was a mere 4 percent, far below the 7.5 to 11.9 percent projected by the SCAQMD and the
6 to 10 percent the EPA estimated for what direct regulation could have achieved (Johnson
and Pekelney, 1996; EPA, 2002). In the 2001-2003 period, when the biggest NOx sources
were de facto removed from RECLAIM, emissions went down by a yearly average of 11.2
percent. Still, the environmental target for 2003 NOx emissions was not met, nor was the
target for SOx emissions, with emissions reductions amounting to 59 percent for NOx and
45 percent for SOx. After trading resumed, between 2004 and 2013, the yearly rate of NOx
reductions dropped again to 3.2 percent.
With the aim of achieving further emissions reductions, the SCAQMD reviewed
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its  rules  and in  2005 implemented changes  to  RECLAIM. The revised allocation rule
would lead to a reduction of over 20 percent for NOx  emissions until 2011. Even with a
more stringent cap, though, NOx emissions reductions in 2013 relative to 1994 were just
71 percent, which is still below the 75 percent target that was to be achieved a decade
earlier. As for SOx emissions, the 2003 target was met only in 2010, but new regulations
and a revision of the cap, which will decrease by about 48 percent between 2013 and
2019, led to a 71 percent decrease in the 1994-2013 period (SCAQMD, 2015).
Empirical evidence also points to the creation of pollution “hot spots” due to the
spatial flexibility allowed by emissions trading. Lejano and Hirose (2005) modelled the
spatial dispersion of NOx with and without RECLAIM, concluding that there was a large
potential for the concentration of pollution in certain localities where a number of large
emitters, namely refineries, converged. Drury et al. (1999) reach a similar conclusion by
drawing a parallel with the observed concentration of VOC emissions that resulted from
using credits from car scrapping to offset emissions from refineries. In both cases, the
authors note that an environmental justice problem arises, since the localities where “hot
spots” are likely to occur have a much larger share of poor people and people of colour
than the regional average. While this problem can be attenuated through restrictions on
trading between different localities, based on continuous monitoring of local air quality,
the added transaction and administrative costs would significantly affect the attractiveness
of emissions trading compared to direct regulation.
Mobile  source  credits  were  also  problematic  due  to  the  possibility  of  car
scrappers  fraudulently  earning  MSERCs  by  scrapping  cars  that  were  no  longer  in
circulation,  even though no emissions reductions  resulted from it  (Drury  et  al. 1999).
Since the EPA never formally approved this mechanism for generating credits, its legality
was questionable. Following lawsuits filed by local environmental justice organizations,
eight out of nine firms that used MSERCs for compliance were penalized by agreeing to
invest in further emissions reductions and environmental improvement projects (Egelston
and Cohen, 2004).
Compliance  with  RECLAIM regulations  has  been  lower  than  acceptable.  An
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internal audit reported that in the first year 30 percent of sources had not installed CEMS,
while in 1999, about 40 percent of large sources and 80 percent of small sources still didn't
comply  with  the  reporting  requirements  (Drury  et  al., 1999).  Data  from audit  reports
furthermore  shows  that  there  were  always  facilities  that  failed  to  deliver  enough
allowances to cover their emissions, indicating that penalties for non-compliance were not
stringent  enough, with over  10 percent  of facilities not  complying with RECLAIM in
1994, 1996 and 2000.
Allowance  prices  have  been  low, reflecting  the  generous  allocation,  with  the
exception  of  the  2000-2001  energy  crisis  period,  which  affected  the  NOx market  in
particular. While before 2000, average allowance prices were always below $500 per ton,
in 2000 the average price for a NOx RTC reached $45,609 per ton. In 2001, the average
NOx RTC price rose to $52,237 per ton,  reaching a maximum of $124,000 per ton in
February. After the market interventions to stabilize prices, RTC prices dropped, with 2002
NOx RTCs being traded at an average $5,110 per ton, far below the $15,000 backstop
price (SCAQMD, 2003).  From 2003 to 2012,  allowance prices  for  current  year  RTCs
remained below $4,000,  so  the  backstop provision  was  never  again  used  (SCAQMD,
2014).
As with the ARP, it seems evident that the cost savings attributed to RECLAIM
can be explained by the sacrifice of emissions reductions, rather than the flexibility in
compliance (Moore, 2004). Furthermore, the experience with the 2000-2001 energy crisis
shows  that  “cap  and  trade”  systems  are  only  viable  when  the  cap  is  not  binding,  in
particular  when  banking  is  not  allowed,  and  can  easily  crumble  apart  when  the  cap
becomes binding.
             The NOx Budget
In  the  1990s,  tropospheric  ozone  (O3),  also  known  as  “smog”,  was  a  major
pollution problem in Northeast  and Mid-Atlantic  states,  where  many coal  plants  were
located. Considering that the ozone precursor NOx can be transported by the wind across
states and that inter-state  cooperation was needed, the 1990 CAAA created the Ozone
Transport  Commission  (OTC).  In  1994  the  OTC  states  signed  a  Memorandum  of
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Understanding to reduce their NOx emissions, which would be the basis for the creation of
a “cap and trade” system in 1999, the NOx Budget Program (NBP).
Following  the  1990  CAAA,  large  NOx sources  faced  Reasonably  Available
Control Technology (RACT) standards, which specified emissions standards compatible
with technologies like low-NOx burners. The NBP built on these regulations to subject
energy generating units with installed capacity of at least 25 MW, as well as industrial
boilers with heat input greater than 250 mmBtu per hour, to a global “budget” on NOx
emissions,  calculated  to  achieve  the  same  level  of  reductions  as  BACT  standards.
Emissions limits were to be lowered progressively, to reach a reduction of 55 percent by
2002 and 75 percent by 2005, relative to 1990 levels (Farrel  et al., 1999; Farrel, 2000;
Napolitano et al. 2007).
From 2003, the NBP entered a new phase, now being centrally administrated by
the EPA, rather than the OTC. This decision followed the 1998 EPA NOx SIP Call, which
required a total of 22 Eastern states, including the OTC states, to deliver SIPs detailing
measures to achieve an 85 percent reduction of NOx emissions from the 1990 levels. Due
to various court proceedings, the deadline for SIP submission was extended to October
2000, while the deadline for emissions reductions was extended to June 2004 (Burtraw
and Evans, 2003).
Emissions  allowances  in  the  NBP  were  distributed  freely  by  the  EPA  to
participating states  based on historic  emissions  and then redistributed by the  states  to
affected sources, according to state rules. States could set aside a part of the budget to
allocate allowances for new sources and energy efficiency or renewable energy projects.
States could also issue additional allowances under the Compliance Supplement Pool, to
reward early emissions reductions or avoid negative impacts on the electricity supply, in
the first two years of each phase of the NBP (Napolitano et al., 2007).
The NOx market operated only during the ozone season, from May to September,
when tropospheric ozone levels are higher due to the increased solar radiation. At the end
of this period sources had to deliver enough allowances to cover their accumulated NOx
emissions.
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As with other emissions trading systems, emissions monitoring was guaranteed
by the mandatory installation of CEMS for large sources and fuel use reporting for small
sources.  Non-compliance was penalized by reducing the following year's  allocation by
three times the number of excess NOx emissions.
Banking  surplus  allowances  was  allowed,  subject  to  limitations  given  by the
Progressive Flow Control mechanism (PFC). The mechanism applied when the number of
banked allowances from all sources exceeded the region's budget by 10 percent or more.
When this happened, a PFC ratio was calculated as 10 percent of the ratio between the
current year budget and the banked allowances and a 2:1 discount factor was applied on
the use of allowances above this critical level (Farrel, 2000). By having sources deliver
two allowances for each ton of emissions when the ratio of banked allowances used for
compliance exceeded the PFC ratio, this mechanism added a dimension of risk to banking.
Further flexibility was delivered by an opt-in provision, adopted by all states, that
allowed non-affected sources  to  voluntarily  join  the  NBP. Additionally, about  half  the
states included a provision that allowed sources emitting less than 25 tons of NOx to opt
out of the program and face an operating hour limit.
The NBP was to  be replaced in  2005 by CAIR, which implemented both  an
annual and an ozone season NOx markets, aiming to reduce NOx emissions by 61 percent
from 2003  levels.  State  NOx budgets  were  calculated  according  to  what  highly  cost-
efficient control methods could achieve and not according to each state contribution to
downwind pollution, an option that motivated the court decision to vacate CAIR in 2008
(McCubbin, 2009). In 2009, following the new court decision to keep CAIR in place until
a revised rule was approved, the CAIR NOx programs began. Banked allowances from the
NBP programs could be used in the CAIR programs without restrictions. These programs
were  in  turn  replaced  by  CSAPR  NOx trading  in  2015,  which  aims  to  reduce  NOx
emissions by 54 percent from 2005 levels.
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Source: EPA and OTC (2003)
During the 1999-2002 period, when the NBP implemented by the OTC was in
place, NOx emissions decreased by an average 3 percent per year, much less than the 8
percent  yearly  reductions  achieved  by  previous  regulations.  Even  though  the
environmental objective was met, with emissions being reduced by a total of 59 percent in
2002 from 1990 levels, the combination of generous allowance allocations and banking
allowed polluters to avoid having to invest in control equipment or technologies that could
lead to higher emissions reductions.
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Figure 6: Ozone season NOx emissions and budget in the OTC NBP, 1990-2002
(103 tons)
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Source: EPA (2009)
The 1998 SIP Call had a major impact on NOx emissions, which went down by
52 percent between 2000 and 2004, the final deadline for compliance. After this regulatory
push, polluters in the revised NBP did not reduce their emissions substantially and the rate
of yearly emissions reductions between 2005 and 2008 was again just 3 percent. Even with
the push, however, emissions reductions in 2005 from 1990 levels amounted to just 71
percent, below the initial objective of 75 percent, which was reached only in 2008.
 
59
Figure 7: Ozone season NOx emissions and budget in the SIP Call NBP, 1990-
2008 (103 tons)
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Source: EPA (2011, 2015)
With the replacement of the NBP by CAIR, emissions reductions are, so far, very
low, amounting to just 1 percent per year. Even so, the trading system is set to achieve the
2015 environmental goal, with emissions reductions in 2013 adding up to 42 percent from
2005 levels.
The  NOx market  has  been  characterized  by  a  large  use  of  banking  and
consistently  low  allowance  prices  (Burtraw  and  Evans,  2003;  EPA,  2011).  While
allowance prices increased to a record high of about $7,000 in 1999, due to fears over a
possible shortage of allowances, they stabilized at an average below $750 in the following
years of the NBP (EPA and OTC, 2003). The implementation of the SIP Call led to a
shortage of allowances and a new price spike, with allowances being sold for about $8,000
in early 2003 and dropping to below $3,000 in the summer, but in later years allowance
prices stayed below $4,000 and declined progressively, reaching $592 by the end of 2008
(EPA,  2006b,  2009).  With  the approval  of  CAIR,  between 2009 and 2012,  allowance
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Figure  8:  Ozone  season  NOx emissions  and  budget  in  the  CAIR seasonal
program, 2008-2013 (103 tons)
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prices dropped to an average below $30 (EPA, 2015).
Contrary  to  RECLAIM,  the  NBP  was  marked  by  significant  emissions
reductions. This is due mostly to the approval of tighter controls, with the SIP Call and
CAIR, to prevent inter-state pollution transport. The seasonal NOx market, however, faces
the  risk  of  following  the  route  of  the  SO2 market,  with  new regulations  increasingly
leading  polluters  to  install  control  equipment  rather  than  buying  allowances,  thus
corroding the market.
3.4 Conclusions
Soon after the 1970 CAA defined the NAAQS and the deadlines to achieve these
standards, the EPA started to introduce market-like principles in the air quality regulations.
The NAAQS were not challenged or revised according to cost-benefit analyses but rather a
mix of bubbles, netting, offsets and banking provisions were introduced to allow polluters
to evade some regulations by using credits generated from emissions reductions in other
sources. These provisions were then unified in the ETP, which, despite its name, was not
really an emissions trading system but rather a patchwork of flexibility provisions that
were  superimposed  on  pre-existing  regulations  and  that  were  subjected  to  many
restrictions.  The  same  characterization  applies  to  the  lead  averaging  program,  which
allowed refineries to face laxer rules for lead phase-out.
Experimenting with ad hoc flexibility provisions that emulated emissions trading
was a stepping stone for the development of the ARP, RECLAIM and the NBP, the first
emissions trading schemes to be implemented in the world. From the early 1970s, when
emissions trading literature started to take off, until the early 1990s, when several “cap and
trade” schemes were approved,  both the theory and practice of  emissions trading was
entirely US-based. The motives for the emergence of emissions trading as an alternative
policy instrument cannot, therefore, be found in general statements about inefficiencies of
direct  regulations  but  rather  in  specific  elements  of  US  politics.  In  particular,  the
conceptualization of emissions trading as a “third option” that could break the impasse
between a historical aversion of policy-makers to  taxes  and the polluters resistance to
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direct  regulation  follows  a  bias  in  Environmental  Economics  towards  crude
generalizations based on the US experience (Braadbart, 1998).
Emissions  trading appeared  firstly  as  a  means  of  discursively  reconciling  the
CAA standards with industrial  growth and environmental protection with the emergent
neoliberalism. While the first experiments appeased the growing anti-regulatory fervour
that reached its height with the Reagan administration, the national and regional emissions
trading  systems  implemented  in  the  1990s  appeased  the  fossil  fuel-based  industry, in
particular coal extraction and burning.
Following  the  US historical  experience,  we  can  trace  how emissions  trading
schemes  were  set  up  in  the  real  world.  First,  a  cap  on  emissions  was  defined  by
considering  the  merits  and  costs  of  available  technologies,  much  like  with  direct
regulation,  and then adding a margin  to  appease  polluters  that  led to  emissions  being
below the cap. Tradable emissions allowances were then distributed to polluters for free,
granting them economic rents proportional to historical emissions. Compliance with the
program was evaluated by installing equipment that measures emissions continuously and
with a high rate of precision. If polluters could not comply with the (modest) emissions
reductions mandated by the cap and allowance prices surged, government intervention in
the  market  would  assure  that  polluters  would  not  have  to  face  a  too  high  cost  of
compliance.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  stricter  environmental  regulations  led  to  increased
emissions reductions, the quantity allowances in excess of the cap would be high enough
to make allowance prices drop to a point where the emissions market would effectively be
terminated.
Using  US  emissions  trading  schemes  as  case-studies,  rather  than  analysing
theoretical abstractions, we can, then, present some important lessons about this regulatory
instrument. First, the practice of emissions trading largely preceded the theory, contrary to
what is implied by Hahn's (1989a) metaphor on the patient following the doctor's orders.
Second,  optimistic  arguments  raised  by  emissions  trading  supporters  regarding  the
possibility of the superior cost-efficiency and attractiveness to polluters of this instrument
leading  to  greater  emissions  reductions  (e.g.  Stavins,  1998,  Ellerman,  2005)  were
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misguided, as in existing “cap and trade” systems the cap was set according to emissions
limits present in standards from direct regulation. Third, the democratic case for emissions
trading is also misguided, since the historical evidence shows that the political process of
approving a “cap and trade” system, in particular regarding cap setting,  was not more
transparent  and  less  technocratic  than  the  process  of  approving  emissions  standards.
Fourth, informational requirements of emissions trading systems tend to be superior to
direct regulation, since these systems require gathering precise information on emissions,
while compliance with emissions standards can be evaluated through audits on pollution
control technologies, fuel use and other industrial data. Fifth, even though allowances can
be auctioned, raising revenue and preventing rent  creation and rent-seeking behaviour,
governmental authorities have chosen consistently to give them away to polluters. Sixth,
emissions trading can lead to the creation of pollution “hot spots”, which can only be
prevented  by  restrictions  to  trading  that  increase  transaction  costs.  Seventh,  while
emissions trading can provide important opportunities for flexibility in compliance, this
flexibility diminishes and eventually disappears as the cap is lowered or technology-push
regulations are approved. Eighth,  given the contrast  between real life experiments and
idealized emissions trading systems, it is clear that implementing emissions trading did not
simplify regulation but rather added new dimensions of complexity.
These  lessons  can,  hopefully,  inform  the  debate  on  instrument  choice,  by
transcending  simplistic  representations  based  on  an  opposition  between  non-flexible,
inefficient and complex “command and control” regulations and flexible,  cost-efficient
and  simple  “market-based  instruments”.  The  debate  should  rather  be  informed  about
perspectives on acceptable levels of pollution and costs of pollution control, development
trajectories and other societal understandings, to determine which instruments should be
included or excluded from the policy-mix. This chapter, by presenting historical data and a
critical review of the first emissions trading schemes, is a contribution to that debate.
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4 Actually Existing Carbon Trading: From Kyoto to the EU
ETS
“The carbon market is a politically created market and needs carefully calibrated
rules.” (EC 2014c: 5)
Climate change, resulting from the accumulation of anthropogenic greenhouse
gas emissions, mostly from burning fossil fuels, has resulted in increasingly widespread
and considerable environmental and social impacts. According to the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), its consequences include increased and more severe
extreme weather  events,  like  heat  waves,  hurricanes  and  floods,  which  lead  to  losses
namely in biodiversity, agricultural productivity and forest cover (IPCC, 2014). Given that
the most important greenhouse gas is CO2, which is pervasive in industrial production and
cannot  be  eliminated  through  abatement  technologies,  climate  change  mitigation  is
arguably the hardest challenge ever presented to environmental regulation. The challenge
has been met by introducing a new instrument, carbon trading, in a move that was both
innovative and contentious.
Until its introduction as a means of compliance in the Kyoto Protocol, in 1997,
carbon trading was an exotic idea to most policy-makers. Emissions trading theory and
practice was until  then a US product,  and the  idea that  industrialized countries  could
replace  domestic  emission  reductions  with  foreign  reductions  was  met  at  first  with
opposition and suspicion from most government and civil  society representatives. This
opposition, however, quickly gave way to acceptance and reformism. Whether this was a
positive or negative evolution depends on the performance of carbon markets, which this
chapter critically reviews.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The first section presents a history of
carbon trading in climate negotiations, which was at first a major point of dispute between
the US and most of the rest of the world and is now, as the centrepiece of international
climate  action,  one  of  the  most  important  issues  on  the  agenda.  The  second  section
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reviews the experience with the Clean Development Mechanism, which allows polluters in
developed countries to finance investment projects located in developing countries that
reduce emissions, receiving in exchange a number of credits equivalent to the reductions
achieved, which can be then used as a means of compliance with emissions commitments.
The third section reviews the history and the performance of the EU Emissions Trading
System, which is since its implementation the largest carbon market in the world. The
fourth section concludes by presenting a critical discussion of carbon trading based on its
history and the available empirical data.
4.1 Carbon trading in climate negotiations
             Negotiating the Kyoto Protocol
International  negotiations  on  climate  change  started  with  the  approval  of  the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in the 1992 Earth
Summit.  The  UNFCCC  included  the  non-binding  commitment  by  countries  listed  in
Annex I, which included Western European countries, the US, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand,  Japan,  Turkey  and  economies  in  transition  (Russia  and  Eastern  European
countries), to stabilize their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2000 at the 1990 levels.
Annex  I  countries  also  committed  themselves  to  create  national  inventories  of  GHG
emissions  and  sinks  and  develop  national  and  regional  strategies  for  mitigation  and
adaptation  to  climate  change.  Furthermore,  countries  listed  in  Annex  II,  which  only
included  industrialized  countries  not  considered  as  economies  in  transition,  were  to
promote “green” technology transfer to aid other countries. These commitments followed
the common but differentiated responsibilities principle, which places the burden of early
action on the countries with the largest historical emissions (UN, 1992).
Two important developments had already taken place when the UNFCCC was
negotiated.  First,  the  IPCC  had  released  its  first  assessment  report,  in  1990,  which
informed decision-makers about the perils of climate change resulting from anthropogenic
GHG emissions and recommended starting negotiations on an international climate treaty
(Houghton et al., 1990). Second, the possibility of meeting national commitments to GHG
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emissions reductions through emissions trading had already been raised and supported by
an UNCTAD (1992) report. Both the need to address climate change through reductions in
anthropogenic carbon emissions and the interest in allowing industrialized countries to
meet their obligations through carbon trading were, therefore, already on the negotiating
table in the early 1990s.
Further negotiations under the UNFCCC proceeded with the yearly Conferences
of  Parties  (COPs).  In  1995,  COP-1,  in  Berlin,  approved  a  mandate  to  complete
negotiations on a global climate treaty that would include binding commitments, with the
opposition of  the US and Australia.  The same mandate also initiated  a  pilot  phase of
Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ), through which carbon offsetting projects could take
place,  specifying  that  these  projects  should  result  in  real,  measurable  and  long-term
benefits, that these benefits should be additional relative to what would have occurred in
the absence of the project and that no credits would accrue to any party (UNFCCC, 1995).
Following the Berlin Mandate, the EU presented in March 1997 a proposal for a
15 percent emissions cut by 2010, which would be applied within in its borders through a
burden sharing agreement that set differentiated targets for each of the fifteen Member
States. The EU also proposed that OECD countries committed themselves to the same
target (Yamin, 2000). In stark contrast, in July the US Senate approved, by unanimity, a
resolution  that  prevented  ratification  of  an  international  climate  treaty  that  would  not
impose binding commitments on developing countries or was deemed to be too harmful
for the US economy (Byrd, 1997). The evolution of negotiations and the compromises
achieved  were  considerably  influenced  by  the  clash  between  EU and  US  negotiating
positions.
Negotiations on the first protocol on climate change concluded in COP-3, which
took place in December 1997. The Kyoto Protocol (KP) included binding commitments
for industrialized countries, averaging a 5.2 percent emissions reductions in the 2008-2012
period, from 1990 levels. Emissions targets oscillated from -8 percent to the EU-15 and -7
percent to the US to +10 percent to Iceland and +8 percent to Australia. The Protocol also
allowed these commitments to be met through international carbon trading and offsetting
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(UN, 1998).
Carbon  trading  was  introduced  by  allowing  countries  with  binding  emission
commitments to trade in emission allowances,  called Assigned Amount Units  (AAUs).
Additionally, two offsetting mechanisms were introduced: Joint Implementation (JI) and
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). While the former would apply to economies
in transition and the latter to non-Annex I countries, both would lead to carbon credits
being generated from emissions-reducing projects, following the experience with AIJ. To
avoid double-counting,  countries  that  sold  JI  credits,  called  Emission Reduction Units
(ERUs), had to retire an equivalent amount of AAUs, making JI essentially a different
form of emissions trading among Annex I countries. Countries that sold CDM credits,
called Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), did not face the same requirements, since
they didn't have binding emission commitments.
Both emissions trading among Annex I countries and the flexibility mechanisms
were supported by the “Umbrella Group”, which included the US, Japan, Canada, New
Zealand, Russia and Ukraine, and opposed by the rest of the world, represented by the
G77+China and the EU. The CDM, in particular, has its roots in a Brazilian proposal for a
Clean Development  Fund,  which  would  be financed by fines  payed by countries  that
exceeded their emissions limits and would be used to invest in adaptation and mitigation
projects  in  non-Annex I  countries.  The  US,  opposing  any type  of  sanctions  for  non-
compliance, managed to convince Brazil to change its proposal into a market mechanism,
in a move that was known as the “Kyoto surprise” (Werksman, 2002).
The US negotiating position in Kyoto was, therefore, based on the promotion of
international  carbon  trading  attached  to  (weakened)  binding  commitments.  The
contradiction between this position and the US Senate refusal to ratify any climate treaty
reflects  a  growing  division  between  industry  coalitions  following  opposing  strategies.
Since 1989, major polluters, including fossil fuel and energy-intensive industries, were
actively opposing climate action, through the corporate lobby Global Climate Coalition
(GCC). This industry coalition followed a strategy that was based on discrediting climate
science and presenting a possible ratification by the US of a climate treaty as a disaster for
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the US economy and a subsidy for foreign companies.  But by 1995 there was a new
coalition  forming  out  of  an  alliance  between  industrial  and  financial  firms  and
environmental NGOs to support carbon trading, through the International Climate Change
Partnership (ICCP). The pro-trading lobby was significantly strengthened by BP's decision
in May 1997 to leave the GCC and rebrand itself as an environmentally conscious firm,
following Dupont's example. Shell soon followed suit, leaving ExxonMobil isolated as the
only oil giant opposing a climate treaty (Kolk and Levy, 2001).9
The EU in Kyoto opposed carbon trading, proposing instead coordinated policies
and measures, some of which would be mandatory. While the G77+China also opposed
emissions  trading,  the EU failed to  get  widespread support  for the list  of  coordinated
policies and measures.  Its  stance was further  weakened by the demand to negotiate  a
single target for the EU, which would then be disaggregated into national targets for the
fifteen Member States according to an internal burden-sharing agreement. Since this was,
in practice, a “bubble” scheme, the US framed it as a zero-cost emissions trade, arguing
that EU's stance on carbon trading was incoherent (Cass, 2005).
At the end of the COP-3, opposition to carbon trading gave way an agreement
through which trading was to be voluntary and supplemental to domestic action and its
design details would be negotiated over the next years. Developing countries opposition to
international offsetting was watered down by the allocation of a share of the proceeds
from CDM projects to cover adaptation costs in developing countries that are particularly
vulnerable to climate change impacts (Grubb et al., 1999: 87-107). 
This evolution essentially  reflected a  victory for the US negotiators,  which is
illustrated by the similarities between the original draft protocol presented by the US and
the  final  text  of  the  KP (U.S.  Department  of  State,  1997).  Following  the  initial  US
proposals, not only carbon trading was included without any significant restriction but also
9 To be sure, this change of direction did not imply a support of stronger climate regulations. Both the
“climate denialist” and the “free market environmentalist” factions of the fossil fuel  industries followed
strategies aimed at getting powerful states to block strong transnational action in the emerging regulatory
institution that was then the UNFCCC (see Levy and Egan, 1998). This is evident in the speech that BP's
CEO,  John  Browne,  gave  to  announce  the  company's  new  “climate-friendly”  strategy,  in  which  he
nevertheless opposed drastic cuts in carbon emissions or a ban on the use of fossil fuels arguing that such
actions would compromise economic growth (Browne 1997).
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the  deadline  for  compliance  was  pushed into  a  2008-2012  commitment  period,  GHG
targets  were defined in  a  basket  that  included trace  gases  from industrial  processes  –
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) –, on
top of the most common gases – carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide
(N2O) –, included GHGs were converted into CO2 equivalent (CO2eq) using the relative
Global  Warming  Potentials  (GWPs)  and  carbon  removals  by  forestry  or  agricultural
activities  was deducted  from national  emissions  inventories.  Even though all  of  these
proposals were initially rejected by the EU and the G77+China, major concessions were
made to assure the US participation in the protocol, deemed essential for its survival. The
effort did not pay off, however, as the US chose not to ratify the protocol anyway.
             Post-Kyoto climate negotiations 
After  the KP was approved,  climate negotiations  proceeded with defining the
rules and procedures for carbon trading. The roadmap was set up in the 1998 COP-4, with
the Buenos Aires  Plan of Action (UNFCCC, 1999),  but  EU's  attempt to  save face by
limiting the use of carbon trading and the US's attempt to expand flexibility as much as
possible evolved into a standstill.
At the 2000 COP-6, in The Hague, the EU argued that no more than half  of
emissions reductions commitments should be realized through carbon trading, following
the supplementarity principle present in the KP, and defended a “positive list” of types of
eligible offset projects, which would exclude forestry and other activities related to carbon
sinks.  The  US,  on  the  other  hand,  argued  against  quantitative  or  qualitative  limits  to
offsetting. Regarding the role of sinks in carbon emissions accounting for industrialized
countries,  the  EU  wanted  to  limit  their  inclusion,  namely  because  of  the  scientific
uncertainties in measuring the carbon stored in  plants and soils,  while the US viewed
forest and agricultural activities that store carbon as a cost-effective means of compliance
(Gardiner, 2002; Zapfel, 2002).
The  clash  was  followed  by  the  US  unilateral  withdrawal  from  the  KP. The
decision was firstly announced in March 2001, through a letter from US President George
W. Bush to members of the Senate, declaring his opposition to the protocol and repeating
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the arguments given in the 1997 Senate Resolution (Bush, 2001). This was a major victory
for the GCC, even though the anti-regulation lobby was losing ground to the pro-trading
lobby and dissolved one year later (Meckling, 2011: 97-98). Removing the US from the
negotiating table did not mean that carbon trading was shelved in climate negotiations,
however, but rather that, paradoxically, it became easier for the rest of the world to reach
an agreement regarding how to implement carbon trading. The EU, in particular, gradually
reversed its opposition to unrestricted carbon trading, in part to appease US's allies in the
“Umbrella Group” (Cass, 2005).
The CDM rules were specified in the Marrakech Accords, negotiated at the 2001
COP-7 (UNFCCC, 2002). The accords addressed some reserves regarding carbon trading
by stating that developed countries had no “right, title or entitlement” over the atmosphere
and that the CDM should contribute to sustainable development, rather than be a means
for  evading  domestic  reductions  obligations.  Since  no  restrictions  on  trading  nor  a
quantitative limit to the use of carbon credits were specified, however, these norms were
merely aspirational and symbolic.
Concerns  with  the  CDM integrity  were  addressed  by establishing  a  complex
bureaucracy  composed  by  Designated  National  Authorities  (DNAs)  to  approve
participation in CDM projects, Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) to validate claims
made in each Project  Design Document (PDD) and a CDM Executive Board (EB) to
supervise the approval and monitoring of CDM projects. Regarding land-use and forestry,
concerns the accuracy of measuring carbon stored in soils and forests led to a compromise
solution whereby only afforestation and reforestation activities were included in the CDM
and Annex I parties could only use these credits for compliance up to one percent times
five of their 1990 emissions (Boyd et al., 2008).
As for JI, its guidelines for implementation were approved at the 2005 COP-11,
in Montreal (UNFCCC, 2006b). A JI Supervisory Committee (SC) was cast in the same
mould as the CDM EB but, considering that JI is very similar to emissions trading among
countries with emissions commitments, projects' host countries were allowed to bypass the
SC  approval  by  following  certain  requirements  regarding  emissions  quantification.
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Projects could then either follow “track one” and be “party-verified” or follow “track two”
and be “independently verified”.
Following Russia's ratification in 2004, the KP finally came into force in early
2005. Negotiations on the post-2012 emissions reductions then followed, with the Bali
Road Map, approved at the 2007 COP-13, specifying procedures to reach a new binding
agreement by 2009 (UNFCCC, 2008). At the 2009 COP-15, however, negotiations ended
on a standstill and no binding agreement was produced. Instead, a voluntary agreement,
the Copenhagen Accord, was submitted by the US and BASIC countries (Brazil, South
Africa, India and China), through which national pledges could be made with the objective
of limiting global mean temperature rise to 2oC (UNFCCC, 2009). The accord could not
become  an  official  UNFCCC  agreement  due  to  opposition  from  several  developing
countries  that  wanted  a  stronger  agreement  but  still  it  heavily  influenced  subsequent
negotiations.
Voluntary pledges for emissions reductions to achieve by 2020 would become a
part of the Cancun Agreements, negotiated at the 2010 COP-16 (UNFCCC, 2011). The
second commitment period for the KP was finally introduced at the 2012 COP-18, in the
Doha Amendment, which also added the gas NF3 to the basket of greenhouse gases to be
controlled  (UNFCCC,  2012a).  The  target  for  emissions  reductions  in  the  2013-2020
period, relative to 1990, was set at 18 percent.
The KP first commitment period, from 2008 to 2012, was characterized by weak
emissions  reductions  commitments  by  Annex  I  countries.  Global  emissions  actually
increased  by  45  percent  between  1990  and  2012,  even  though  most  industrialized
countries complied with their Kyoto commitments (UNEP, 2014). The apparent paradox is
explained largely by the relocation of polluting industries from Annex I countries to non-
Annex I countries. Comparing production and consumption emissions, Davis and Caldeira
(2010)  concluded  that  in  2004  22.5  percent  of  China's  emissions  were  exported  to
consumers  in  other  countries,  while  the  UK and France  imported  over  30  percent  of
consumption-based  emissions.  Since  emission  inventories  used  to  evaluate  Kyoto
commitments  are  conducted  according  to  production  emissions  and  not  consumption
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emissions, every time a factory moves from an EU country to China EU's emissions are
reduced, even if the factory is exporting all of its production to the EU.
The second commitment period can have even worse results. Emissions pledges
span from a 3 percent reduction for the US and a 20-30 percent reduction for the EU,
considering 1990 as the base year (UNFCCC, 2011). These targets, while unambitious,
can be weakened by the use of allowances from land-use change activities and “hot air”
allowances banked from the first commitment period. Russia and Ukraine alone, having
reduced their  emissions  by over  50 percent  of  what  was required,  accumulated  2.271
million allowances between 2008 and 2012, enough to cover nearly all 2012 emissions
from Germany, the UK, France and Italy (UNFCCC, 2014c). Considering the impact of
these extra allowances, which can be used subject to restrictions stipulated in the Doha
COP-18, Chen et al. (2013) estimate that pledges can lead to a 10-11 percent emissions
reduction in industrialized countries. Since economic growth in industrializing countries
will inevitably lead to emissions increases, however, Rogelj  et al. (2010) estimated that
global emissions could increase by 10-20 percent in the 2010-2020 decade even if the
pledges are met. The UNEP (2014) estimates a 6-12 percent increase over the same time
period but even with this less pessimistic estimate global emissions in 2020 will still be
about 18-23 percent higher than the level consistent with the 2oC target.
Concerning the post-2020 period, following the Durban Platform for Enhanced
Action, approved in the COP-17, a “new and universal greenhouse gas reduction protocol,
legal instrument or other outcome with legal force” will have to be negotiated by 2015
(UNFCCC, 2012b). It is currently uncertain what kind of agreement will emerge but the
history of climate negotiations tells us that it is unlikely that it will contain binding and
ambitious commitments. This conclusion is reinforced by Canada's decision to withdraw
from the KP in 2011, as well as Russia's, New Zealand's and Japan's refusal to deliver
pledges for 2020 (Chen et al. 2013).
Despite  not  being  able  to  produce  measurable  results  regarding  emissions
reductions,  climate  negotiations  have  been  successful  in  pushing  forward  new carbon
trading  and  offsetting  schemes.  The  Durban  Platform  introduced  the  New  Market
73
Actually Existing Carbon Trading: From Kyoto to the EU ETS
Mechanism (NMM), an umbrella term that can encompass diverse mechanisms for trading
in  carbon  credits,  beyond  the  CDM  and  JI.  One  option  on  the  negotiating  table  is
complementing project-based offsetting from the CDM and JI with sector-based offsetting,
through which carbon credits can be generated from whole sectors or regions, following
mitigation  plans  predicted  in  developing  countries'  Nationally  Appropriate  Mitigation
Actions (NAMAs) (UNFCCC, 2013). Another option is generating carbon credits from
activities  that  plant  or  conserve  trees,  as  predicted  in  the  framework  for  Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), approved at the 2013
COP-19, in Warsaw (UNFCCC, 2014b). 
These  new  flexibility  mechanisms  are  complemented  by  the  expansion  of
regional, national and sub-national carbon trading systems. Besides the regional carbon
market  in  the  EU,  national  carbon  markets  have  been  established  in  New  Zealand,
Australia,  Switzerland,  Republic  of  Korea  and  Kazakhstan  and  sub-national  carbon
markets  exist  in  the  US,  Japan,  China  and  Canada.  National  or  sub-regional  carbon
markets  are also under  consideration in Chile,  Mexico,  Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine and
Brazil (Kossoy  et al. 2015). These existing and proposed carbon markets operate under
different rules, namely regarding their mandatory or voluntary nature or the existence of a
cap on emissions, which makes it potentially very difficult to link different markets. As a
result, instead of converging towards a global carbon market, countries engaged in carbon
trading  seem to  converge  instead  towards  a  weakly  integrated  patchwork of  regional,
national and sub-national carbon markets.
Even though carbon trading has been expanding internationally, most trades are
still  concentrated  in  the  CDM and  the  European carbon market  (ibid.).  To assess  the
relevance of carbon trading, each of these schemes will be exposed and analysed in the
next two sections. 
4.2 The Clean Development Mechanism
The  first  step  towards  creating  international  offset  crediting  mechanisms  was
given with the inclusion of AIJ in the 1995 Berlin Mandate. Even though these projects
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could not generate carbon credits, they were attractive to investors that wanted to gain
experience  with  offsetting  and  enjoy  “first  mover”  advantages  when  a  crediting
mechanism was established. The latest AIJ assessment reported that the number of projects
increased from 37 in 1997 to 157 in 2006, most of which focused on the energy sector (80
percent)  and a majority of which implemented in economies in transition (55 percent)
(UNFCCC, 2006a).
Partially based on the experience with AIJ, the CDM was implemented in 2001,
allowing Annex I countries to prepare for KP's first commitment period by buying CERs
and banking them for future use. Considering the uncertainty regarding the future of the
KP, though, CERs only started to be issued in early 2006. Since then, the CER market has
grown rapidly and as of September 2015, a total of 1,614 million CERs were issued and
7,764 projects were registered, encompassing 108 host countries (UNEP DTU Partnership,
2015).
Project data also shows that CER supply is  highly skewed in favour of some
countries and technologies. Almost half of all registered projects and almost 60 percent of
CERs issued until  2014 had China as the host party, while India had about a fifth of
registered  projects  and  13  percent  of  CERs  issued.  In  total,  84  percent  of  registered
projects are located in the Asia and Pacific Region, while Africa has only 2.5 percent
(UNFCCC, 2014a).
These discrepancies can be explained in part by the replication, within the CDM,
of the limitations that developing countries face accessing financial markets, as well as the
correlation between industrial development and emission reduction potential (Jung, 2006;
Bohr and Dill, 2011). Furthermore, the considerable bureaucracy and high costs inherent
to project  approval  discriminate against  small-scale projects,  namely community-based
projects that can have a positive impact on poor regions (Lövbrand  et al., 2009). As a
result, CDM projects tend to channel finance to large polluters located in industrializing
countries.
This trend can also be illustrated by the distribution of CERs issued by project
type. Almost half of CERs issued during until the end of the KP first commitment period
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came from projects that rely on end-of-pipe reductions in non-CO2 gases, with a third
being issued to abatement of industrial gases (HFCs, PFCs, SF6 and N2O) and 11 percent
being  issued  to  CH4 abatement  in  landfills  and  coal  mines.  Although  investment  in
renewable energy accounted for 34 percent of issued CERs, almost half of this investment
was directed towards building large dams, while investments in solar energy, which can be
highly beneficial for local communities, accounted for a mere 0.2 percent of total issued
CERs (UNEP DTU Partnership, 2015).
An  example  of  a  particularly  problematic  category  of  CDM  projects  is  the
destruction of HFC-23, a waste gas that results from HCFC-22 production. Even though
HCFCs are ozone-depleting substances and its production is being phased out under the
Montreal  Protocol,  developing  countries  face  laxer  rules  and  only  have  to  reduce  its
production  by  10 percent  by  2015 and 35 percent  by  2020 (UNEP, 1987).  Industries
located in these countries can install HFC-23 incinerators and sell CERs according to the
conversion rate specified in the KP (the GWP), so that each ton destroyed is worth 11,700
CERs. Since marginal abatement costs are very low, below $1 per ton of CO2eq, HFC-23
elimination  is  a  highly  profitable  business,  even  in  China,  the  host  country  of  most
projects, where the tax rate reaches 65 percent (Shin, 2010).
The high profitability of HFC CDM projects raises doubts about their integrity, as
it actually makes economic sense to increase HCFC-22 production beyond the demand
just to earn CDM money. To address this concern, the CDM methodology for this project
category limits CER generation to historical levels of HFC-23 emissions but still empirical
evidence suggests that HCFC-22 production would have been lower without the CDM
revenue (Schneider, 2011).
Furthermore, profits from HFC destruction projects can be seen as an indication
of a waste of resources, since it is much more costly to buy CERs from these projects than
to subsidize the installation of HFC-23 incinerators. Even before the KP first commitment
period began, Wara (2007) estimated that paying HCFC-22 producers to install HFC-23
destruction  equipment  would  cost  only  €100  million,  saving  €4.6  billion  in  CERs.
Similarly, Shislov and Belassen (2014) report HFC-23 abatement costs from two CDM
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projects at US$0.1, far below the average carbon price of US$21 registered between 2008
and 2012. The estimates show how the CDM, taken as a subsidy, is highly cost-inefficient
and results in a massive rent to HFC destruction project developers.
Another critical issue with the CDM is additionality, that is, the requirement that
CERs are not attributed to emission reducing investments that would have happened even
if the project developers had not received CDM funding. This requirement is crucial to
guarantee  the  environmental  integrity  of  the  CDM. If  CERs are  generated  from non-
additional projects, then their use for compliance purposes leads to a net increase in global
carbon  emissions.  Furthermore,  developers  of  non-additional  CDM  projects  receive  a
windfall  profit,  since the revenue from selling CERs is not associated with any action
beyond business-as-usual.
Using  a  random  sample  of  registered  CDM  projects,  Schneider  (2009)
distinguishes four different approaches to assessing additionality. The first, positive lists,
automatically classifies a project as additional if it fits within a certain category. This is
rarely  used,  and  in  most  cases  the  CDM  EB  uses  a  combination  of  the  other  three
approaches:  barrier,  investment  and  common  practice.  Barrier  analysis  consists  in
demonstrating  that  there  are  barriers  that  prevent  the  project  from being  carried  out.
Investment analysis uses an opportunity cost approach to make the case that there is a
better  alternative  for  investing  the  funds  than  the  project.  Finally,  common  practice
analysis requires a demonstration that the technology or practice inherent to the project
type has not been extensively used in the relevant sector or region. All of these analyses
are problematic, since it is not clear what counts as a barrier or common practice or how to
establish financial attractiveness and project developers frequently make unsubstantiated
claims  and  fail  to  provide  detailed  data.  Furthermore,  many  projects  (a  third  of  the
reviewed sample) are retroactively financed, which shows that the concept of additionality
has been stretched to the point where the validation or registration date can be posterior to
the project activity start date.
Assessing  additionality,  like  calculating  a  CDM  project  contribution  towards
reducing  emissions,  is  not  merely  a  technical  task  since  it  involves  measuring  future
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emissions reductions relative to an imaginary baseline, which has to be somehow isolated
from an undetermined and possibly infinite set of possible futures. Project developers have
an incentive to inflate baseline emissions as much as possible and can be rewarded with
CERs for investments that would have been made anyway because they're profitable or
required  by  law.  On  the  other  hand,  since  non-additional  CERs  can  be  used  for
compliance, CER buyers do not have an incentive to discriminate against fraudulent CDM
projects. Given the impossibility of objectively determining additionality and the lack of
incentives for quality control in the CER market, the CDM becomes unregulatable, despite
the considerable technical apparatus set up around it (Lohmann, 2009a). 
Empirical  data  on  project  distribution  by  country  and  type,  as  well  as  on
additionality analysis, exposes the deep contradiction that exists within the CDM, since,
on  the  one  hand,  it  was  designed  to  minimize  the  costs  of  abatement  by  directing
investment in emissions reducing projects to where they are cheaper and, on the other
hand, it was purported to deliver sustainable development. The trade-off between these
two objectives has been widely documented (Olsen, 2007; Paulsson, 2009), as well as the
failure of the CDM to offer significant  employment,  health  or environmental  benefits,
while  having detrimental social and environmental effects  (Boyd  et al.,  2009; Docena,
2010; Shin, 2010; Ghosh and Sahu, 2011; Bond et al., 2012).
The main source of demand for CERs has been the european carbon market, but
new  rules  approved  for  the  post-2012  period  have  led  to  a  CDM  breakdown.  To
understand why, it  is necessary to analyse the evolution of the first large-scale carbon
market in the world, which was born out of a EU volte-face on emissions trading soon
after the Kyoto negotiations.
4.3 The European Carbon Market
             From resistance to adoption
The first attempt to regulate carbon emissions in the EU appeared at the time of
the Rio Summit, in 1992, when a carbon tax was proposed. Fierce opposition by industrial
lobbies and lack of consensus in the Council of Finance Ministers, however, made the
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proposal approval impossible and it was formally withdrawn in 2001 (Christiansen and
Wettestad,  2003). The failure to implement a carbon tax, combined with the failure to
promote its coordinated policies and measures approach in Kyoto and growing support for
carbon trading from industry lobbies,  Member States  and European Commission (EC)
officials, set the stage for a remarkable U-turn, with the EU quickly shifting from a major
opposer to a major supporter of carbon trading (Wettestad, 2005).10
In the run-up or shortly after the Kyoto climate summit, a growing number of
heavy polluters  changed their  stance  from climate action opposition  to  carbon trading
support. This trend was particularly evident in the EU as already in early 1998, the Union
of  Industrial  and  Employers'  Confederation  of  Europe  (UNICE,  now  called
BusinessEurope) was defending that the EU should introduce emissions trading between
companies  to  address  climate  change  (UNICE,  1998).  The  industry  association
representing energy suppliers, Eurelectric, went one step further and ran economic models
in its Greenhouse Gas and Energy Trading Simulations (GETS), starting in early 1999, to
estimate the effects of emissions trading. After realizing that utilities could profit from
passing through the opportunity cost of freely allocated allowances, Eurelectric became
another strong advocate for emissions trading (Meckling, 2011: 112-113).11
The two european oil giants, BP and Shell, went even further and actually set up
internal  carbon  trading  systems,  in  1998  and  2000,  respectively  (Christiansen  and
Wettestad, 2003). BP, in particular, had an instrumental role in the development of carbon
trading in the EU. On the one hand, its internal emissions trading system, which ran until
2002, was presented as a success case, since BP managed to reduce GHG emissions by 10
percent below 1990 levels and save over $650 million through increased gas venting and
flaring and increased energy efficiency (Victor and House, 2006). On the other hand, BP's
10 Damro and Méndez (2003) discuss the adoption of carbon trading by the EU not as a U-turn or as a
concession to the US but rather as a reconciliation of the competing policy paradigms: US free market
environmentalism and EU risk-prevention leadership. Carbon trading allows the flexibility that the US was
promoting, while also delivering the emissions reductions commitments that the EU was defending. We do
not follow this approach since it downplays the political relevance and the environmental effects of the EU
not only accepting carbon trading but also dropping its proposals for limits to trading in carbon allowances
and credits.
11 The opportunity cost of an allowance used for compliance is the market price that it would reach if it was
sold. Accordingly, opportunity costs are calculated as the market value of freely allocated allowances. 
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expertise allowed it to assign members of its staff to key lobbying positions in industrial
associations  like  UNICE,  as  well  as  being  invited  to  informal  meetings  with  EC's
Directorate-General for Environment officials (Braun, 2009). This two-tiered strategy was
complemented  in  2000  with  the  company's  rebranding  as  “bp:  beyond  petroleum”,  a
marketing move intended to convince the public that BP was no longer an oil giant but
rather  an environmentally-friendly energy company committed  to  solar  energy (Beder,
2002).
Some EU Member States were also experimenting with emissions trading after
Kyoto.  In 1999, Denmark introduced a carbon trading system for electricity providers,
implemented  in  the  2000-2003  period  (Pedersen,  2001).  More  significantly,  the  UK
created  an  Emissions  Trading  Group (ETG),  an  institution  created  in  1999 to  engage
industries and government bodies in a proposal for a national emissions trading scheme.
The ETG was set  up at  BP's  headquarters,  which was symbolic  of  the oil  company's
leadership role (Meckling, 2011: 111-112). The UK Emissions Trading System (UK ETS)
was launched following industry opposition to the proposed Climate Change Levy (CCL),
a tax on carbon emissions that would be implemented in 2001. The UK ETS was expected
to provide an early experience with emissions trading for businesses, help to establish the
City of London as an international centre for emissions trading and influence the design of
a future EU-wide carbon market (Von Malmborg and Strachan, 2005).
The  UK  ETS  was  a  mix  of  different  policies.  Industries  could  choose  to
participate  in  a  “cap  and  trade”  system or  in  a  “baseline  and  credit”  system,  facing
absolute or relative targets, respectively. Firms not incorporated in any of these systems
could also invest in offset projects and sell carbon credits (Rees and Evers, 2000). In any
case, firms could voluntarily participate in the system by participating in the 2002 auction
and bid emissions reductions pledges to be achieved over the 2002-2006 period, using
historical  emissions  in  the  1998-2000 period  as  a  baseline.  Participants  were awarded
carbon allowances for free according to their pledges, which were tradable and bankable.
Those that complied with the pledges were also rewarded with a share of the £215 million
that was made available as incentive payments. This generous subsidy raised the question
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of whether there were market participants that could be rewarded for emissions reductions
that would have happened anyway. In fact, an assessment of the UK ETS by the House of
Commons criticized this subsidy and concluded that some participants were rewarded with
incentive payments for emissions reductions that they had achieved prior to 2002 (House
of Commons, 2004).
Considering that the UK ETS was a complex overlap of different policies and
that it wasn't really an alternative to carbon taxation, which wasn't dropped, but rather a
form  of  compensating  polluters  for  the  costs  of  the  CCL,  its  conception  and
implementation by an industrial lobby can be seen as a symbolic step towards the political
acceptance  of  carbon trading (Nye and Owens,  2008).  Framing carbon trading as  the
business-friendly  alternative  to  taxation  and  regulation  in  the  UK was  seen  by  major
polluters like BP as a stepping stone towards making the same case in the EU.
Within  EU  institutions,  the  first  step  towards  carbon  trading  acceptance  was
given  only  months  after  the  Kyoto  climate  summit,  when  the  EC  published  its
communication on a post-Kyoto strategy (EC, 1998). In this communication, international
carbon  trading  and  offsetting  was  already  presented  as  a  means  to  achieve  emission
commitments at a lower cost for the EU industry. The door was opened also to setting up
an internal carbon trading system by 2005, to accumulate practical experience and prepare
for international carbon trading, which would take off in 2008.
This first step was followed in 1999 by another EC communication, on the KP
implementation,  which  announced  a  consultation  with  stakeholders,  Member  States,
businesses and NGOs on a carbon trading pilot phase (EC, 1999). This consultation was
conducted on the basis of a Green Paper exposing different design options for an EU
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). To bring together environmentalists, experts and
industry representatives to discuss on carbon trading in the EU, the European Climate
Change Programme (ECCP) was also created. Setting up the ECCP was fundamental to
legitimate  the  creation  of  an  EU  carbon  trading  scheme,  as  initial  opposition  from
environmentalists, represented in the federation Climate Action Network – Europe (CAN-
E), and industry lobbies, namely the Federation of German Industries (BDI), gradually
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evolved into reformism (Braun, 2009).
Consultations based on the Green Paper exposed divisions between polluters and
environmentalists (EC, 2000, 2001). On one side, industrial lobbies, represented namely
by UNICE and Eurelectric, mostly supported a voluntary EU ETS, with free allocation of
allowances and no restrictions  on the use of international  offset  credits.  On the other,
environmentalists,  represented  in  CAN-E,  supported  a  mandatory  ETS,  with  full
auctioning of allowances and severe restrictions on the use of international offset credits.
Even though the European Parliament's position on ETS design was largely convergent
with CAN-E's, the results of the consultation were heavily skewed in favour of industrial
lobbies' positions (Markussen and Svendsen, 2005; Vlachou and Konstantinidis, 2010).
Within Member States, initial reactions to the proposed EU ETS indicated a lack
of consensus. While the UK, Denmark, The Netherlands, Sweden and Ireland supported
carbon trading, other Member States were more skeptical. Germany, the largest emitter,
sided with its industrial lobby to defend voluntary agreements and oppose a mandatory EU
ETS in the pilot phase, a demand that was also supported by the UK. To tackle this initial
opposition, the EC conceded to a decentralized EU ETS, allowing states to define rules for
market participation (Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2009). The stage was now set for the EU
ETS implementation.
             Implementing the EU ETS
Following consultations, the EU ETS directive was approved in 2003 (EC, 2003).
The directive  established a  mandatory  carbon trading system,  starting  in  2005,  which
would  incorporate  CO2 emissions  from major  stationary  emitters.  Carbon  allowances,
called European Union Allowances  (EUAs),  would be distributed  for  free to  polluters
according  to  historical  emissions,  following  rules  set  out  by  each  Member  State  in
National Allocation Plans (NAPs). Offset credits from the CDM and JI were excluded
until 2007.
To monitor  EU  ETS  emissions,  a  Community  Independent  Transaction  Log
(CITL, later renamed to EUTL) was created to connect national registries (EC, 2004b).
Member  States  assessed  compliance  according  to  self-reported  emissions,  verified  by
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certified  independent  entities,  following  EU monitoring  and  reporting  guidelines  (EC,
2004a). Non-compliance was penalized with a 40€ fine for each ton of excess emissions,
which would rise to 100€ after 2008 (EC, 2003).
Following the pilot phase, from 2005 to 2007, the second phase of the EU ETS
lasted from 2008 to 2012, corresponding to the KP first commitment period. In Phase II,
the  number  of  participating  countries  increased  to  30,  with  Norway,  Iceland  and
Liechtenstein joining. The scope of the carbon market was also increased, by having non-
CO2 gases from the chemical sector included. Major reforms, however, were excluded, as
the EC (2006) recommended.
An exception to this rule was the inclusion of air transport emissions in the EU
ETS. Following a 2008 Directive, emissions from international flights from, to or within
the European Economic Area (EEA) were included in 2012 (EC, 2008b). The 2012 cap
was set at 97 percent of the average emissions in the 2004-2006 period, while the post-
2013 cap was set at 95 percent of the same baseline. Airlines were allocated a new type of
allowance, the EU Aviation Allowance (EUAA), which cannot be used for compliance by
other polluters. Free allocation of EUAAs covers 85 percent of emissions in 2012, and 82
percent  after  2013, with the remaining 3 percent  being given to  new entrants  or  fast-
growing airlines. To cover the remaining emissions, airlines can buy EUAs or EUAAs.
Additionally, airlines  can cover  up to  15 percent  of  their  emissions  with international
offset credits.
Accounting for the possibility of using allowances and credits, an early impact
assessment  carried  out  for  the  EC  estimated  that  emissions  reductions  from  airlines
resulting from their inclusion in the EU ETS would amount to 2.8 percent by 2020, which
is equivalent to one year's growth in emissions in a “business as usual” scenario (EC,
2006). Despite the limited impact, the new directive was opposed by the International Air
Transport  Association  (IATA),  representing  airlines,  as  well  as  by  many  foreign
governments (CEO, 2008). To appease opposition, the EU suspended participation in the
EU ETS for flights to and from non-EEA countries until 2016. By then, following a 2013
decision  by  the  International  Civil  Aviation  Organization  (ICAO),  an  agreement  is
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expected to be reached to develop a global market-based mechanism to regulate aviation
emissions, to be applied in 2020 (EC, 2013).
Environmental targets for Phase III, from 2013 to 2020, were first presented in
the “20 20 by 2020” strategy, which postulated a reduction of at least 20 percent in GHG
emissions and an increase to 20 percent of the share of renewable energies in EU energy
consumption by 2020 (EC, 2008a). The strategy predicted the possibility of increasing the
emissions reductions to 30 percent by 2020 if there was an international agreement that
committed industrialized countries to comparable targets, which became the EU official
negotiating stance in climate negotiations. It was also made clear that the EU was eager to
engage other OECD countries in creating an international carbon market.
The 2020 strategy also presented the guidelines for a EU ETS reform in Phase III
(Skjærseth  and  Wettestad,  2010).  The  reforms  included  incorporating  more  non-CO2
GHGs (N2O and PFCs) and industrial  emitters that  were previously excluded (namely
aluminium and ammonia producers),  replacing NAPs with harmonized allocation rules
and a single cap on CER use across the EU. The EU cap was set by having a yearly linear
reduction of 1.74 percent in allocated EUAs, to achieve by 2020 a 21 percent reduction
from 2005 levels. Auctioning was to replace grandfathering as the allocation method for
the  power  sector,  while  industries  were  to  receive  free  allowances  according  to  a
benchmark that reflects the best available control technologies and gradually converge to
full auctioning until 2020. 
Regarding the use of EUA auction revenues, the new rules specify that they are
distributed to Member States according to historical emissions, with the recommendation
that half of the revenues are used in mitigation and adaptation measures. Additionally, 2
percent of total auction revenue is redistributed to Member States with emissions in 2005
that  are  20  percent  below 1990 levels  and 10 percent  of  auction  revenue accruing to
relatively richer Member States is redistributed to relatively poorer Member States. New
sources can participate in the auctions of the New Entrants Reserve (NER), through which
300 million  EUAs will  be  sold  to  finance  carbon  capture  and storage  and  renewable
energy projects.
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Two important changes were made by the European Council to the auctioning
rule, though, to tackle industry and Member States opposition (European Council, 2008;
Skodvin  et  al.,  2010;  Vlachou,  2014).  First,  power  plants  that  provide  more  than  30
percent of national electricity in Eastern European countries will be given 70 percent of
EUAs  for  free  in  2013  and  will  only  face  full  auctioning  in  2020.  Second,  the
benchmarking rules were changed to increase the quantity of freely allocated allowances.
According to the new rules, the benchmark for each sector or sub-sector is calculated by
multiplying historical production levels with self-reported average emissions of the 10
percent  most efficient  installations,  using the pre-crisis  2005-2008 period as reference.
Industries that are deemed to be energy-intensive and exposed to international competition
will receive all of their benchmark for free, while the remaining industries will receive 80
percent of the benchmark for free, declining to 20 percent in 2020 and zero in 2027 (EC,
2009a, 2011a). 
EU ETS reforms further affected how offset credits can be used in Phase III.
Concerns with the geographical distribution of the CDM and how it led to subsidizing
competitors in industrializing countries supported a decision to restrict CER use to those
that were generated by projects located in Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Additional
credits  generated  from other  countries  can  be  used  only  if  these  countries  engage  in
international or bilateral agreements with EU. For developing countries that aren't LDCs,
the EU aims to replace the CDM with a sectoral crediting approach, through which whole
sectors can generate offset credits by achieving a pre-determined emissions threshold (EC,
2009b).
The limit on the use of offset credits was also revised. While the initial Phase II
limit to CER and ERU use was set at 1.4 billion credits, and 1.05 billion credits were
surrendered until 2012, the new rules specify a 1.6 billion limit that applies from 2008 to
2020 (Betz, 2015). With the new limit, half of Phase III emissions reductions from 2005
levels  can  be  met  by  surrendering  offset  credits.  On top  of  that,  the  new rules  allow
banking credits from Phase II to Phase III, up to a limit of 3 percent of 2005 emissions
(EC, 2008c).
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In 2011, two additional reforms were approved. First, CERs generated by projects
that destroy industrial gases were banned from use in the EU ETS from May 2013. The
decision  targets  both  N2O  from  adipic  acid  production  and  HFC-23  from  HCFC-22
production and was justified by the EC for the lack of environmental integrity of projects
that  destroy  these  gases  and  the  unequal  geographical  distribution  of  the  CDM  (EC,
2011d). Second, a “backloading” provision was approved to postpone the auctioning of
900 million EUAs until the end of Phase III. This ad-hoc decision was taken to address the
oversupply of EUAs, estimated at  almost two billion EUAs, and will  be implemented
gradually, with auction volumes being reduced by 400 million allowances in 2014, 300
million in 2015 and 200 million in 2016 (EC, 2011b).
The “backloading” provision will not reduce the number of EUAs in circulation
but merely reshuffle their temporal distribution. The EC actually expects the oversupply of
EUAs to continue to grow and reach 2.6 billion at the end of Phase III, and is currently
proposing that a Market Stability Reserve (MSR) is implemented after 2021. The MSR
would  allow  the  adjustment  of  auction  volumes  to  the  balance  between  supply  and
demand, by reducing the number of auctioned allowances if the excess supply is higher
than 833 million EUAs or increasing the number of auctioned allowances if there is an
excess demand over 400 million EUAs (EC, 2014b).
These reforms fell very short of what environmentalist NGOs advocated for: full
auctioning,  use  of  auctioning revenue in  climate  change related  investments,  stringent
quantitative and qualitative limits on the use of international offset credits and a 30 percent
reduction target for 2020 (CAN-Europe et al., 2007). Following the precedent given in the
2005 Green Paper, the 2007 consultations within the ECCP on the EU ETS review process
were  again  skewed  in  favour  of  industrial  lobbies'  interests,  which  is  unsurprising
considering that the european carbon market was created to placate opposition from major
polluters to environmental regulations.
On top of the changes made in the EU ETS in Phase III, EU institutions have
been discussing the future of carbon trading after 2020. The 2030 framework on climate
and energy indicates that the emissions target for Phase IV of the EU ETS, from 2020 to
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2030, will be a 40 percent emissions reduction, from 1990 levels, which will be achieved
through increased investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency and without the
use of international offset credits (EC, 2014a). This framework, in turn, follows a roadmap
for  a  low  carbon  economy  by  2050,  which  indicates  an  80  to  95  percent  emissions
reduction until 2050, to be achieved through the EU ETS (EC, 2011c).
The EU ETS reforms are intended to address some of the problems that have
plagued it during Phase I and Phase II. To ascertain its adequacy and effectiveness, we
now turn to an empirical review of the EU ETS performance.
             The EU ETS performance
The effectiveness of the EU ETS can be evaluated firstly by the evolution of
covered emissions.  The picture that  emerges from this  evolution is  not  very clear-cut,
however, since exogenous factors can lead to substantial variations in emissions.
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Source: EEA (2015)
During Phase I, emissions from covered sources actually increased by about 7.5
percent but during Phase II, emissions decreased by about 13.8 percent, following a sharp
decline in 2008-2009. Using the consistent scope correction calculated by the European
Environment Agency (EEA) to retrospectively add the emissions from sectors and gases
that were included only in Phase III, emissions reductions in the EU ETS from 2005 to
2014 reach a total of 23.7 percent.
The observed downward trend in the EU ETS emissions is consistent with the 19
percent decrease in GHG emissions in the EU registered in 2013, relative to 1990 levels,
which is very close to the 20 percent reduction target set for 2020 (EEA, 2014). But this is
not enough to determine the environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS, since emissions
reductions can be attributed to factors unrelated to the ETS. Among factors that explain
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Figure  9: EU ETS verified emissions and freely allocated EUAs, 2005-2014
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emissions reductions in the early 1990s, we can point out the replacement of coal plants
for  gas  plants  in  the UK and the  deindustrialization of  Eastern Europe (including the
former  Eastern  Germany),  as  well  as  the  relocation  of  polluting  industries  to  non-EU
countries.  More  recent  factors  include  the  approval  of  renewable  energy  and  energy
efficiency policies and the economic recession of 2008-2012.
Given the difficulties in separating the different factors that can lead to emissions
reductions,  early  estimates  on  the  EU  ETS  effectiveness  were  very  disparate,  with
Ellerman and Buchner (2008) estimating a 270 to 420 million tonnes of CO2  reduction in
2005-2006 and Anderson and di Maria (2011) estimating a reduction of 174 million tonnes
during  Phase  I,  compared  to  a  “business  as  usual”  baseline.  Ex-post  studies  using
empirical data instead of baselines delivered more pessimistic conclusions, indicating that
the reductions can be attributed to exogenous factors. Using data from the energy sector in
the 2005-2012 period, Nicolas  et al. (2014) estimate that, even though the carbon price
contributed to emissions reductions, the main factor was the increase in renewable energy
production, which in turn can be explained mostly by national policies unrelated to the EU
ETS like feed-in tariffs or green certificates. Gloaguen and Alberola (2013) went further
and estimated that, during the 2005-2011 period, emissions reductions in EU ETS covered
sectors  could  be  explained  almost  entirely  by  a  combination  of  increased  renewable
energy production, the economic downturn, improved energy efficiency and fuel switching
(from coal  to  gas),  all  of  which  are  factors  dependent  on  EU policies  and economic
variables  unrelated  to  the  carbon  market  evolution.  Similarly,  Bel  and  Joseph  (2015)
estimated that, during the 2005-2012 period, only 11.5 to 13.8 percent of the reductions in
EU ETS sources can be attributed to the carbon market.
Comparing the EU ETS verified emissions with freely allocated EUAs, in turn,
we  can  confirm that  overallocation  was  constant  over  the  first  two  phases,  with  the
exception of  the years 2007 and 2008.  Data from Phase III  shows that  the new rules
resulted in a major decrease in the number of freely allocated EUAs, of about 50 percent
between 2012 and 2013, even after the scope of the EU ETS was broadened to include
new gases  and sectors.  In  2014 only  about  half  of  emissions  were  covered  by freely
89
Actually Existing Carbon Trading: From Kyoto to the EU ETS
allocated EUAs, implying that the other half had to be covered with banked or auctioned
EUAs.
Disaggregating the EU ETS verified emissions by sector, we can infer that the
total emissions from stationary installations presents a strong correlation (r = 94%) with
emissions  from fuel  combustion.  This  indicates  that  the  yearly  variation  of  EU  ETS
emissions is determined mostly by the yearly variation of fossil fuel use in the energy
sector, since the correlation with industrial emissions is much weaker (r = 64%).
Source: EEA (2015)
This trend reflects an important division within the EU ETS. Even though energy
suppliers and manufacturing industries were integrated in the same carbon market, the two
sectors have faced different  allocation rules.  In particular, the energy sector  has faced
constant under-allocation, which implies that the overallocation present in the EU ETS
results entirely from a too generous allocation to manufacturing industries. This was not
incidental but rather part of the EU ETS design, reflecting the general conviction that,
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Figure 10: EU ETS verified emissions by sector, 2005-2014 (Mt CO2eq)
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while  energy  companies  could  easily  pass  through  the  cost  of  bought  allowances  to
consumers,  industries  were  prevented  from  doing  the  same  due  to  international
competition. In other words, the cost of the EU ETS has been borne almost entirely by
consumers through higher energy prices.
Source: EEA (2015)
Comparing free allocations with emissions also shows that the rift between the
energy sector and manufacturing industries has broadened considerably in Phase III. While
in  Phase  I  and II,  the  energy  sector  was  under-allocated  by  about  7  percent  and the
manufacturing industries were over-allocated by about 26 percent, in the first two years of
Phase  III  the energy sector  underallocation  reached 74 percent  and the manufacturing
industries overallocation dropped to 8 percent. This reflects the effect of new allocation
rules,  which  force  most  energy  companies  to  buy  all  of  the  necessary  allowances  in
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Figure  11:  Difference  between  freely  allocated  allowances  and  verified
emissions by sector, 2005-2014 (Mt CO2eq)
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auctions but exempt industries from the same requirement.
Since the EU ETS has been swamped with excess allowances, both EUA and
CER prices have been low and declining. This trend can be illustrated with the evolution
of spot markets.
Source: Caisse des Dépôts (2006, 2007, 2008).
EUA spot prices in Phase I were relatively high at first, reaching a peak high of
27€ in April 2006. After the data on EU ETS emissions and allocations from 2005 was
released, however, the EUA price dropped to 15€ in May 2006 and exhibited a negative
trend from thereafter. By early 2007, the EUA price was already near zero. This reflected
both the oversupply of allowances and the impossibility of banking EUAs for use in Phase
II.
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Figure 12: Monthly average EUA spot price, September 2005 – December 2007
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Source: Caisse des Dépôts (2008, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a, 2015b)
Since banking from Phase II to Phase III is allowed, the EUA spot price on the
two phases can be analysed together. The trend is very similar to what was observed in
Phase I, with prices being above 20€ at first but then declining steadily. After reaching a
peak 27€ in June 2008, the EUA price started to decrease and by September 2008, when
the global financial crisis hit the EU markets, the price plunged, dropping below €10 in
February 2009. After  a period of recovery, during which the EUA monthly spot  price
averaged at about €15, there was again a price slump in June 2011, following the recession
caused by the EU debt crisis. The EUA price reached a record low of 2.5€ in May 2013
and has slowly recovered thereafter, reaching 7€ in April 2015.12
12 Even though we concentrated on spot prices, EUA prices on futures markets have followed a similar
pattern.  Zhu  et  al.  (2015),  for  instance,  use  econometric  models  to  find  structural  breaking  points  for
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Figure 13: Monthly average EUA and CER spot price, February 2008 – June
2015
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During most of Phase II,  CER prices have followed the EUA price trajectory,
being traded at a discount that results from the limits on CER use and the uncertainty
regarding CER delivery by project  developers.  Accordingly, until  mid-2012,  EUA and
CER prices were highly correlated (r=97%), and the spread averaged 2.3€. In July 2012,
however, the EUA-CER price spread reached a record high of €4.11 and then grew to
more than €6 by the end of Phase II. By the end of Phase II the CER price had dropped to
zero and in Phase III it has stayed consistently below 1€.
This evolution reflects the EU ETS reforms that limit CER use in Phase III. Since
no bilateral CER purchase agreements were signed between the EU and third countries,
only  CERs  from projects  located  in  LDCs  are  now  accepted.  Furthermore,  EU  ETS
installations  have  already  surrendered  1.45  billion  CERs  and  ERUs  to  cover  their
emissions, which is 90 percent of the total 1.6 billion limit that applies from 2008 to 2020
(Kossoy et al., 2015).
The price dynamics of both EUAs and CERs is illustrative of the incapacity of
the EU ETS to deliver a  stable and non-negligible carbon price that  could facilitate  a
transition towards a low-carbon development path. This is due both to the difficulty of
enacting reforms and to the insufficiency of the reforms enacted.
The EU ETS Phase I was conceived as a pilot phase, during which industries, EU
authorities  and  Member  States  would  gain  knowledge  and  experience  on  emissions
trading.  During Phase I, up to 5 percent of allowances could be auctioned by Member
States during Phase I, but this provision was hardly used and nearly all allowances were
allocated to polluters for free. Allocations followed emissions historical data contained in
NAPs, which exhibited substantial variations in the methodologies used, despite the EC's
supervision (Betz  et al.,  2004).  Furthermore,  even after the EC revised original  NAPs
proposals to reduce Phase I allocations by 4.5 percent (Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2009), the
final allocation was still too generous, with EUAs exceeding emissions by 3 percent.
No  major  changes  were  made  in  Phase  II,  from 2008 to  2012,  even  though
serious  problems  with  EUA allocation  were  already  evident.  The  limit  for  voluntary
auctioning was increased to 10 percent, but still auctioning was negligible. Allocations
December 2012 EUA futures contracts in November 2008, June 2011 and November 2011.
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again followed rules set in NAPs and again, even though EC's revision reduced allocations
by 10.5 percent (Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2009), allocated EUAs still exceeded emissions
by about 3 percent.
By creating an asset with economic value and then giving it away for free, the EU
delivered a massive windfall to polluters. In particular, the power sector has been allowed
to earn windfall profits from increasing energy prices according to the opportunity cost of
grandfathered EUAs. This was already evident during Phase I of the EU ETS, with Sijm et
al. (2006) estimating a windfall profit for the power sector in The Netherlands of €300-
600 million  per  year. By the  end of  Phase  I,  Keppler  and  Cruciani  (2010)  estimated
windfall  profits  for the power sector from cost pass-through at €13 billion.  This trend
continued during Phase II, with Fell  et al. (2013) estimating a cost pass-through rate for
electricity suppliers of at least 100 percent in Germany, France, The Netherlands, the Nord
Pool Market and Spain. Windfall profits for the power sector in Phase II were estimated by
Point Carbon (2008) at €23-72 billion.
The practice of passing through the opportunity costs of freely allocated EUAs
also extends to energy-intensive industries, despite the fears of carbon leakage, i.e., the
relocation  of  industrial  production  to  countries  without  binding  emissions  constraints.
Econometric  estimates  from  de  Bruyn  et  al.  (2010)  suggest  that  industries  from  the
refineries, iron and steel and plastic sectors managed to pass on the full opportunity cost of
EUAs in most of their products between 2005 and 2008. This suggests that even industries
exposed to carbon leakage risk were able to reap a considerable windfall profit from the
EU ETS.
Similar conclusions can be reached regarding the inclusion of airlines in the EU
ETS. Nelissen and Faber (2012) estimated windfall profits accruing to aviation companies
in 2012 at €679-1,358 million, of which €436-872 million are due to passing through the
opportunity costs of free allowances and €243-486 million result from tariff increases in
intercontinental flights prior to the suspension of their participation in the EU ETS.
These empirical  estimates  expose a  major  weakness  of  the allocation method
chosen in Phase I and II of the EU ETS, which turned it into a “polluter gets paid” system.
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Grandfathering allowances,  instead of auctioning them, turns allowance allocation into
rent distribution. Accordingly, industries have competed among themselves for a larger
share of the rent created, equivalent to the value of freely allocated allowances (Markussen
and Svendsen, 2005). Since rent-seeking is a wasteful activity that adds nothing to social
product (Krueger, 1974), the cost of this waste should be considered when evaluating the
cost-efficiency of the EU ETS. 
Considering  that  windfall  profits  are  proportional  to  historical  emissions,
grandfathering also results in a redistribution of income from labour-intensive industries to
energy-intensive  industries,  which  can  lower  employment  and  increase  energy  use.
Moreover, by subsidizing industries according to their historical pollution levels, the EU
ETS has provided an incentive extend the lifetime of old dirty installations or even build
new ones. During Phase I, econometric estimates already pointed out that the EU ETS
made it  more profitable to  build new coal  plants (Neuhoff  et  al.,  2006).  Accordingly,
empirical evidence on Germany suggests that grandfathering during Phase I was a major
factor for a massive increase in coal plant investments (Pahle et al., 2011). In other words,
even  though  carbon  trading  is  supposed  to  incentivize  a  transition  to  a  low-carbon
development path,  in reality the EU ETS made european energy consumers face tariff
increases to support a subsidy to the dirtiest industries.
The new allocation rules applied in Phase III are intended to address the problems
associated with grandfathering by replacing it with auctioning as the allocation method.
Since the change is gradual, however, only by 2027 full auctioning is expected to take
place. Until then, EUAs will continue to be distributed for free, but the basis for allocation
is a benchmark representing historical emissions of the least polluting industries, instead
of historical emissions.
Allocating allowances according to benchmarks provides in theory an incentive
to reduce emissions up to the level of the less polluting installations in each sector or sub-
sector. In reality, though, calculating benchmarks is as much a scientific as a political
process  and,  therefore,  it  is  amenable  to  being  influenced  by  industry  lobbying.
Environmentalists  represented  by  CAN-E,  for  instance,  noted  that,  following  EC
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consultations with industry lobbies, the cement benchmark excluded from calculations the
production of cement substitutes and the steel benchmark was increased by 25 percent.
Since the baseline for production levels was set at the 2005-2008 median, i.e. at pre-crisis
levels, environmentalists estimated that these industries will not have to reduce emissions
or buy EUAs during Phase III (CAN-Europe, 2010).
Further problems lie in the free allocation of allowances to industries considered
to be at a significant risk of carbon leakage. According to EU ETS rules, these sectors are
defined as those with carbon intensity greater than 5 percent and trade intensity greater
than 10 percent or either carbon or trade intensity greater than 30 percent. The carbon
intensity is calculated as the ratio between the costs of allowance auctioning, using €30 as
a  reference  price,  and the  gross  value  added  of  a  sector,  while  the  trade  intensity  is
calculated as the ratio between the total value of international trade with third countries
(exports plus imports) and the total market size of the EU (annual turnover plus imports
from third countries) (EC, 2009a). But many industries that fall within this category can
easily switch to inputs with lower carbon intensity or pass through the cost of allowances
bought in international markets, namely those that benefit from country specific factors.
Taking this into account, Martin et al. (2014) suggested a new carbon leakage measure,
after interviewing managers in regulated firms, that extends auctioning to industries with
high trade intensity and low carbon intensity and redefines trade intensity to include only
international trade with developing countries. The authors estimate that even with a low
allowance price of €5 this decision could generate an additional revenue of €0.5 to €3.5
billion per year.
Industries  deemed  to  be  at  risk  of  carbon  leakage  are  also  being  awarded
subsidies in the form of state aid, to cover the costs of the expected increase in electricity
prices. A total of thirteen sectors and sub-sectors, including aluminium, steel, paper and
chemicals, are targeted by state aid, which can amount to 85 percent of eligible costs from
2013, 80 percent from 2016 and 75 percent from 2019. Additionally, electricity providers
can apply to state aid to cover up to 15 percent of investments in new coal or gas plants
that are “CCS-ready”,  i.e.,  that can be retrofitted to install  carbon capture and storage
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equipment (EC, 2012).
To sum up, the EU ETS has been characterized by a chronic excess supply and
allocation rules that result in massive giveaways to polluters. Even though the reforms
applied from 2012 were intended to address these problems, they fall short of what was
required. Without further changes in the horizon, at the end of Phase III, in 2020, the EU
ETS will still not provide a binding cap for emissions and carbon prices will likely remain
low.
4.4 Conclusions
Following the Kyoto Protocol ratification, a complex network of carbon markets
emerged, of which the CDM and the EU ETS are the most relevant. International climate
negotiations have since then put several new market mechanisms on the table but failed to
deliver binding post-2012 emission reductions commitments. While this evolution closely
follows  the  interests  of  industry  lobbies  supporting  carbon  trading,  the  environmental
performance of market mechanisms is,  at  best,  dubious and it  is  unclear how it  could
improve in the future.
The  experience  with  CDM  exposes  the  difficulties  associated  with  attaching
climate mitigation investment in developing countries to a financial instrument that allows
industrialized countries to increase their emission levels. Sustainable development benefits
from CDM investments are negligible, since the logic of the market in carbon offsets is
based  on  minimizing  regulated  industries  costs  and  not  on  maximizing  social  and
environmental benefits from emission reductions. Furthermore, since project additionality
is impossible to prove, the CDM inevitably leads to offset credits being generated from
emission  reductions  that  would  have  happened  anyway,  thus  resulting  in  inefficient
investments and increased global emissions.  None of these problems are solvable in a
market where no participant has an incentive to care about the quality of the product being
traded.
The experience with EU ETS, on the other hand, shows what can and does go
wrong  with  trading  in  carbon  emissions  allowances.  Considering  that  the  premise  of
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carbon  trading  is  that  industries  can  be  pushed  into  transitioning  to  a  low-carbon
development path through the incentive that is provided by the carbon price set in the
market, the failure of the EU ETS to deliver a non-negligible and stable carbon price is a
failure of the system on its own terms. 
This  failure,  to  be  sure,  can  be  traced to  a  combination  of  overallocation  of
allowances and use of international  offset  credits  that  took the “cap” out  of  “cap and
trade”. The allowance overallocation, as well as the grandfathering that allowed polluters
to reap windfall profits, is an example of design problems that could be addressed by EU
ETS reforms,  as  opposed  to  inherent  and  consequently  unsolvable  problems.  But  the
distinction between design issues and inherent problems becomes less important as we
step outside textbook economics, as the inability of EU authorities to approve reforms that
could effectively address identified problems shows. 
Considering the dismal performance of existing carbon markets,  it  seems that
adopting carbon trading as an alternative to direct regulation and taxation was a costly
mistake. This begs the question of whether these carbon markets should be reformed or
dropped from the policy-mix, or, to put it another way, whether carbon trading could work
in theory. This question will be addressed in the following chapters, which deal with the
foundations and consequences of carbon trading.
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5 Slicing the pie in the sky: The science and politics of the
carbon commensuration black box
“Potentially at least, far from restricting the space of contestation, further
scientific calculations may serve to open it up.” (Barry, 2002: 274)
Following the Kyoto Protocol,  multiple carbon markets were created to allow
polluters to trade in emissions rights. In these markets, allowances from “cap and trade”
programs and credits from offset projects can be traded not only by polluters but also by
speculators interested in making a profit from price fluctuations and NGOs engaging in
market environmentalism by retiring allowances or credits bought. The question that is
rarely asked, while numbers flow from one computer to another, is what exactly is being
traded. This chapter engages with this important question by shedding some light on how
carbon market numbers are produced and how they relate to carbon emissions.
Carbon  trading  is  a  form  of  governing  and  managing  carbon  as  a  financial
commodity. Turning carbon into a commodity, in turn, requires abstracting carbon from its
social,  historical  and  political  context,  which  is  achieved  by  commensurating  carbon
across  space  and  time.  Carbon  commensuration,  as  the  social  process  that  creates
equivalences between carbon emissions by measuring them according to conventions of
quantification, is a “black box” that transforms the complex phenomenon of anthropogenic
climate  change  into  a  simple,  quantifiable  problem  of  too  much  (abstract)  carbon
emissions.  This  transformation  is  not  without  its  costs,  though,  as  everything  that  is
deemed to be irrelevant is obfuscated, including quantification uncertainties.
Because  the  numbers  produced by the  carbon commensuration  black  box are
fundamental to carbon trading, we propose to open the black box and explore the accuracy
and accountability of the quantification of carbon emissions, as well as expose the political
assumptions  that  lie  at  its  core.  While  the first  section presents  an analysis  of  carbon
commensuration as a mechanism for producing objective knowledge, the second section
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shows how the numbers produced by the commensuration process are misleading, due to
scientific  uncertainties  and  social  indeterminacies.  The  final  section  concludes  with  a
reflection on the role of numbers in climate policy.
5.1 Carbon commensuration as a black box
Commensuration is the process of using a common metric to measure different
entities (namely persons, countries or institutions), in order to compare them according to
intervals or ratios.13 By transforming qualities into quantities and delivering numbers that
can  be  easily  compared,  the  quantification  inherent  to  commensuration  produces
(apparently)  objective,  rational  and impersonal  knowledge,  which can then be used to
legitimize and simplify decision-making (Porter, 1996). Objectifying knowledge through
numbers, however, is costly because “it implies the existence of a heavy socio-technical
infrastructure that can assure its production” but also “in terms of reducing the normative
complexity  of  phenomena”  (Centemeri,  2008:  119).  Furthermore,  by  creating
“relationships between virtually anything”, commensuration “simultaneously overcomes
distance (by creating ties between things where none before had existed) and imposes
distance  (by expressing value  in  such abstract,  remote ways)”  (Espeland and Stevens,
1998: 324).
Carbon  commensuration  follows  from  the  quantification  of  emissions  using
methodologies grounded in scientific knowledge, but goes beyond this measurement to
create equivalences between emissions attached to different realities (MacKenzie, 2009).
This  process  is  central  to  carbon trading.  Setting  up  a  carbon  market  involves  firstly
creating the carbon commodity, which is specified both by its boundaries of tradability and
by  its  connection  with  carbon  emissions.  Creating  the  carbon  commodity,  in  turn,
necessarily involves commensurating carbon emissions across space and time, a process
that can be described as a “black box”, to borrow Latour and Woolgar's (1986) term, that
abstracts carbon emissions from their context.
Levin  and Espeland  (2002)  described  how emissions  commensuration,  in  the
13 Following Chang's  (1997) suggestion, when two entitites  can be ordinally ranked but not  cardinally
compared, we can conclude that the two entities are comparable but not commensurable.
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context of emissions trading, follows three dimensions: technical, value and cognitive. We
can illustrate these three dimensions using carbon markets.
Technical commensuration consists of the use of knowledge and technologies to
create accounting methods that allow for the monitoring of emissions. While scientifically
and  technically  complex,  this  operation  is  essential  to  evaluate  compliance  with  the
mandated emissions limits, both at  the aggregate and at the individual level. It is also
essential to create uniform commodities that can be traded in carbon markets.
Value commensuration consists of attaching a single monetary value to all carbon
emissions. This is achieved by the regular functioning of carbon markets, which, working
within the limits set by government regulation, set a price for allowances and credits.
Cognitive commensuration consists  of the amalgamation of polluters within a
category  of  “abstract  polluter”,  through  the  decontextualization  of  emissions  made
possible by technical and value commensuration. In other words, carbon markets do not
allow  us  to  see  the  qualitative  differences  between  polluters,  as  the  quantitative
reductionism that is at its base only allows differences to be expressed in quantities.
Following  this  framework,  the  three  dimensions  of  carbon  commensuration,
which are mutually reinforcing,  create  and reify new objects  (abstract  carbon and the
attached  allowances  and  credits)  and  new  actors  (abstract  polluters),  while  rendering
invisible or irrelevant information regarding how, where and when emissions occurred.
Carbon  trading  therefore  operates  on  a  reality  that  was  reconstructed  by  the
commensuration processes, which frames climate change as a problem that flows from an
excess of abstract carbon emissions. These processes, in turn, are a fundamental part of
both commodification practices and of the pollution as externality discourse, produced by
what Lohmann called the “endless algebra of climate markets”:
Commodity solutions always reinterpret and transform the social and environmental
challenges that they confront.  Their goals are never exogenous but are incessantly
reshaped  by  the  very  process  of  addressing  them.  Hence  the  ‘‘internalization  of
environmental  externalities’’  associated  with  market  environmentalism  is  better
conceived not as a (successful or failed) attempt at ‘‘environmental problem-solving’’
but  rather as a continuous changing of the subject.  In order to be ‘‘internalized,’’
environmental  harms  of  any  complexity  must  be  simplified,  reformatted,  made
abstract,  quantifiable,  and  transferrable  in  a  process  that  obscures  many  of  their
characteristics while introducing fresh problems. (Lohmann, 2011: 112)
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Carbon commensuration is also fundamental for to make carbon “manageable”.
Following the old management adage “you cannot manage what you cannot measure”,
many corporations, under the guise of Corporate Social Responsibility, are measuring their
carbon emissions, in order to plan and enact actions to reduce them. The resulting carbon
accounting,  which can be seen as  a  tool  to  generate  knowledge,  frame policy debates
and/or governing people (Lovell and MacKenzie, 2011), is able to generate sustainability
reports for corporations only at the expense of leaving out what cannot be translated as
physical  information  (Lippert,  2012).  Likewise,  “carbon  footprints”  value  individual
human actions  using abstract  carbon as  the commensurator, resulting  in  a  measure  of
individual responsibility that ignores social, political and historical constraints (Dalsgaard,
2013).
Carbon  accounting  reproduces  at  the  corporate  or  individual  level  the  same
carbon commmensuration process that frames climate change as a problem that can be
“fixed” by carbon trading. While calculative practices are arguably indispensable in any
climate policy, a market-based policy is highly susceptible to its shortcomings, since it
demands a high level of accuracy. In other words, unlike, say, technological standards, a
carbon market cannot be implemented on the basis of an interval for the emissions of each
regulated polluter but rather requires a specific number. Whether or not this number can be
accurately  produced by the commensurative  “black box” is  the  question  that  the next
section addresses.
5.2 Opening  the  black  box:  Uncertainties,  assumptions  and
misleading numbers
The Kyoto Protocol (KP) created binding carbon emissions reduction targets for
industrialized countries,  according to which each party is  attributed carbon allowances
(UN,  1998).  Following  Article  5,  compliance  with  emissions  targets  is  evaluated
considering carbon emissions from sources and carbon removals from sinks, which are
measured according to guidelines prepared by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) that reflect the best available scientific knowledge (IPCC, 1996, 2000).
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The targets are calculated as the carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2eq) of six greenhouse
gases  (GHGs):  carbon  dioxide  (CO2),  methane  (CH4),  nitrous  oxide  (N2O),
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). The
CO2eq of each gas, in turn, is calculated by multiplying emissions with the respective
Global Warming Potential (GWP). Article 8 of the protocol further stipulates that national
inventories (emissions minus removals) are verified by expert review teams. Since these
inventories reflect estimates and not real emissions (which are unknown), it is theoretically
possible for a party to the protocol to be in legal compliance even if its emissions exceed
the target.
The  issue  of  scientific  uncertainty  in  emissions  measurement  is  particularly
problematic  considering that  compliance with the KP can be achieved through carbon
trading. If estimated emissions from a party are below its target,  the party can sell its
excess allowances to another party, even if real emissions are actually above the target.
While the technical dimension of carbon commensuration presupposes that the scientific
knowledge  necessary  to  accurately  measure  and  commensurate  carbon  emissions  is
available, significant uncertainties remain in carbon emissions measurement. Furthermore,
the use of GWPs to commensurate GHGs obscures both the scientific uncertainties and the
normative assumptions present in its calculation. Both of these two issues can result in
profit  opportunities for entities engaged in carbon trading created by the measurement
methodologies, even while their emissions are not decreasing.
National carbon inventories are obtained using a mix of direct measurements and
estimations based on activity data multiplied by emissions factors. Uncertainty estimates
for industrialized countries' emissions inventories reviewed by Gupta  et al. (2003) reach
20 percent for CH4, 34 to 200 percent for N2O, 15 to 50 percent for HFCs, 20 to 100
percent for PFCs and 25 to 50 percent for SF6. Accordingly, Rypdal and Winiwarter (2001)
estimate  uncertainties  in  the  inventories  from  five  industrialized  countries  (UK,
Netherlands, US, Norway and Austria) at 5 to 20 percent. More relevant for compliance
evaluation, trend uncertainties, i.e., uncertainties in yearly changes in emissions, reach 4 to
5 percentage points for countries with available estimates (ibid.). Since this level of trend
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uncertainties is comparable with Kyoto's emission reduction targets for 2012, it follows
that compliance cannot be evaluated unambiguously (Winiwarter, 2004).
The use of GWPs to convert each GHG into CO2eq, the common metric used in
Kyoto's carbon trading systems, further adds uncertainty to emissions measurements. The
GWP was developed by the IPCC following a proposal made by the US government in
1989, which successfully argued for a “comprehensive approach” to climate policy and
research that included and commensurated all emissions and sinks, in order to prioritize
cost-efficiency (see Stewart and Wiener, 1992: 85-86). The first definition of the GWP in
the scientific literature is found in Lashof and Ahuja (1990) who present it as an extension
of the work done to commensurate ozone-depleting chemicals according to their Ozone
Depletion Potential  (ODP) and define the GWP as a metric that measures the relative
radiative forcing of each GHG, relative to CO2.
Estimates for the GWPs for several GHGs were then presented in the IPCC First
Assessment Report, calculated as:
GWP=
∫
0
n
a1 c1 dt
∫
0
n
aCO 2 cCO2 dt
Where  ax is  the  instantaneous  radiative  forcing  due  to  a  unit  increase  in  the
concentration of the gas x, cx is the concentration of the gas x remaining at time t and n is
the number of years considered for the calculation (Houghton et al., 1990: 58). Radiative
forcing  measures  the  difference  between  the  solar  radiation  absorbed  by  the  Earth
atmosphere  system and the radiation emitted  back to  space.  This  indicator  is  relevant
because  disturbances  in  the  equilibrium  between  planetary  radiation  absorption  and
emission, caused by increased carbon concentrations, lead to climate change.
According to Article 5 of the KP, compliance is evaluated using GWP estimates
from IPCC's (1996) Second Assessment Report, with n being 100 years. Since then, the
GWP estimates  have been periodically  recalculated by the IPCC. Table 1 shows how,
when recalculations were made, the GWPs for non-CO2 GHGs rarely remained unaltered.
Comparing the estimates used in the KP with the most recent estimates from the IPCC, we
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can see that the GWPs increased by 62 percent for CH4 and 26 percent for HFC-23 while
decreasing by 4 percent for N2O and 5 percent for SF6. Since GWPs are used to calculate
the CO2eq of each GHG, updating the GWP estimates has a proportional effect on the
profitability of carbon offsetting projects.
Table 1 – Global Warming Potentials (100 year integration time horizon) for
greenhouse gases included in the Kyoto Protocol
IPCC Assessment Report / Year
Greenhouse Gas I / 1990 II / 1995 III / 2001 IV / 2007 V / 2013
CH4 21 21 23 25 34
N2O 290 310 296 298 298
PFC-14 6,500 5,700 7,390 7,350
PFC-116 9,200 11,900 12,200
HFC-23 11,700 12,000 14,800
HFC-134a 1,200 1,300 1,300 1,430 1,550
SF6 23,900 22,200 22,800
Source: Houghton, Jenkins, and Ephraums (1990: 60), Houghton et al. (1996: 121), Houghton et
al. (2001: 386), Solomon et al. (2007: 211), Stocker et al. (2013: 114).
GWP recalculations made according to new scientific evidence are predicted and
even encouraged by the KP, but this has no practical effect. The formulation of Article 5 of
the  KP precludes  the  possibility  of  changing  the  GWPs  used  to  evaluate  compliance
during the first commitment period (2008-2012). Since the Doha Amendment to the KP
did not incorporate any change to Article 5, the 1995 estimates for GWPs will also be used
in  the  third  commitment  period  (2013-2020)  (UNFCCC,  2012a).  Precluding  GWP
estimates updating is fundamental to assure predictability in carbon trading investments,
which apparently was deemed more important in climate negotiations than assuring the
quality of carbon emission estimates.
Apart  from  the  scientific  uncertainties,  using  the  GWP  estimates  to
commensurate different GHGs is also problematic due to its sensitivity to the assumptions
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made in calculations, including if and how to incorporate indirect effects, the atmospheric
lifetime of each gas, the evolution of CO2 concentrations and the relevant time horizon.
One crucial aspect of these assumptions is that the GWP estimates have to be
periodically adjusted to reflect calculations of CO2 concentrations according to the current
treatment of the carbon cycle. These recalculations would be pertinent even if no scientific
uncertainties existed regarding the estimation of GWPs, given that the climate system is
not at an equilibrium state and that CO2 concentrations are increasing and will continue to
increase due to current and past emissions (Wuebbles et al., 1995). On the other hand, if
the objective of climate policy is to follow a certain emission reduction path, rather than
assure a certain level of emissions concentration, an index that varies with time would be
more adequate than the GWP (Wigley, 1998; Tanaka et al., 2009).
Another crucial aspect is the non-scientific nature of the choice of integration
time horizon. Choosing a shorter time horizon emphasizes the rate of climate change over
its  magnitude,  so  it  would  be  adequate  for  formulating  a  climate  policy  aimed  at
preventing medium-term abrupt changes in the climate system. Conversely, choosing a
longer time horizon emphasizes the magnitude of climate change over its rate, so it would
be  adequate  for  formulating  a  climate  policy  aimed  at  preventing  long-term,  chronic
changes in the climate system (Harvey, 1993).
Regarding  this  choice,  the  IPCC's  First  Assessment  Report  presented  GWP
estimates for three different time horizons, of 20, 100 and 500 years, but made it clear that
these were merely “candidates for discussion” that “should not be considered as having
any special significance” (Houghton et al., 1990: 59). The KP ended up using the 100-year
integration time horizon, but this was “not based on any published conclusive scientific
discussion” (Fuglestvedt et al., 2003: 292), nor, which is more surprising, on any explicit
political justification. It can be argued that choosing a long time horizon was coherent with
the objective of the UNFCCC, stated in Article 2, which is the “stabilization of greenhouse
gas  concentrations  in  the  atmosphere  at  a  level  that  would  prevent  dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” But this does not explain why a 100-
year time horizon was chosen over, say, a 500-year time horizon.
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A final critical issue with using GWPs to commensurate GHGs is the choice of
variable used to compare the climate impact of each gas. Contrary to what its name might
suggest,  GWPs do not  commensurate  GHGs according  to  their  contribution  to  global
warming, which can be measured by global temperature change, but rather commensurate
GHGs according to radiative forcing. If the objective of the KP is to stabilize global mean
temperatures, sea level rise and/or other climate change indicators, then the GWP is not an
adequate commensurator and climate models must be used to convert radiative forcing
into these indicators. If, on the other hand, the objective is to minimize ecological and
social impacts or welfare loss, socioecological and/or econometric models must also be
used.  Of course,  the further  we go down on the cause-effect  chain from emissions to
impacts and damages, the increased relevance of the commensurator used comes at the
price of increased complexity and uncertainties in calculations (Fuglestvedt et al., 2003).
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Figure 14 -  Cause-effect chain Emissions—Impacts—Damages
Source: Adapted from Fuglestvedt et al. (2003)
Each step in the cause-effect chain involves is marked by complex and non-linear
relationships. According to Smith and Wigley (2000b), the GWP overestimates forcing
changes, since it assumes constant background concentrations of GHGs and ignores the
non-linearities  in  the  relationship  between  emissions  and  concentrations  and  between
concentrations and radiative forcing. Some authors, however, have proposed to go further
down the chain.
Shine et al. (2005, 2007), suggest going one step further in the chain to calculate
the Global Temperature Change Potential  (GTP) for each GHG. Hammit  et al.  (1996)
further suggested going to the last step of the chain, to calculate an Economic Damage
Index  (EDI)  that  commensurates  GHG  emissions  according  to  their  contribution  to
discounted GDP loss. Also taking into account economic variables, Manne and Richels
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(2001) proposed instead to calculate the relative importance of each GHG on the basis of
the willingness to pay to emit one additional ton of the gas, considering its contribution for
global  mean  temperature  change.  An  IPCC  meeting  on  alternative  metrics,  however,
concluded that the GWP continues to be useful, since alternative metrics lack the scientific
basis to address the shortcomings identified with the GWP (IPCC, 2009). In other words,
using a more complex metric requires further research.
Changing  the  metric  used  to  commensurate  GHGs  significantly  changes  the
relative importance of non-CO2 short lived gases (Aamaas et al., 2013), with proportional
effects on the relative profitability of different investments in carbon offsetting. But any
metric that commensurates CO2 emissions reductions with non-CO2 emissions reductions
effectively creates an incentive to replace the former with the latter, whenever it is cheaper
to do so. Yet, since non-CO2 GHGs are short-lived and CO2 can remain in the atmosphere
for centuries, the equivalence established by the chosen metric does not hold in the long-
run.  If,  for  instance,  Kyoto's  carbon  trading  leads  to  a  CO2 emissions  increase,
compensated by a CH4 or  other short-lived GHG emissions reduction,  in  the long-run
radiative forcing and climate change consequences are increased (IPCC, 2009; Smith and
Wigley, 2000a). This problem follows from the choice of the GWP as the common metric,
as it  can lead to  a  significant  overestimation of the importance of  non-CO2 emissions
reductions  for  the  stabilization  of  global  temperature  change  (Johansson  et  al.,  2008;
Fuglestvedt et al. 2000).
To sum up, the GWP methodology followed by the KP implicitly assumes that
GHGs  can  be  traded-off  according  to  their  contribution  to  radiative  forcing,  CO2
concentrations  are stable,  the magnitude of change is  more important  than the rate  of
change and 100 years is the relevant time horizon. While all of these assumptions reflect
political choices, including the choice to sideline scientific uncertainties to promote carbon
trading with non-CO2 GHGs, none of these choices was made explicitly nor justified.
Instead, the political nature of the GWP was obscured by “black boxing” its calculations
and presenting the numbers as indisputable scientific facts.
The  available  scientific  knowledge,  then,  cannot  assure  the  quality  of  the
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numbers  produced  by  the  technical  dimension  of  carbon  commensuration.  But  the
scientific basis for the value and cognitive dimensions of carbon commensuration also
exhibits  significant  weaknesses,  considering  the  location  effects  of  GHGs  and  the
differences between emissions from land use and fossil fuel burning.
Global carbon trading, created by the KP, relies on the assumption that all carbon
emissions should be given the same value since the contribution of carbon emissions to
climate change does not depend on its location or timing. The assumption, however, does
not hold when carbon emissions are mixed with emissions of gases and aerosols that have
an indirect climatic effect, which is the case of fossil fuel burning and most industrial
processes that emit GHGs. Burning fossil fuels, for instance, releases not only CO2 and
CH4 but  also  nitrous  oxides  (NOx),  volatile  organic  compounds  (VOCs)  and  carbon
monoxide (CO), which contribute to the formation of the GHG tropospheric ozone (O3), as
well as affect the atmospheric lifetime of CH4. Considering these indirect effects, Berntsen
et al. (2006) conclude that the climate effect of reducing carbon emissions depends not
only on the time horizon over which the effects are considered but also on which gases
and aerosols are affected, the duration of the reduction and the chemical, physical and
meteorological  conditions  of  the  region  where  the  reduction  occurred.  Accordingly,
Shindell  and Faluvegi (2010) estimate strong regional variations in climate impacts of
multi-pollutant emissions from coal plants, which cannot be captured by global metrics
such as the GWP.
Attributing the same value to all carbon emissions is also problematic when it
involves accounting for sinks, that is, negative carbon emissions from land use activities.
This is the case of KP's inclusion of Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)
in industrialized countries' carbon inventories, as well as the inclusion of afforestation and
reforestation activities in the CDM, which allow sink enhancement to be used to offset
fossil fuel emissions. It is also the case of the proposed inclusion of Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) as an offsetting mechanism, which
would  generate  carbon  credits  from avoided  deforestation.  While  the  carbon  stock  in
unexplored  fossil  fuel  reserves  is  stored  geologically,  the  land  carbon  stock,  i.e.,  the
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carbon stored in forests and soils, is part of the active carbon cycle and therefore circulates
in  the  atmosphere.  In  a  policy-relevant  time  horizon  (which  can  go  from decades  to
centuries but is commonly taken to be 100 years, as the GWP formula shows), only the
fossil fuel carbon is permanently stored and the potential contribution of sinks to climate
mitigation is negligible (Mackey  et al., 2013). Commensurating land use and fossil fuel
emissions, therefore, leads to an increase in the transfer of carbon from fossil fuel reserves
to the carbon cycle, through fossil fuel burning, which aggravates climate change.
Commensurating carbon across sources and sinks also leads to an increase in
scientific  uncertainties  regarding  the  measurement  of  national  inventories.  While
measuring emissions from sources can be done directly (with monitoring equipment) or
indirectly (through calculations on the basis of fuel consumption),  measuring removals
from sinks  necessarily  depends  on  estimates  which  rely  on  complex  calculations.  To
unambiguously  estimate  variations  in  carbon  sequestered  in  the  world's  forests,  for
instance, it is necessary to not only have a common definition of forest but also use a
common methodology to provide accurate data on deforestation and its impacts on the
carbon  cycle  (Ramankutty  et  al.,  2007).  But  the  best  available  scientific  knowledge,
combined with advanced technologies  (like  satellite  remote  sensing),  is  still  unable  to
deliver such accurate data, due to scientific uncertainties and the high cost of measurement
technologies (Spalding  et al.,  2012). The lack of comparable and reliable historic data
further  adds  considerable  uncertainties  to  the  process  of  establishing  baselines  against
which to determine variations in forest cover (DeFries  et al., 2002; Harris  et al., 2012).
What is worse, even if accurate data on forest cover was available, inaccuracies could still
remain in the methodologies used to convert this data to estimates of carbon sequestration.
Likewise, carbon sequestration estimates for other carbon stock, like soils, are also prone
to significant uncertainties (Ogle et al., 2003; Goidts et al., 2009).
The  high  cost  of  gathering  data  on  carbon  sinks  further  leads  to  significant
omissions and imprecisions, namely in developing countries' carbon inventories (DeFries
et al., 2007). Transferring data from well-known carbon sinks is not an option, considering
that the carbon sequestered on terrestrial carbon sinks depends on regional variables and
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exhibits  seasonal  changes.  It  is  also  climate-dependent,  meaning  that  carbon  sinks
estimates have to be revised downwards as the global climate changes (Friedlingstein et
al.,  2006).  Regional,  seasonal  and climatic  variations are important  enough to convert
sinks  into  sources,  temporarily  or  permanently,  and  magnify  uncertainties  in
measurements.
In short, uncertainties and inaccuracies in land carbon measurement do not make
it possible to unambiguously determine the carbon outcome of land use changes, or even
its sign, with the exceptions being the transition from agriculture to forest regeneration
(which is certainly positive) and the transition from mature forest to agriculture (which is
certainly negative) (Ziegler et al., 2012). But this is not merely a scientific problem. Since
it  is  impossible  to  predict  future  human actions,  namely  regarding  land-use  practices,
social indeterminacies have to be acknowledged, which leads to abandoning the idea that
advances in scientific knowledge will eventually eliminate all uncertainties and produce
objective and value-neutral estimates of carbon sinks (Lövbrand, 2004). The inclusion of
sink enhancement as a means of compliance in the KP, therefore, can significantly widen
the gap between emissions estimates and real emissions.
5.3 Conclusions
Carbon trading requires carbon commensuration,  that is,  the social process by
which carbon emissions are quantified, given a single monetary value and abstracted from
their context. This process is not just an interpretation of the underlying reality, but rather
a transformation that renders irrelevant or invisible all the information about how, where
and when carbon was emitted,  while  creating  and reifying new categories  and actors.
Opening  the  black  box  of  carbon  commensuration  to  analyse  how  its  numbers  are
produced,  however, reveals  significant  uncertainties,  as  well  as  political  choices  made
without justification.
The implementation of a comprehensive approach to climate change, interpreted
as the creation of carbon markets where all carbon emissions can be traded, was based on
sidelining measurement uncertainties, in order to transform intervals into numbers. These
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uncertainties in carbon emissions quantification can make emissions estimates unreliable
to  the  extent  that  compliance  with  reduction  commitments  cannot  be  evaluated
unambiguously.  This  is  aggravated  by  the  use  of  a  common  metric,  the  GWP, for
commensurating different GHGs, which is prone to its own uncertainties and dependent on
implicit political assumptions that were never justified. Ignoring the effect of co-pollutants
and  including  sinks  without  considering  the  consequences  of  non-permanence  and
inaccuracies in data gathering further contributed to sidelining uncertainties. As a result, a
source can avoid reducing its emissions by buying allowances or credits even if these do
not  correspond  to  real  emissions  reductions  but  rather  were  generated  as  a  result  of
measurement errors. 
These errors could, to be sure, be partially corrected by advances in scientific
knowledge and measurement technologies. Berntsen  et al., (2005) argue that it could be
possible to directly measure national emissions using inverted models that use data on the
spacial  and  temporal  distribution  of  a  pollutant  in  the  atmosphere,  the  atmospheric
circulation and the natural emission sources and sinks. The authors note, however, that this
method would have to be substantially refined to deliver estimates for each country and
greenhouse gas with a low level of uncertainty, which implies that,  two decades after
Kyoto, carbon markets still lack the knowledge necessary to measure emissions with a
high degree of confidence, even though this is supposedly a major precondition for the
implementation of emissions trading.
Measurement errors, moreover, do not merely reflect scientific uncertainties but
also deep uncertainties regarding the evolution of societies and political choices regarding
the  objectives  of  climate  policy. There  is  no  technical  solution  that  would  render  the
comprehensive  approach  a  workable  alternative  for  climate  mitigation.  A reasonable
alternative that  would be compatible  with an effective climate policy would rather  be
based on accepting uncertainties regarding possible outcomes of human actions, which
would necessarily lead to different approaches for each type of carbon emissions source or
sink.  Accepting  uncertainties  as  a  fact  of  life  would  also  lead  to  following  the
precautionary  principle  and committing  to  deep emissions  reductions,  steering  climate
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policy into the lower end of the interval of possible climate change impacts. Clearly, none
of this is compatible with including carbon trading on the policy-mix.
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6 All carbon emissions were not created equal: Why carbon
trading fails
“The  carbon  market  doesn’t  care  about  sustainable  development.  All  it  cares
about is the carbon price…the carbon market is not going to be able to put sustainable
development and everything else into one price.” (Jack Cogen, 2005  apud Erion, 2008:
446).14
The Kyoto Protocol sets binding commitments for greenhouse gases (henceforth
designated as  carbon)  emissions  for industrialized countries.  These targets  can be met
through the use of two types of flexibility mechanisms: “cap and trade”, which allows
polluters to trade pollution allowances among themselves, and offsetting, which allows
polluters  to  exceed  their  caps  by  buying  credits  generated  from  projects  that  reduce
emissions elsewhere.
Both  instruments,  which  will  be  approached  here  using  the  umbrella  term
“carbon trading”, are justified on cost-efficiency grounds. As the argument goes, by not
discriminating carbon emissions, carbon trading allows polluters to choose their level of
emissions  and  abatement  technologies  according  to  their  cost  structure,  therefore
minimizing abatement costs (cf. Dales, 1968b). This follows mainstream economics focus
on finding the best instrument to put a price on pollution, which is understood as a market
failure  that  results  from unpriced  external  effects  of  production  (or  externalities).  The
climate policy debate,  then,  is  reduced to the relative merits  of a  carbon tax versus a
carbon trading system, in terms of their effects on economic efficiency (Parry et al., 1999;
Hepburn, 2007).
Efficiency arguments disregard how efficiency is but one of several values that
societies can pursue. From a value pluralist perspective, a richer climate policy debate can
14 President  and  co-founder  of  carbon  asset  management  firm  Natsource  and  ex-Chairman  of  the
International  Emissions  Trading  Association  (2008-2010),  personal  communication  at  a  2005  Montreal
Climate Conference side-event.
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be  had  by  understanding  climate  change  impacts  as  social  costs  of  private  economic
activities that are borne by societies as a whole. Following Kapp (1975: 13-25, 67-79),
these social costs are multi-dimensional, in the sense that they affect different dimensions
of  human  well-being,  and,  as  extra-market  phenomena,  fail  to  be  fully  captured  by
quantitative evaluations. This framework allows us to acknowledge both the existence of
value conflicts in climate policy and the impossibility of addressing these value conflicts
by assuming their commensurability, i.e., assuming that values can be traded-off with each
other (O’Neill et al., 2008: 70-81).
The Kappian approach on social costs also allows us to question the ends-means
dichotomy that is inherent to the characterization of carbon trading as the best means to
achieve a given end, which is taken to be a certain level of emissions reductions. As this
chapter will illustrate, even though carbon trading was purportedly conceived to address
then social costs of climate change, it also generates social costs of its own. This means
that different means (policies) lead to different ends (policy outcomes) and, therefore, that
the design of climate policies is both a process of adjusting means to ends and of adjusting
ends to means.
This  approach can be  further  enriched by articulating  the problem of  climate
policy choice with the debate on the limits of markets. Carbon trading is a fundamental
part  of  the  neoliberalization  of  nature,  which  comprises  relations  of  governance,
privatization, enclosure and valuation (Heynen and Robbins, 2005). It grants polluters the
possibility of delaying structural change by buying rights to pollute, while also creating
new financial markets that expand the frontiers of capital  accumulation.  Through what
Castree (2003) called the proxy commodification of the environment, trading in rights to
pollute and “ecosystem services” is discursively justified as a means of “selling nature to
save it” (McAfee, 1999). Yet, as Polanyi (2001: 75-79) warned, the commodification of
nature cannot “save it” but rather contribute to its destruction. Free market ideology, which
leads to costly and ultimately futile attempts to disembed the economy from society, is
particularly damaging when applied to nature which,  as a  fictitious commodity, is  not
something that is produced to be sold in a market but rather a condition for production and
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life itself. Following Polanyi, then, environmental policies should not hand out decisions
about the fate of the environment to the laws of the market.
Using  these  references  as  inspiration,  this  chapter  aims  to  present  a  radical
critique  of  carbon  trading,  focusing  on  the  negative  consequences  of  carbon
commodification and of the processes of commensuration and abstraction that support it.
First, we present the methodology for devising a taxonomy of normative critiques, based
on published critical literature. Second, we argue, following the taxonomy of normative
critiques, that carbon trading is ineffective, unjust, undemocratic and unethical. Third, we
discuss the possibilities and limitations of carbon trading reforms that could address some
critiques. The chapter concludes with a discussion on alternative ways to evaluate climate
policies.
6.1 Reviewing the critical literature on carbon trading
To produce a normative critique of carbon trading, we did a comprehensive and
systematic review of the relevant critical literature. We retrieved publications using the
generic  search  terms “carbon  trading”,  “carbon  markets”  and  “Clean  Development
Mechanism” in full text academic databases provided by major publishers (Elsevier, Sage,
Springer, Taylor and Francis and Wiley) and library services (EBSCO's Academic Search
Complete and Business Source Complete). Additionally, the same search term was used on
Google Scholar, to retrieve open access versions of publications  not included in these
databases. We then selected academic journal articles and books written in English, and
excluded  book  reviews,  news  articles,  interviews,  conference  proceedings,  reports,
comments and presentations. Given the objective of the review, publications were selected
on the basis of their abstracts. This resulted in the exclusion of four types of publications:
(1)  reformist  critiques,  i.e.  those  that  criticize  a  certain  correctable  problem in  carbon
markets  and  propose  ways  to  overcome  the  problem;  (2)  pro-emissions  trading
publications  that  reject  its  applicability  to  carbon emissions  on the  basis  of  technical,
economic or scientific obstacles; (3) empirical publications that present case-studies; (4)
publications that do not focus primarily on carbon trading, including those that present a
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broad critique of market-based environmental policies.
The database thus gathered of critical articles and books was remarkably small:
even though our original search in academic databases resulted in retrieving over 2,000
publications, our final database included only thirty one articles (Driesen, 1998, 2007a,
2007b;  Byrne  and  Yun,  1999;  Byrne  et  al, 2001;  Richman,  2003;  Bachram,  2004;
Lohmann, 2005, 2008, 2009b, 2009c, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Sandel, 2005; Baldwin, 2008;
Bumpus  and  Liverman,  2008;  Jones,  2009;  Pearse,  2010;  Spash,  2010;  Vlachou  and
Konstantinidis, 2010; Bohr and Dill, 2011; Aldred, 2012; Böhm et al., 2012; Childs, 2012;
Fletcher, 2012; Spash and Lo, 2012; Bryant  et al., 2015; Ervine, 2014; Vlachou, 2014;
Pearse and Böhm, 2015) and three books (Lohmann, 2006; Böhm and Dabhi, 2009; Reyes
and Gilbertson, 2009).
Most of these publications (nearly 80 percent of the total) were published after
2007, that is, a decade after the Kyoto Protocol was signed. One reason why it took a
decade for critical literature to take off might be that only in 2005 the first carbon trading
system was implemented, in the EU. Another possible reason was the publication in 2006
of a critical book by activist and independent researcher Larry Lohmann, which was made
freely available on the internet and is one of the most widely quoted references on this
carbon trading.15
15 To compare citations for carbon trading publications we used the citations analysis software Publish or
Perish (Harzing, 2007) to search in  Google Scholar, as it  is the most comprehensive database available.
Lohmann (2006) is the most quoted reference when we use the search term “carbon trading”, both in terms
of total number of citations and of the number of citations per year.
120
All carbon emissions were not created equal: A critique of carbon trading
After compiling and reviewing the critical literature, we grouped the arguments
given against carbon trading according to four normative principles that they appeal to:
effectiveness, justice, democracy and environmental ethics. By focusing on how carbon
trading disregards these principles,  we arrived at four normative critiques,  which were
substantiated, as needed, by complementary literature.
The  four  normative  critiques  are,  necessarily,  interconnected:  an  ineffective
climate  policy  unjustly  penalizes  those  who  cannot  adapt  to  climate  change,  an
undemocratic climate policy is also procedurally unjust and thus penalizes those who are
not consulted, an unethical climate policy undermines the motivation for mitigation action,
and so on. For analytical purposes, however, a taxonomy of normative critiques, which
can also be seen as a taxonomy of the social costs of carbon trading, is both useful and
illustrative, even if the boundaries between different categories are sometimes blurred.
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6.2 Four normative critiques of carbon trading
             1. Carbon trading is ineffective
Addressing climate change requires substantial emissions reductions, which can
only be achieved if  most fossil  fuel reserves are left  unexplored (McGlade and Ekins,
2015).  This,  in  turn,  requires  major  changes  in  production  and  consumption  patterns,
affecting all economic sectors, including industry, energy, agriculture and transportation.
Carbon  trading  is  ill-designed  to  promote  the  transformations  that  are  required  to
overcome fossil  fuel dependency and drives resources away from political actions and
technological innovations that can forestall fossil fuel extraction and burning (Lohmann,
2005). 
Modern  industrial  economies  are  characterized  by carbon lock-in,  that  is,  the
lock-in of high-carbon technological systems and the lock-out of alternative ones (Unruh,
2000). This is a result of increasing returns to scale on the adoption of new technologies,
which makes competition between technologies a path-dependent process that can “cause
the  economy  gradually  to  lock  itself  in  to  an  outcome  not  necessarily  superior  to
alternatives,  not easily  altered,  and not entirely predictable in  advance” (Arthur, 1989:
128; see also David 1985).  In addition,  the public  and private institutions that govern
adopted technologies can create non-market forces of lock-in (Unruh, 2000).
Transitioning  to  a  low-carbon  development  path  necessarily  involves
implementing  low-carbon  technological  systems,  which  can  only  be  achieved  by
positively  discriminating  investments  in  radical  innovations,  to  the  detriment  of
incremental  innovations  (Unruh,  2002).  Investments  in  renewable  energy,  energy
conservation  and other  alternatives  to  fossil  fuel  energy, then,  should  be valued more
highly  than  end-of-pipe  investments  in  technologies  that  reduce  emissions  but  do  not
displace fossil fuels in the long run, as the former lead to higher emissions reductions in
the  future  than  the  latter. Since  carbon  trading  fails  to  differentiate  between  different
emissions reductions of the same magnitude, it does the opposite, directing investments to
cheap  emissions  reductions  that  are  usually  associated  with  incremental  innovations
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(Driesen, 2007b).16 As a result, carbon trading reinforces carbon lock-in and makes the
transition away from fossil fuel dependence even more difficult.
This  incapacity  of  carbon  trading  to  acknowledge  path  dependencies  on
technological innovations is on par with the failure of the economic theory that supports it
to acknowledge path dependencies in control costs. Future control costs depend on the
choices made in the present on how to distribute carbon reductions across sectors, time
and greenhouse gases. These choices affect the price of carbon permits and credits, which
will have an effect on all prices in an economy, due to the fact that, in the present, all
goods use (fossil) energy in their production process as an input. The present and future
effect on prices, including prices of pollution control technologies, from variations in the
carbon price is uncertain and unpredictable (Spash, 2010; Spash and Lo, 2012). A climate
policy based on carbon trading, however, cannot incorporate this unpredictability, as it
implicitly  assumes a  stable  and predictable  relationship  between the  carbon price  and
carbon emissions.
The  incapacity  to  differentiate  emissions  reductions  also  undermines  carbon
trading's  effectiveness  in  the  present,  due  to  the  differences  in  the  local  effects  of
pollutants. As mentioned in the previous section, carbon emissions are usually released
into  the  environment  mixed  with  emissions  of  other  pollutants.  Many  of  these  co-
pollutants have not only a direct effect on air quality but also have an indirect climate
effect,  namely by contributing to the formation of tropospheric ozone (O3),  which is a
greenhouse  gas,  and  by  affecting  the  lifetime  of  methane  emissions.  The  timing  and
location of carbon emissions, then, matters when considering their climate effect (Berntsen
et al., 2006; Shindell and Faluvegi, 2010).
A third  reason  why carbon  trading  is  ineffective  is  the  failure  to  distinguish
16 It can be argued that carbon trading provides a lower incentive to innovate than performance standards
since  sources  with  high  abatement  costs  can  choose  to  buy  carbon  allowances  instead  of  investing  in
emissions-reducing technological innovations (Driesen, 2007a). The incentive to innovate might, however,
be larger with emissions trading for sources with low abatement costs, since these can choose to invest in
emissions-reducing technological innovations to sell carbon allowances at a profit, so the relative inferiority
or superiority of emissions trading in terms of incentives to innovation depends on the balance between
allowance buyers and sellers in the market (Malueg, 1989). Furthermore, the argument presented here is
unrelated to the discussion on incentives for innovation from different regulatory instruments and is rather a
variation of the argument on the relative inferiority of price instruments regarding incentives for radical
innovations (Mokyr, 1991).
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emissions  reductions  driven  by  policy  changes  from “paper”  reductions  derived  from
exogenous  events  or  from non-additional  CDM  projects.  The  first  source  of  “paper”
reductions is the “hot air” allowances that are generated as a result of economic crises.
One source of “hot air” is the early 1990s crisis that followed the disaggregation of the
USSR,  which  is  not  reflected  in  Russia  and  Eastern  European  countries'  emissions
commitments. Another source is the 2008-2012 global financial crisis, which led to an
increase in excess allowances held by EU countries. Allowing industrialized countries to
buy  “hot  air”  allowances  from  countries  that  reduced  their  emissions  due  to  factors
unrelated to the KP results in a net emissions increase.
The second source of “paper” reductions is non-additional CDM projects. For a
CDM credit to be considered eligible for compliance, it has to result from an emissions
reducing investment in a country from the global South which would not have happened
otherwise. Yet, as explained in chapter 5, this additionality requirement is both essential
and  impossible  to  enforce,  since  scientific  knowledge  and  technical  expertise  cannot
isolate a single baseline scenario, representing the business as usual emissions, from the
undetermined and possibly infinite set of possible futures (Lohmann, 2009c, 2010). The
classification of a project as additional and the estimates of emissions reductions achieved
by it  are therefore exercises in futurology or even in story-telling,  and any objectivity
claims attached to the numbers that these exercises produce are unfounded. Consequently,
the CDM, by replacing real emissions reductions in the present for imaginary emissions
reductions in the future that might happen for motives unrelated to the CDM or fail to
materialize, actually leads to a net increase in carbon emissions (Lohmann, 2011b).
Given the non-technical nature of the additionality problem, a technical solution
will necessarily fail. Furthermore, the nature of the CDM leads “bad” credits to drive away
“good” credits. In a market where consumers cannot evaluate the quality of the products
sold,  lower  quality  producers  will  drive  higher  quality  producers  out  of  the  market
(Akerlof, 1970). In carbon offset markets, not only are consumers unable to evaluate the
quality of the credits but will likely even be indifferent to it, since all that matters is that
credits are usable for compliance. Credit buyers will then prioritize low-cost emissions
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reductions, disregarding the environmental and social circumstances in which the credits
were produced (Byrne et al., 2001).
Finally, a  fourth  reason why carbon  trading  is  not  an  effective  instrument  to
address  the  climate  crisis  is  that  it  is  incompatible  with  an  ambitious  climate  policy.
Reducing the cap on emissions to  the level  that  is  compatible  with avoiding runaway
climate change, which is a 40 to 70 percent reduction by 2050 relative to 2010 (IPCC,
2014), would undermine and eventually eliminate opportunities for trading (Childs, 2012).
Moreover, approving regulations that lead to further emissions reductions, to compensate
for the ineffectiveness of carbon trading, inevitably leads to conflicts, as the reductions
generate an allowance surplus that can be sold to other sources or banked for future use. 
When carbon trading is a part of the policy-mix, the emissions reduction achieved
by  additional  regulations  can  be  compensated  by  an  emissions  increase  of  the  same
magnitude,  rendering  the  regulations  ineffective.  Additional  regulations  can  only  be
effective if they mandate polluters to reduce their emissions irrespective of the number of
allowances and credits  held.  This  would,  however, lead to  a  chronic excess  supply in
carbon markets and eliminate opportunities for trading. Carbon trading, then, can only
work when both the emissions cap and the additional climate regulations are unambitious.
             2. Carbon trading is unjust
Climate change impacts are not spread equally across societies but rather hurt the
vulnerable and the poor disproportionately, since affluent individuals and groups can adapt
to the changing climate more easily (Barker  et al., 2008; Comim, 2008). Since carbon
trading is ineffective in addressing climate change, it necessarily follows that it aggravates
climate injustices. But carbon trading is also unjust because it relies on abstracting carbon
emissions from their context and does not allow for the distinction of different emissions-
reducing projects or emissions-enhancing investments regarding their impacts on social
inequalities (Lohmann, 2008).
Any  climate  policy  encompasses  a  quantitative  target  for  carbon  emissions
(which can be a number or an interval) and the means to ration the carbon below the
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target.  Carbon  trading  rations  carbon  according  to  willingness  to  pay  and  income,
extending  the  extreme inequalities  of  access  to  goods  that  exists  within  and between
countries to carbon (Aldred, 2012). But carbon is not a product, rather it is an undesirable
byproduct, one that is pervasive across production processes, given industrial economies'
dependence on fossil fuels (Spash, 2010). Inequalities in access to carbon lead, therefore,
to inequalities in access to goods that are essential for subsistence. Since carbon trading
disregards  the  distinction  between  subsistence  emissions  and luxury  emissions,  to  use
Narain and Riddle's (2007) terminology, it inevitably aggravates inequalities. Furthermore,
carbon trading can  result  in  the  concentration  of  carbon emissions  and hazardous  co-
pollutants in local “hot spots”, aggravating living conditions for poor communities living
in the most polluted areas (Kaswan, 2008).
The deleterious effects of carbon trading on social justice are amplified as its
scope  increases.  The  CDM,  in  particular,  by  allowing  industrialized  countries  to
appropriate cheap opportunities for emissions reductions in the global South and evade
their climate commitments, amounts to a form of carbon colonialism (Bachram, 2004).
International carbon offsetting supports accumulation strategies of polluting industries in
the North by allowing them to export emissions reductions to the South, even though the
historical responsibility for climate change lies in the North (Bryant  et al., 2015). Even
though developing countries can profit from selling CDM credits, this benefit comes at the
cost  of  sacrificing  the  “common  but  differentiated  responsibilities”  principle  that  is
present, even if only symbolically, in the KP, their sovereignty and the interests of the
poorest and most vulnerable countries (Byrne et al., 2001; Richman, 2003; Bohr and Dill,
2011). Furthermore, the CDM benefits for the global South are allocated under conditions
of unequal exchange between buyers and sellers, making the CDM a form of accumulation
by  dispossession  (Harvey,  2003)  that  Bumpus  and  Liverman  (2008)  dubbed  as
accumulation by decarbonization.
Freely allocated allowances,  which are a pervasive feature of carbon markets,
also  lead  to  shifts  in  the  distribution  of  income  depending  on  these  allowances  are
distributed  across  polluters.  On  the  one  hand,  if  firms  are  able  to  pass  through  to
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consumers the opportunity cost of allowances they got for free, they get a windfall profit,
which reflects a transfer of income from consumers to polluters. On the other, if energy-
intensive industries face relatively laxer caps than labor-intensive industries, justified by
the exposure to  international  competition and the risk of  “carbon leakage”,  income is
transferred from the latter to the former, which can aggravate unemployment and stimulate
higher energy use. In short, while auctioning allowances leads to inequalities in the access
to carbon, freely allocating allowances leads to having governments distribute economic
rents to polluters, in a regressive and potentially corrupt slicing-the-pie game  (Vlachou,
2014).
Carbon trading also conflicts with intergenerational justice, which requires that
present generations abstain from actions that increase the probability of future harm and
compromise  future  generations'  needs  (Ekeli,  2004).  Banking  provisions  in  carbon
markets, which allow polluters to retain emissions allowances and credits that can be used
in the future, can induce greater emissions reductions in the present only at the expense of
increased emissions in the future. But, while the chemical composition of emissions does
not change over time, its social meaning and even its environmental impact (given the
cumulative nature of environmental problems) is constantly evolving (Levin and Espeland,
2002). Future generations, therefore, should have the right to review the goals of climate
policies  to  reflect  changes  in  values  or  scientific  evidence,  namely  by  increasing  the
ambition in emissions reduction targets, which inevitably colludes with polluters' rights to
use banked allowances and credits.
             3. Carbon trading is undemocratic
A democratic  climate  policy  presupposes  that  citizens  can  have  a  voice  and
participate in decision-making, while  decision-makers are held accountable to citizens.
Carbon trading conflicts with these goals, as public participation is a transaction cost that
hampers its efficiency (Kaswan, 2008).
According  to  the  democratic  argument  for  emissions  trading,  while  direct
regulation focuses the political debate on the cost and potential of technologies, emissions
trading rather focuses the debate on the acceptable levels  of pollution (Ackerman and
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Stewart, 1988; Sunstein, 1991). Since most people do not have the knowledge necessary to
participate in a debate on technologies but nevertheless have an idea about what is an
acceptable environmental state and what is the level of emissions reductions needed to
achieve  that  state,  it  follows  that  replacing  direct  regulation  with  emissions  trading
increases the accountability and democratic participation in the decision-making process.
This argument, however, does not hold when we take into account that it is not possible to
separate the discussion on means and ends, and therefore discussing what is an acceptable
level of pollution necessarily implies discussing what are the costs of reducing emissions
to reach that level of pollution, bringing into fore the discussions on control technologies
that emissions trading was supposed to dismiss (Heinzerling, 1995). Historical experience
with carbon trading illustrates this impossibility, since the EU ETS Directive determined
that  emissions  caps  for  covered  sectors  should  be  set  according  to  the  technological
potential for reductions, which is the same calculation made in Best Available Technology
(BAT)  standards  (Driesen,  2010).  Furthermore,  the  assumption  that  debates  over  the
acceptable  levels  of  pollution  are  (always)  more  accessible  than  debates  over  control
technologies amounts to a leap of faith of dubious validity (Heinzerling, 1995).
Given that decisions on where and how to reduce emissions,  how to allocate
carbon allowances and whether and in what terms is offsetting allowed have a profound
impact on social justice and climate change mitigation, it is to be expected that citizens
will  care  about  these  decisions  and not  just  about  the  emissions  cap.  Carbon trading,
however,  hands  decisions  on emissions  reductions  over  to  polluters,  traders  and other
carbon market  participants,  while  other  decisions  are  made in  an opaque process  that
makes policy-makers accountable to corporations instead of populations. Accountability to
consumers is also lost in the abstraction of carbon emissions, as carbon trading provides
little  information  regarding the emissions  abatement efforts  made by producers  or  the
location of the reductions (Baldwin, 2008).  Likewise,  democratic accountability is lost
when emissions  commitments  made by governments  can be overturned by purchasing
allowances and credits, making it possible for KP parties to comply with their reduction
commitments even if  their  emissions increased and even if  the allowances  and credits
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purchased to cover excess emissions do not reflect real emissions reductions (Driesen,
1998).
Accountability, to be sure, is not just about implementing accounting schemes
that  accurately  measure  emissions  and  trades,  using  the  best  available  scientific  and
technical knowledge. While such schemes could be of crucial importance to monitor the
environmental  performance  of  market  participants,  their  monopolization  by  a  narrow
professional class of quantifiers and validators excludes citizen participation in decisions
regarding the future climate and actions directed at securing this desired environmental
state (Lohmann, 2005). A quick perusal at documents produced over the years within the
climate negotiations on carbon markets by technocratic elites is enough for any non-expert
to feel increasingly flooded with indecipherable technical jargon, making it increasingly
hard for  environmental  NGOs and local  communities  to  participate  in  the  discussions
(Pearse and Böhm, 2015). Paradoxically, the increased accountability that improvements
on measurement and verification methods can bring to carbon markets is often achieved at
the cost of the decreased accountability of these methods.
             4. Carbon trading is unethical
A climate policy necessarily aims to change the individual and corporate conduct,
by fostering personal  and societal  values  that  have a positive effect  on environmental
morale. Carbon trading can have the opposite effect, by weakening environmental morale
and thus undermining motivations for behaviour change. Furthermore, carbon trading is
based on pricing and commodifying nature and its implementation runs counter the ethics
of shared responsibility and care for the environment that should be at the heart of climate
policies.
Carbon trading allows polluters to evade their obligations by buying allowances
and credits, even if these do not correspond to emissions reductions beyond business as
usual.  While  regulation  is  based  on  the  principle  that  pollution  is  a  wrong  and  thus
subjects polluters to fines, carbon markets are based on trading pollution rights, turning
fines into fees and removing the moral stigma that is properly associated with pollution
(Sandel, 2005). As a consequence, carbon trading can crowd out the environmental morale
129
All carbon emissions were not created equal: A critique of carbon trading
that  supports  behaviour  change.  This  effect  is  stronger than with environmental  taxes,
which  do  not  entirely  remove  the  moral  stigma  associated  with  pollution,  and  much
stronger than with direct regulation, which can even reinforce environmental morale (Frey
and Stutzer, 2008; see also Goodin, 1994; Frey, 1997). This is because direct regulations
and taxes have a clear expressive function which reinforces citizens' and firms' motivation
to refrain from causing harm to the environment, while buying rights to pollute legitimises
pollution, inducing a cynical attitude comparable to that of buying indulgences to absolve
past or future sins (Smith, 2007).17
A second moral objection to carbon trading is that it undermines the sense of
shared  responsibilities  and  sacrifices  that  cooperation  in  addressing  climate  change
requires (Sandel, 2005). Much like war time rationing systems, a carbon rationing system
will only be seen as fair and worthy of compliance if no individual or firm is able to buy
its way out. Carbon rationing, then, requires that everyone participates directly in reducing
emissions.  Furthermore,  the  moral  obligation  not  to  cause  harm cannot  justifiably  be
discarded by paying someone else to avoid causing harm, which is what carbon markets
allow participants to do (Hyams and Fawcett, 2013).18
Carbon trading is also unethical due to the commodification of the carbon cycle
and the concomitant creation of property rights over the atmosphere.19 This assertion holds
whether we consider the atmosphere to be common property or no one's property. If the
atmosphere is humanity's common property, then carbon trading is to be rejected because
it leads to an uneven access to the privatized atmosphere. If, alternatively, the atmosphere
is not the property of humanity but rather we are just its stewards, then no one can own the
atmosphere nor a right to pollute it (Aldred, 2012).
17 Even though firms are not individuals, the argument still stands for firms if they behave as if they were
motivated  by  environmental  concerns.  This  is  the  case  when  firms  follow  the  environmental  ethic  of
consumers to increase their market share or avoid boycotts, when firms want to appease governments in
order to prevent environmental regulations or when firm owners are environmentalists (Frey, 1992).
18 This argument was made eloquently, if also sarcastically, by Cheat Neutral (http://cheatneutral.com), a
spoof website that advertises cheat offsets, to be bought by people who cheat on their partners and sold by
people who commit to being faithful.
19 A common counter-argument from carbon trading supporters is the denial of the status of property rights
to carbon allowances and credits, as these only grant temporary use rights on the atmosphere (Caney, 2010).
This argument, however, ignores how a lease is a de facto legal property right, a fact illustrated by the legal
difficulties inherent to removing from circulation rights to pollute (Spash, 2010; Aldred, 2012).
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A fourth  ethical  objection  to  carbon  trading  is  that  it  relies  on  the  incorrect
assumption that the environment should be valued in market terms. Carbon markets set a
price for carbon, which can be taken to express the social cost of carbon, i.e., the value
that  compensates  for  the harm caused by emissions,  and thus  used  as  a  reference for
climate  policies  (Aldred,  2012).  This  conflicts  with  people's  commitments  to
incommensurable environmental values, which can emerge from an ethic of care for the
environment that is irreconcilable with the notion that the environment should only be
preserved if monetary benefits exceed costs (O’Neill et al., 2008: 70-88). 
These objections expose two major flaws in the consequentialist ethic that carbon
trading promoters follow (e.g. Caney and Hepburn 2011; Page 2013). First,  focusing a
climate policy on its consequences, measured by emissions reductions, neglects legitimate
concerns with justice and democracy. Second, the connections between motivations for
acting and the consequences of the act, illustrated with the consequences of removing the
moral  stigma of pollution,  creating a way for  firms to  buy their  way out of  reducing
emissions and pricing nature, are sufficient to show how carbon trading crowds out the
environmental ethic that is needed to induce behaviour change. This is yet another reason
why carbon trading is ineffective, which invalidates the consequentialist defence of carbon
trading in its own terms.
6.3 The  limitations  and  contradictions  of  carbon  trading
reformism
There  are,  broadly  speaking,  two types  of  answers  to  the  normative critiques
presented supra.  On one side, the radical answer, given in the critical literature that was
reviewed, consists in arguing that carbon trading should not be seen as an alternative for
climate change mitigation. On the other side, the reformist answer consists in arguing that
carbon trading can  be improved to increase its effectiveness, reduce injustices, promote
public participation and protect environmental ethics (Boyd  et al.,  2009; Caney, 2010;
Caney  and  Hepburn,  2011;  Page,  2011,  2012,  2013;  Newell  et  al.,  2013).  Social
movements and environmental NGOs that follow the former approach include Friends of
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the  Earth  and the  Climate  Justice  Now! coalition,  while  WWF, Greenpeace  and most
organizations affiliated with the Climate Action Network follow the latter approach.
Carbon  trading  reformism  is  supported  by  “pragmatic”  arguments.  As  the
argument  goes,  there  is  no  alternative  to  carbon  trading  and  that  the  debate  that
environmentalists should have is on how to improve it (MacKenzie, 2009; Dirix  et al.,
2015). In a more optimistic version of this political “pragmatism”, carbon markets are seen
as  an  on-going  in  vivo experiment  that  gradually  incorporates  solutions  for  the  new
problems it  creates  (Callon,  2009).  Since this  type  of  arguments  inevitably  emerge in
climate policy debates, it is necessary, at this point, to explain in detail why carbon trading
reformism is doomed to fail.
A first response to reformist arguments is to discuss what carbon markets are for.
As instruments of capital accumulation, carbon markets facilitate the commodification and
financialization  of  nature,  while  allowing polluters  to  evade  emissions  reductions  and
creating perverse  profit  opportunities  for  polluters  and financial  corporations  from the
climate  crisis  (Lohmann,  2006;  Böhm  and  Dabhi,  2009;  Jones,  2009;  Pearse,  2010;
Vlachou and Konstantinidis,  2010; Böhm  et al.,  2012; Fletcher, 2012). In fact,  carbon
trading stands out as one of the few regulatory instruments that was not only supported but
even promoted by some major polluters, including fossil fuel companies which could go
out  of  business  if  an  effective  climate  policy  was  approved  (Meckling,  2011).  Some
authors, though, even while acknowledging that carbon markets are instruments for capital
accumulation, maintain that they can also be instruments for decarbonization, ushering in
a new era of “climate capitalism”, if adequate reforms are made (Newell and Patterson,
2010;  Hahnel,  2012a,  2012b).  A critical  view  of  carbon  trading  does  not,  therefore,
provide a decisive argument for their abandonment, since it might be a necessary evil in
capitalist economies. The decisive argument is, instead, the insufficiency and infeasibility
of carbon market reforms.
That some of the problems with carbon trading can be mitigated through design
changes  in  existing  carbon markets  is  unquestionable.  The negative  impact  of  carbon
markets on income distribution could be attenuated by auctioning allowances using the
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revenue to compensate the poor for the loss of income. Increased monitoring and positive
discrimination  of  emissions  reductions  associated  with  renewable  energy  and  energy
efficiency would increase the effectiveness of carbon markets. A set of discount factors
and/or spatial restrictions to trading could be devised to account for the differences in
carbon emissions contribution to climate change. We could even have different markets for
different greenhouse gases or restrict trading to CO2. The banking of permits and credits
can be banned or penalized with a fee. The possibilities are endless.
All of these reforms involve restrictions to trading, diminishing the attractiveness
of carbon trading. Furthermore, it is is not clear if these reforms, even if they work as
intended, will not just end up creating new problems. New regulations will bring about
new loopholes which will be exploited by polluters seeking to evade costly emissions-
reducing investments, and the need for more reforms will emerge. As carbon markets are
patched  up,  they  become  more  complex  and  harder  to  regulate  and  transaction  costs
inevitably  increase.  Increasing  the  regulatory  apparatus,  in  turn,  comes  at  the  cost  of
expanding the power of the regulatory bureaucracy, which can increase corruption and
fraud even if the intention was to decrease it (Lohmann, 2009b).
Proposed carbon market  reforms also fail  to address  problems that  cannot  be
designed away. Establishing additionality for carbon offsets is not a technical issue but
rather a scientific impossibility, given that no one can predict the future. An ideal carbon
trading system would still conflict with other climate policies, since emissions reductions
achieved  by  these  policies  would  be  compensated  by  emissions  increases  elsewhere.
Carbon markets can never foster public participation and the democratic accountability of
climate policy because markets are not democratic institutions through which people can
express their values and vote on desired outcomes. Likewise, trading in pollution rights
inevitably implies the privatization and pricing of the atmosphere, the crowding-out of
environmental morale and the undermining of the shared responsibilities principle.
A final line of defense for a carbon trading proponent might be to argue that we
could design a completely different system of carbon trading in which tradable allowances
would be given to individuals, perhaps on an equal per capita basis, which would be used
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to cover their consumption emissions (Ayres, 1997; Fleming, 1997;  Fawcett and Parag,
2010). The overwhelming complexity of such a system, due to the number and diversity of
participants,  as  well  as the difficulties  of  having a carbon currency alongside national
currencies in all markets, however, is enough to understand how the administrative costs
of  implementing  personal  carbon  trading  would  be  far  superior  to  other  regulatory
instruments. Personal carbon trading would also generate new injustices, as it amounts to a
rationing system in which the relatively rich can buy their way out. Furthermore, it is left
unexplained by personal carbon trading proponents how it would help societal transition to
a low-carbon development path, when individual citizens do not have the power to affect
patterns  in  infrastructure  investments  through  their  shopping  habits.  In  other  words,
personal carbon trading would just unduly penalize citizens with higher consumer prices
for choices  made at  the government and/or firm level on issues such as  transport and
energy production.
Regardless of the direction that the never-ending process of reforming carbon
trading takes, it inevitably raises the fundamental question of whether it would still make
sense to use the term “market” to describe an increasingly complex and regulated system
for trading emissions allowances and credits. Carbon market reforms entail restrictions on
trading, which conflict with their cost-efficiency by raising transaction costs and reducing
polluters' flexibility in compliance. Much like lowering the emissions cap to a level that
requires  deep  emissions  reductions  from  all  polluters,  such  reforms  gradually  erode
opportunities  to  trade,  eventually  rendering  carbon  markets  irrelevant.  Carbon  trading
reformism, then, if taken seriously, is a failed project, not only because it undermines the
political justifications for adopting carbon trading in the first place but also because it ends
up being contradictory with the objective of saving carbon trading from itself. It is hard to
see how this project can be politically more realistic than dropping carbon trading from the
policy-mix.
6.4 Conclusions
The discussion presented here, based on the critical literature on carbon trading,
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allows us to see that carbon trading is ineffective,  unjust,  undemocratic and unethical.
Turning the  discussion  on its  head,  we can  postulate  the  criteria  that  climate  policies
should ideally follow. An effective climate policy would facilitate escaping carbon lock-in
and fossil  fuel  dependence,  acknowledge the  interactions  between different  pollutants,
exclude “paper” reductions, minimize conflicts with other climate policies and be based on
an ambitious emissions reductions commitment. A just climate policy would ration access
to carbon according to social needs and not income, address international and intranational
injustices in adaptation to climate change, exclude any means of subsidizing polluters and
allow future generations to review it according to their needs. A democratic climate policy
would promote citizen participation and accountability, instead of market participation and
accountability. An  ethical  climate  policy  would  recognize  the  wrongness  in  pollution,
promote a sense of shared responsibilities and exclude the privatization of the environment
or its valuation in market prices.
While perfect climate policies would be impossible to devise, several examples
of policies that respect at least most of these criteria can be easily brought to the fore,
including  those  that  support  community-based renewable  energy, energy  conservation,
public  transport,  agroecology or  waste  reduction,  reuse and recycling  initiatives.  Such
policies can foster a plurality of values and provide significant social benefits, whereas
carbon trading generates significant social costs.
Trying instead to  patch up a broken carbon trading system is  a  dead end for
discussions on climate policy. Reforming existing carbon trading systems could alleviate
some of the problems that they face, but only at the cost of increasing barriers to trade and
decreasing  its  political  support  by  polluters.  Since  some  problems  would  remain
unaddressed, while other new problems would emerge, the never-ending process of carbon
trading reformism would inevitably lead to an erosion of opportunities to trade in carbon
markets. How advocating for reforms that slowly kill carbon trading is more politically
feasible  than  dropping  carbon  trading  from  the  policy-mix  is  a  question  to  which
reformists have yet to provide an answer.
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7 Conclusions
In  the  1960s,  while  the  modern  environmental  movement  was  blooming,
mainstream economic theory incorporated concerns with excessive pollution by framing
pollution as an externality, a market failure that resulted from polluters not having to pay
for the costs  of pollution.  Addressing this  market  failure through Pigouvian taxes that
internalized the cost of pollution would maximize efficiency and bring pollution to its
optimal level. The Coasean critique, however, had already raised the possibility that, in the
real world, transaction costs and government failure would be significant enough to make
the case for intervention unwarranted, since in many situations the solution that maximizes
efficiency is to do nothing. Furthermore, while formally elegant, the taxation scheme was
hardly applicable outside the textbook, considering that pollution costs tend to be non-
linear, non-separable and uncertain, if not outright incalculable and incommensurable.
Emissions trading theory, which was emerging at the same time, offered a way
out of this conundrum. The general idea was to get rid of the externality concept and the
project of trying to calculate the optimum level of pollution, allowing instead a politically
constructed market of emissions rights to define the price of pollution. But Crocker (1966)
was still trying to devise a way to optimize the two air value dimensions (life support and
waste dump), while Dales (1968b) restricted his proposal to a market that would allow
reaching an exogenously determined pollution level at the least cost. The latter proposal,
which became known as “cap and trade”, was appealing, in theory, for its cost-efficiency,
simplicity and flexibility, when compared with taxation or direct regulation. Still, it took
two decades for it to be implemented.
The US started to experiment with emissions trading in the 1970s and 1980s,
with several provisions being juxtaposed with existing environmental regulations to allow
some  flexibility  in  compliance.  The  Emissions  Trading  Program consisted  of  netting,
offsetting,  bubbling  and  banking  provisions  that  allowed  polluters  to  trade  emissions
reductions in some sources for reductions in other sources,  while lead trading allowed
refineries to trade in lead credits, instead of meeting individual limits to lead in gasoline.
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These experiments were not yet real emissions trading schemes, but rather “baseline and
credit” schemes through which polluters could exchange credits without an emissions cap
being  defined.  Their  ad-hoc  nature  reflected  the  conflict  between  environmental
preservation and economic growth that the schemes were meant to resolve, but failed to do
so, since increased market oversight to guarantee environmental effectiveness increased
transaction costs, while increased regulatory flexibility to promote efficiency resulted in
widespread fraud.
The early attempts to introduce emissions trading gave way, in the 1990s, to the
first “cap and trade” systems in the world: the Acid Rain Program (ARP), at the national
level,  and  the  Regional  Clean  Air  Incentives  Market  (RECLAIM)  and  NOx Budget
programs at the regional level. The experience with these systems clearly disproves the
purported simplicity and low informational requirements of emissions trading. In reality,
emissions trading systems are characterized by a level of complexity that exceeds even
direct regulation, which makes monitoring harder and more expensive and discourages
public participation. Similarly, claims made by emissions trading proponents regarding the
possibility of it leading to increased emissions reductions do not resist the test of reality. In
contrast, emissions trading schemes in the US were characterized by unambitious caps and
rent distribution through free allocation of allowances. Since emissions reductions were
far  below what  could have been achieved with regulation,  the US government had to
implement  further  regulations  to  counteract  the  detrimental  effects  of  air  pollution  on
human health, which ended up eroding the opportunities to trade in emissions markets to
the point where these markets only exist in theory.
Given that the environmental performance of regulation and taxation in Europe
was far superior to the performance of emissions trading in the US, it seems surprising that
carbon  trading  was  introduced  in  the  Kyoto  Protocol.  Under  Kyoto,  not  only  are
industrialized countries allowed to trade in carbon allowances but also an international
offsetting  scheme,  the  Clean  Development  Mechanism  (CDM),  was  introduced  that
effectively  allows  these  countries  to  increase  their  emissions  beyond  the  global  cap.
Despite being opposed by a clear majority of countries, carbon trading was accepted in
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climate negotiations as a way to guarantee the US participation, and justified as a first step
towards an increasingly stringent global climate regulation.  But the US decided not to
ratify the protocol anyway and global emissions actually increased in the first commitment
period.  Even  worse,  climate  negotiations  have  not  evolved  towards  binding  and
increasingly tight  emissions  commitments,  but rather  towards the expansion of carbon
trading  through  the  creation  of  new  regional  and  national  carbon  markets  and  new
offsetting mechanisms.
Experience with Kyoto's carbon trading has proved disappointing. The CDM has
mostly financed investment  projects  that  reduce emissions  from trace gases  with high
Global  Warming  Potential  (GWP),  which  are  very  profitable  but  do  not  contribute  to
sustainable  development.  It  has  also  been  plagued  with  the  impossibility  of  proving
additionality and the inevitable attribution of offset credits to investments that would have
happened even without the CDM funding. The experience with the CDM is, therefore, a
good illustration of the trade-off between cost-efficiency and sustainable development.
As for the biggest carbon market in the world, the EU Emissions Trading System
(EU ETS),  it  resulted in  negligible incentives  for  emissions  reductions  and a massive
subsidy to large polluters. Since one major reason for the EU ETS failure to deliver a
stable and significant carbon price is the systematic overallocation of allowances and since
the free allocation represents an unacceptable windfall profit, some major reforms were
approved  for  the  post-2012  period  that  will  purportedly  address  these  issues.
Benchmarking was to replace grandfathering as the method for free allocations, in order to
attribute allowances based on environmental performance benchmarks instead of historical
emissions.  Auctioning  was  to  gradually  replace  free  allocations.  Some  of  the  most
problematic offset credits, associated with industrial gas CDM projects, became unusable
for compliance and only credits  from Least Developed Countries can now be used.  A
“backloading” provision delayed auctioning a part of allowances until 2020, in order to
temporarily remove some of the excess allowances from the market. But these reforms
were insufficient to effectively address the problems that the EU ETS faces, in particular
after the EU institutions backed down on their original proposals and approved a series of
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extensions and exemptions to the full auctioning rule. In short, not only did the European
carbon market face the same problems of the US “cap and trade” systems but also showed
how politically  unrealistic  it  is  to  expect  that  a “polluter gets  paid” system eventually
evolves through internal reforms into the “polluter pays” system that it was supposed to
be.
The history of Kyoto's carbon trading also shows how it faced new problems,
namely  regarding  the  quantification  and commensuration  of  emissions,  relative  to  US
emissions  trading  schemes.  While  the  latter  regulate  emissions  from  a  single,  easily
measurable  pollutant,  emitted  by  a  relatively  small  number  of  sources,  the  former
regulates emissions from several pollutants, some of which cannot be measured with a low
degree of uncertainty and emitted by a large and diverse group of sources. This raises the
question of whether the “black box” of carbon commensuration that measures, values and
abstracts carbon emissions and thus supports carbon trading is based on accurate data or
rather ignores inaccuracies and uncertainties. Analysing the scientific literature leads to the
latter conclusion.
Even though carbon trading's environmental effectiveness is supposedly assured
by  the  emissions  cap,  the  uncertainties  regarding  national  carbon  inventories  are
significant enough to make it impossible to unambiguously monitor compliance. These
uncertainties were magnified by the use of the GWP as a commensurator of greenhouse
gases, taking into account that its methodology relies on implicit political assumptions,
namely on the relevant time horizon and metric. The inclusion of land-use emissions and
removals  in carbon inventories further aggravated difficulties in monitoring emissions,
since the data these calculations rely on is plagued by uncertainties and inaccuracies. On
the  other  hand,  attributing  the  same  value  to  all  carbon  emissions  ignores  important
scientific facts regarding the role of co-pollutants in climate change and the difference in
permanence between fossil  and land carbon. Furthermore,  deep uncertainties regarding
possible  future  states  of  societies  cannot  be  mitigated  through  advances  in  scientific
knowledge and technology.
If carbon emissions from some activities and sectors cannot be measured with a
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high degree of accuracy, then a carbon trading system that includes all carbon emissions,
like the Kyoto system with its  “comprehensive approach” will  inevitably be based on
erroneous  data,  which  negatively  impacts  its  effectiveness  and  has  significant
distributional  effects.  But  the  processes  of  commensuration  and  abstraction  that  are
present in carbon trading raise more significant issues, that cannot be addressed with more
accurate  data,  since  they  relate  to  how these  processes  reconstruct  reality  and  render
invisible  or  irrelevant  information  on the emissions  “how, where and when”.  Using a
critical literature review as a starting point, these issues were grouped in four normative
critiques of carbon trading, exposing its ineffective, unjust, undemocratic and unethical
nature.
Carbon trading is  ineffective because it ignores the role of carbon “lock-in” and
the need to positively discriminate some relatively costly investments to overcome fossil
fuel dependence, disregards the contribution of co-pollutants to climate change and local
pollution problems, does not distinguish between real and “paper” emissions reductions
and is not compatible with an ambitious emissions cap and/or ambitious climate policies.
Carbon trading is  unjust because it  rations  access  to carbon (across  individuals,  firms
and/or  countries)  according  to  relative  income,  subsidizes  polluters  through  free
allocations and conflict with future generations needs through banking. Carbon trading is
undemocratic because it not only fails to avoid obstacles to public participation that are
present in environmental regulation but also hands decisions on climate policy to polluters
and carbon market actors, with accountability to consumers and citizens being inevitably
lost. Finally, carbon trading is  unethical because it turns wrongs into rights, undermines
the sense of shared responsibilities in climate mitigation, privatizes the atmosphere and
values the environment in market terms.
Not only are these critiques,  for the most part,  not dependent on how carbon
markets are designed but also the possibility of addressing some of the problems with
internal reforms is precluded by the very functioning of carbon markets. Even if some
reforms address some of the problems without creating new ones, their political feasibility
is always questionable, considering that they always imply restrictions to trade and the
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concomitant  increase in  transaction costs  and decrease in  cost-efficiency. Furthermore,
reformism,  taken  seriously,  would  inevitably  erode  and  kill  carbon  markets,  as
opportunities to trade are constrained by increasing restrictions.
To sum up,  then,  carbon trading has  failed  in  all  of  its  purported  objectives,
namely  deliver  larger  emissions  reductions,  compared  to  regulation,  provide  a  stable
carbon  price  that  would  push  the  economy towards  decarbonization,  simplify  climate
policy, increase democratic participation, make polluters pay for their pollution and, in
international politics, assure the Kyoto Protocol's ratification by the US. On the flip side,
carbon  trading  was  successful  in  “marginalizing  certain  types  of  futures  and  actors”
(Lohmann 2005:  230),  namely  the  type  of  technological  and institutional  innovations,
individual, communitarian and corporate behaviour changes, government regulations and
social actions that ease the transition towards a low-carbon development path.
Not only are actually existing carbon markets very different from the textbook
ones but carbon trading, even in theory, fails to provide an effective, just, democratic and
ethical  climate  policy. While  a  carbon trading proponent  can,  at  this  point,  ask about
alternatives,  we argue instead that  carbon trading is  itself  an alternative to both direct
regulation and taxation and that the question that must be asked is rather whether or not it
should be a part of the policy-mix. The present thesis, naturally, concludes that the answer
to  this  question  is  a  clear  “no”,  given  that  carbon  trading  is  ineffective,  imposes
unacceptable social costs and conflicts with other climate policies.
The question that climate policy theory has to answer, then, is what policies are
worthy of being pursued and what policies are not. To put it in other words, the most
important question is what policies should be on the menu, considering the social values
that they foster or hinder. Answering this question is beyond the scope of this thesis, but
obvious candidates include feed-in tariffs to support renewable energy, an environmental
tax reform that does away with fossil fuel subsidies and other dispositions incompatible
with  climate  mitigation,  public  investment  in  energy  efficiency  and  conservation,
improved  regulation  to  cut  down  on  packaging  waste  and  increase  the  lifetime  of
consumer goods, increased waste recycling, agricultural policy reform to promote agro-
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ecological modes of production, direct regulation of polluting industries through emissions
standards and transport policies that favour public transport and non-polluting modes of
transportation. At the international level, financing climate mitigation and adaptation in
less developed countries should be separated from market mechanisms and rather be based
on   mechanisms  of  aid  and  cooperation,  namely  by  foreign  debt  cancelation  and
technology transfer.20
These policies can and should be implemented in a general policy framework that
respects value pluralism and acknowledges conflicts between incommensurable values,
which is not compatible with market-based policies that take the minimization of a narrow
definition of costs as the overriding societal goal to which all others must pay tribute. The
justification  for  these  policies  rests  on  a  false  ends-means  dichotomy, which  must  be
rejected in favour of policy-making that continuously adjusts means to ends and ends to
means. Similarly, the false distinction distinction between “command and control” policies
and  “free  markets”  should  be  questioned,  considering  that  creating  a  market  through
government  regulation  is  no  less  of  an  intervention  in  existing  markets  than  direct
regulation is. New markets in renewable energy credits or energy efficiency credits, as
well  as  new markets  in  environmental  services,  such  as  biodiversity  offsets  or  water
quality allowances, have to be created and tightly regulated by governments, in order to
reduce the opportunities for fraud, manipulation and corruption that they create, as well as
the  ones  that  already  existed  in  previous  regulatory  schemes.  The  experience  with
emissions trading is enough to show how, far from being a simple and efficient alternative
to regulation, these markets are complex and can generate significant social costs.
In short, emissions trading fails to be a satisfactory alternative when dealing with
pollution, particularly in the case of carbon emissions. Dropping the existing emissions
trading schemes would not lead to inaction but rather open the way for better alternatives.
Considering the urgency of climate change and the high cost of carbon trading's “cost-
efficiency”, the never-ending effort to fix a broken system is no longer an option. We can
do better by re-centring environmental policy on the same social values that emissions
20 Some of these policies have been proposed by civil  society organizations that  are critical  of  carbon
trading (Clifton 2010; Coelho 2012; Reyes 2014).
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trading  sidelines,  which  precludes  applying  “cap  and  trade”  or  offsetting  schemes  to
environmental  policy  that  create  new  financial  markets  and  allow  polluters  to  evade
regulations.  
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